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Science Advice in the Public Interest
The Council of Canadian Academies (the Council) is an independent, 
not-for-profit organization that supports independent, science-based, 
authoritative expert assessments to inform public policy development in 
Canada. Led by a 12-member Board of Governors and advised by a 16-member 
Scientific Advisory Committee, the Council’s work encompasses a broad 
definition of science, incorporating the natural, social, and health sciences as 
well as engineering and the humanities. Council assessments are conducted 
by independent, multidisciplinary panels of experts from across Canada and 
abroad. Assessments strive to identify emerging issues, gaps in knowledge, 
Canadian strengths, and international trends and practices. Upon completion, 
assessments provide government decision-makers, researchers, and stakeholders 
with high-quality information required to develop informed and innovative 
public policy. 
All Council assessments undergo a formal report review and are published and 
made available to the public free of charge in English and French. Assessments 
can be referred to the Council by foundations, non-governmental organizations, 
the private sector, or any level of government. 
The Council is also supported by its three founding Member Academies: 
The Royal Society of Canada (RSC) is the senior national body of distinguished 
Canadian scholars, artists, and scientists. The primary objective of the RSC is 
to promote learning and research in the arts and sciences. The RSC consists 
of nearly 2,000 Fellows — men and women who are selected by their peers 
for outstanding contributions to the natural and social sciences, the arts, and 
the humanities. The RSC exists to recognize academic excellence, to advise 
governments and organizations, and to promote Canadian culture.
The Canadian Academy of Engineering (CAE) is the national institution 
through which Canada’s most distinguished and experienced engineers provide 
strategic advice on matters of critical importance to Canada. The Academy 
is an independent, self-governing, and non-profit organization established 
in 1987. Fellows are nominated and elected by their peers in recognition of 
their distinguished achievements and career-long service to the engineering 
profession. Fellows of the Academy, who number approximately 600, are 
committed to ensuring that Canada’s engineering expertise is applied to the 
benefit of all Canadians.
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The Canadian Academy of Health Sciences (CAHS) recognizes individuals of 
great achievement in the academic health sciences in Canada. Founded in 2004, 
CAHS has approximately 400 Fellows and appoints new Fellows on an annual 
basis. The organization is managed by a voluntary Board of Directors and a 
Board Executive. The main function of CAHS is to provide timely, informed, 
and unbiased assessments of urgent issues affecting the health of Canadians. The 
Academy also monitors global health-related events to enhance Canada’s state 
of readiness for the future, and provides a Canadian voice for health sciences 
internationally. CAHS provides a collective, authoritative, multidisciplinary 
voice on behalf of the health sciences community.
www.scienceadvice.ca 
@scienceadvice
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Message from the Chair
The objectives of improving the health and well-being of Canadians and of the 
health system both require ongoing research and innovation. One of the major 
requirements for addressing these challenges is the availability of high-quality 
data, including data on individuals and their encounters with service providers 
in the health system as well as social data on factors that affect health outcomes. 
At the same time, individuals have a right to privacy; there is a clear obligation 
that personal health-related data are kept confidential. Striking an appropriate 
balance between these two imperatives is of fundamental importance. It is also 
of great concern to numerous organizations and individuals in every jurisdiction 
in the world, perhaps none more than those who have a responsibility to act 
as custodians of the data involved.
Ideally, the organizations and individuals who contribute to this collective 
effort, whether within a single province or territory or at the national level 
in a federated jurisdiction like Canada, would constitute a coherent and 
smoothly operating system with well-defined governance principles and efficient 
operating procedures that, among other things, would support timely access 
to health and social data for research and system innovation. This tends not to 
be the case in Canada. Indeed, those who need access to data must navigate a 
“complex environment of heterogeneous entities,” often including numerous 
data custodians, privacy offices, and research ethics boards, whose collective 
governance and operational practices fall short of constituting a well-defined 
and coherent system.
To address the challenge of providing timely access to health and social data 
within this context, the Expert Panel was asked, among other things, to identify 
where the provision of such access could be seen as constituting a “best practice.” 
One particularly noteworthy finding of this report is that many of the “best 
practice entities” identified here were themselves created as a result of a 
review of the collective behaviour of the complex environment existing in 
their particular jurisdiction. In other words, the undertaking of a review by a 
provincial, territorial, or federal jurisdiction of how well its complex environment 
addresses collective governance responsibilities itself constitutes a best practice.
viii Accessing Health and Health-Related Data in Canada
On behalf of the Panel I would like to thank those who met with us early in 
the process to help us tackle our charge. I would also like to acknowledge the 
significant contribution of Council staff to the Panel’s work, which would have 
been impossible without their professionalism, patience, and insight into how 
we might best make a contribution. Finally, I would like to personally thank 
the Panel members for their dedication and hard work. I cannot imagine any 
group of individuals better positioned to help the cause of providing timely 
access to data for health research and system innovation in Canada. Their 
report deserves careful consideration.
Andrew K. Bjerring,  
Chair, Expert Panel on Timely Access to Health and Social Data for Health 
Research and Health System Innovation 
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Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION
Canadians care deeply about health care — for themselves, their families, 
and their communities. Ensuring that the health-care system can deliver the 
best possible care depends fundamentally on research into system innovation 
and health and social well-being. This research depends on the availability of 
high-quality data. 
The volume and variety of data relevant to such research have increased 
exponentially in recent years. Each patient interaction with a physician, a 
pharmacist, a laboratory technician, or hospital staff generates data. Social 
and environmental data are highly relevant to health research because they 
are vital for providing a complete picture about factors that affect the lives 
and health of Canadians. The research community, including health system 
innovators in hospital and government offices as well as academic researchers 
and clinicians, views these data as a critical resource. It recognizes the enormous 
potential of using health and health-related data in privacy-sensitive ways to 
reveal factors that can affect health and well-being, and discover interventions 
that can improve health outcomes. 
Despite these benefits, working with the data on which the research is based 
can be challenging. Some challenges are technical, such as the use of different 
standards in different jurisdictions to record important data. Others are 
related to privacy concerns: access to health data for research carries the risk 
that personal data could be released, whether inadvertently or intentionally. 
The greatest challenges, which are indeed barriers to beneficial research, are 
institutional. These include the application of differing, and in some instances 
overly cautious, interpretations of privacy legislation, and complex and lengthy 
approval processes that impede researchers’ access to data. 
The primary, overarching challenge in Canada, as in other jurisdictions, is 
to meet two fundamental goals at the same time: to enable access to health 
and health-related data for research that is in the public interest, on the 
one hand, and to respect Canadians’ privacy and maintain confidentiality 
of their information when it is used for research, on the other. Innovative 
organizations and less formal collaborative undertakings are finding ways to 
meet these goals. They are instituting governance models and practices that 
further scientifically sound, ethically robust research and respect privacy, while 
using technology in innovative ways to provide data access in a timely and 
confidentiality-preserving manner. 
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Charge to the Panel
In 2013, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR; the Sponsor) 
asked the Council of Canadian Academies (the Council) to respond to the 
following charge:
What is the current state of knowledge surrounding timely access to health and social 
data for health research and health system innovation in Canada?
The charge also included five sub-questions:
• What is known about how to address technological and methodological 
challenges (such as variable data quality and comparability) associated with 
linkage of health and social data from various sources and across jurisdictions?
• What is known about the benefits, risks and barriers to timely access to health 
and social data for health research and health system innovation in Canada?
• What are the ethical, legal, and social implications of timely access to such data?
• What are best practices for improving access to such data for researchers while 
ensuring appropriate privacy safeguards and also taking full advantage of 
the digital data revolution?
• What are best practices in Canada and internationally for governance 
frameworks that facilitate access to such data and maintain public trust in 
the research enterprise?
To address these questions, the Council formed the Expert Panel on the Timely 
Access to Health and Social Data for Health Research and Health System 
Innovation (the Panel), which comprised 14 Canadian and international 
experts from the health-care sector, academia, and industry. Panel members 
had experience as data custodians, researchers, managers of health research 
organizations, or in legal aspects of health research.
At the outset of the assessment, the Sponsor gave further direction on interpreting 
and refining the charge. First, the Sponsor defined timely access as access granted 
within four months of submitting a data request to an organization responsible 
for providing the data. Second, the assessment should concern only public 
interest research (i.e., research conducted by public bodies and/or supported by 
public funds). Thus, health and health-related data used by private, commercial 
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companies were excluded. Third, the assessment should identify best practices 
in Canada and other countries for timely access to data that can be linked and 
integrated for research purposes, rather than exploring barriers to accessing 
data in general. Finally, the Panel’s work should encompass all types of health 
data related to publicly funded research, ranging from administrative health 
data to genomic data. The Panel understood the inclusion of social data as 
data on non-medical determinants of health such as health behaviours, living 
and working conditions, personal resources, and environmental factors, and 
hence uses the term health-related data. 
Methodology for Identifying Best Practices
The identification of best practices was the first issue addressed because of 
broad implications for the Panel’s overall approach. The Panel looked for 
organizations, institutions, programs, or other entities that had been especially 
successful in meeting the twin goals of enabling timely access and protecting 
privacy. It selected six entities, three from Canada and three from other 
jurisdictions with similar legal and social systems: 
• Manitoba Centre for Health Policy (MCHP) 
• Ontario – Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES)
• Ontario – Better Outcomes Registry and Network (BORN)
• Wales Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank (SAIL)
• Data Linkage Western Australia (Data Linkage WA)
• Farr Institute @ Scotland1 
These “best practice entities” are mandated, in some cases under legislation, to 
receive data from encounters in the health-care system and to provide access 
for public interest research. They all succeed in providing access within a four-
month timeframe and share four common principles:
• Enabling appropriate use of data to enhance public well-being;
• Managing risk by identifying the range of risks involved in providing data 
access and minimizing those risks where possible, while acknowledging that 
risks cannot be entirely eliminated;
• Respecting privacy to reassure citizens that risks to their core personal 
interests are kept to an absolute minimum; and
• Maintaining public trust by providing evidence of trustworthiness, including 
using data appropriately and demonstrating the social value of the 
resulting research.
1 The Farr Institute @ Scotland builds on the success of the Scottish Informatics Programme 
(SHIP), which ran from 2009 to 2013.
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The practices highlighted by the Panel reflect both a literature review as well 
as the practices of the six entities. The Panel found many examples of good 
practice, including approaches for dealing with legal and ethical considerations. 
These are highlighted in Finding 4 below. However, in accordance with the 
charge, the Panel only identified best practice related to governance that could 
be put in place to enable access to health data. Best practices for governance 
are discussed in Finding 5. Good practice and best practice are defined in the 
glossary that accompanies the full report.
The Panel also examined many other organizations that provide access to 
health and health-related data, or that play a special role in analyzing such 
data, including, among others, Statistics Canada, Statistics Netherlands, the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health, Population Data BC, the Canadian Network for 
Observational Drug Effect Studies (CNODES), and the Canadian Institute for 
Health Information (CIHI). Many insights can be drawn from these innovative 
organizations about striking an appropriate balance between respecting privacy 
and providing timely access to data.
In addition to identifying best practice organizations, the Panel reviewed 
evidence on how other organizations in Canada and around the world enable 
access to health and health-related data for research. It drew from published 
literature, conference proceedings, and online reports, including a key OECD 
report (Strengthening Health Information Infrastructure for Health Care Quality 
Governance) that summarizes the use of health data in a range of countries.
KEY FINDINGS
The Panel’s findings fall into five categories that roughly correspond to the 
five sub-questions of the charge: technological and methodological challenges, 
benefits, risks, legal and ethical considerations, and governance.
Overall, the Panel found data-intensive research has both clear benefits and 
risks. Striking the right balance can be achieved through good governance that 
demonstrates respect for legal and ethical considerations, and for the people 
whose data are being used. 
1.  Technological and Methodological Challenges of Access to Health Data
For effective research with health and health-related data, disparate sources 
of data must be brought together. Providing these data in an “analysis-ready” 
format, thereby allowing statistical relationships or patterns to be derived, 
is a central methodological challenge.
xviiExecutive Summary
The full potential of Canada’s health and health-related data can only be 
realized if the data are made ready for analysis. However, much of the data with 
the greatest potential for research are collected for other purposes, such as 
administration of health care services. To be used for research, these data need 
to be transformed into specific forms and formats — predominantly statistical 
ones. As electronic health records (EHRs) become increasingly prevalent, it 
will be more efficient to anticipate and design into these data the capacity to 
support secondary use rather than to retrofit after computer systems for EHR 
recording have already been designed. 
EHRs and health-care encounter data inherently involve many disparate 
sources of data, from hospitalizations to lab tests. Thus, for research as well as 
effective patient care, it is necessary to bring different data sets together. The 
key difference is that for patient care, the focus is on a single patient, while 
for research, the focus is on large samples of individuals, where any given 
individual’s identity is irrelevant. As a result, research-oriented data sets may 
be from the same province/territory, multiple provinces and territories, or 
multiple countries. 
To be compared or combined and used meaningfully in statistical analysis, data 
elements must be harmonized. The best approach for harmonization involves 
the development of standard terminologies, questionnaires, measurements, 
and protocols (i.e., prospective harmonization). But this approach may be too 
challenging, time-consuming, or labour-intensive; or an underlying consensus 
on how to define or measure a given variable may be absent. In these situations, 
retrospective harmonization can be attempted. Tools are available to help determine 
whether similar inferences can be drawn from variables across different studies.
Data linkage allows different types of information for one individual to be 
brought together. It can be challenging if (i) unique identifiers are not available 
for all individuals in a data set, or (ii) data have been strongly de-identified.2 
To overcome the first challenge, probabilistic methods can be used to link 
records. The simplest solution to the second challenge is to link the data prior 
to de-identification, if possible. Databases do not always need to be linked 
permanently. The link can be destroyed after the research is completed, and/
or kept completely separate by implementing the separation principle.
2 De-identification is the act of minimally perturbing individual-level data to decrease 
the probability of discovering an individual’s identity. It involves masking direct identifiers 
(e.g., name, phone number, address) as well as transforming indirect identifiers that could be 
used alone or in combination to re-identify an individual (e.g., birth dates, geographic details, 
dates of key events).
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Pooling of similar data from several populations is often used to increase the 
sample size for a study. Bona fide pooled data analysis involves physical transfer 
of individual-level data to a central server, where the data are then analyzed 
as they would be if they were from the same study (with statistical adjustments 
if needed). In many important cases in Canada, restrictive interpretations of 
privacy and other laws have hindered pooling of individual-level data from 
different provinces. Therefore, approaches that avoid the need to pool individual-
level data have been developed. One of these approaches (used by CNODES) 
involves statistical analyses of harmonized, individual-level data at each study 
site, followed by pooling of the (non-confidential) summary statistics to obtain 
an overall result. Another, provided by DataShield, uses sophisticated iterative 
techniques to mimic a pooled analysis of data from individual participants, 
when, in reality, the data always remain with their original data custodian.
2. Benefits of Access to Health Data
Timely access to health and health-related data enables significant high-quality 
research, which identifies risk factors for various health and social outcomes, 
and determines health interventions with the most beneficial effects. The 
knowledge gained from this research is fundamental for improving health 
generally, and maintaining high quality health care. Recent Canadian studies 
with significant clinical or public health implications have demonstrated the 
benefits of research using health and health-related data. For example, analysis 
of data from the Canadian Community Health surveys by researchers at ICES and 
Public Health Ontario led to the development of a Life Expectancy Calculator 
that helps Ontarians understand the effect of certain behaviours on their life 
expectancy. Researchers at MCHP used record linkage to show that low socio-
economic status affects educational achievement much more than previously 
thought. CNODES analysis of hospital data from across Canada showed that 
seniors over age 65 were five times more likely than the rest of the population 
to be hospitalized for adverse drug reactions due to specific risk factors such 
as drug interactions.
Evidence shows that timely access to data enables significant high-quality 
research that can have far-reaching effects for health care and the overall 
health of Canadians.
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3. Risks of Access to Health Data
While there are clear benefits of research using individual Canadians’ personal 
health and health-related data, there are also risks. These can include accidental 
release of identifiable data, to the public or unauthorized researchers, when 
proper security and privacy protocols are not followed (e.g., through loss 
of computer equipment); illicit access to identifiable data (e.g., through 
hacking); and inadvertent access to identifiable data by those working inside 
data organizations. 
While these types of breaches have occurred during research projects, breaches 
rarely happen at institutions with databases set up specifically for maintaining 
large volumes of health and health-related data for research and administrative 
purposes. They are much more likely to occur when researchers or employees 
are accessing data directly from health-care centres. Importantly, there are no 
examples of breaches at the six best practice entities identified by the Panel. 
In many cases, the data that researchers access from secure facilities are 
de-identified. However, re-identification remains a concern. The Panel found 
that best practices in de-identification can lower the risk of re-identification to 
acceptable levels. Although health data breaches can cause serious harm, the 
risk of a breach actually occurring in the context of research is low, particularly 
if effective governance mechanisms and protocols are in place and respected 
by care providers, researchers, and data custodians.
4. Legal and Ethical Considerations of Access to Data
The risk of potential harm resulting from access to data is tangible but 
low. The level of risk can be further lowered through effective governance 
mechanisms. 
Timely access to data is hindered by variable legal structures and differing 
interpretations of the terms identifiable and de-identified across jurisdictions. 
Instead of rigidly classifying data as either identifiable or non-identifiable, 
it is useful to view de-identification as a continuum and to adjust access 
controls accordingly.
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In enabling access to data for research, the benefits of research, as well as the 
range of risks, need to be weighed. Canadian research projects demonstrate 
that beneficial research can be advanced while maintaining confidentiality of 
sensitive personal information. Yet, access to data and successful data-based 
research is not uniform across Canada because of (i) the lack of consistency and 
clarity in Canada’s ethical and legal framework, and (ii) differing interpretations 
of key terms and issues across the country. 
While federal and provincial/territorial laws generally allow researchers to 
access data that do not include “identifiable information,” this term is not always 
defined precisely. This makes it confusing to base data sharing guidelines on the 
notion that “non-identifiable data” can be used freely. As well, data custodians 
may interpret their legal duty to protect privacy as precluding access. Laws on 
sharing data across provinces/territories and countries differ or are lacking, 
which can also make researchers and research ethics boards (REBs) uncertain 
as to whether data can be shared. 
This lack of legal clarity has contributed to cautious and conservative 
interpretations of allowable access in many Canadian organizations. While 
the law provides specific limits for data custodians, it is less specific in other 
areas. And although provincial and federal laws lay out broad rules about when 
and how data can be used or shared, often they are silent on specific questions 
about whether data should be so used in specific settings. This means that data 
custodians often face an asymmetry — there are clear sanctions if there is a 
data breach when they are in charge, but no benefit to them if their release of 
data for bona fide research generates important public benefits. This asymmetry 
supports a tendency to not grant access, even if access would be acceptable 
within their legal frameworks. 
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A number of good practices for addressing legal and ethical issues are 
summarized below. 
Good Practices – Legal and Ethical Considerations
Appropriate access controls for differing levels of de-identification: Because 
data may be fully identifiable (i.e., no identifiers removed), mildly de-identified, or 
strongly de-identified, the Panel did not single out one specific process for dealing 
with de-identified data. Rather, a good practice is to use the degree of de-identification 
to determine the circumstances under which the data may be made accessible for 
research purposes (i.e., increase access control as identifiability increases).
Rules governing sharing of identifiable data for research purposes: Maintaining a 
set of rules that govern the sharing and use of fully identifiable or partially de-identified 
data for research purposes is a good practice. Examples of such rules are as follows:
• Data are held at designated research entities: In some provinces, the legislation 
designates specific entities that may receive health and health-related data without 
consent for research purposes, acknowledging that establishing such centres is 
in the public interest.
• Research meets approval criteria: To ensure privacy is respected, and to clearly 
delineate the requirements for access to identifiable data without consent, good 
practice suggests showing that the research serves the public interest; obtaining 
consent is impracticable; identifiable data are necessary to the research project; 
and physical, electronic, software, and all other security measures are appropriately 
calibrated to protect the data and to sanction any misuses. 
• Researchers sign researcher-custodian agreements: To ensure that researchers 
are accountable for protecting data confidentiality, good practice suggests that 
full and explicit data transfer agreements between researchers and custodians are 
needed for each research project.
Risk management strategies: The Tri-Council Policy Statement, which governs 
ethical research in Canada, recognizes that risk cannot be eliminated but should be 
considered proportionately. Good practice suggests incorporating risk management 
in all aspects of governance, including ethical governance.
Establishment of dedicated governance: Whatever the applicable law in 
a given jurisdiction, it may be open to a considerable range of interpretation. 
A dedicated governing body is a good practice that could, for example, establish 
reasonable processes to de-identify data, as well as ensure respect for overall legal 
and ethical principles.
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5. Governance 
The Panel found a marked shift among the six best practice entities from a “data 
custodianship” model, in which holding and securing data are emphasized to 
the exclusion of other considerations, to a “data stewardship” model, in which 
enabling access is a core institutional objective proportionately balanced with 
protecting privacy. The balance is achieved through good governance, which 
encompasses the definition of an entity’s purpose, objectives, values, and policies.
Addressing the question of providing timely access to health data for research 
is particularly challenging in Canada as the many institutions, organizations, 
programs, and activities that deal with health and health-related data are only 
loosely coordinated. They are best thought of as a “complex environment of 
heterogeneous entities,” the parts of which were not designed to work in concert 
with one another as a system with a common overall purpose. 
Over time, coordination, consistency, and overall effectiveness of the “complex 
environment” could be achieved through the adaptation of the pre-existing 
entities. Alternatively, the responsible governments could carry out a broad 
review and subsequent redesign of their system, comparable to that undertaken 
in Wales or Scotland. 
Along with the other organizations in each of their jurisdictions, the six best 
practice entities share a collective responsibility for addressing several cross-
cutting aspects of governance. The Panel found four particularly relevant 
aspects of governance: privacy governance, information governance, research 
governance, and network governance. When considered together, these 
four aspects provide a reasonable framework for examining how the complex 
environment as a whole governs access to health and health-related data for research. 
Privacy Governance
Privacy governance involves monitoring the specific risk to privacy posed by 
data access by researchers and protecting data confidentiality. Such governance 
may involve specialized knowledge of technology, privacy law, ethics, and 
statistical methods.
Evidence demonstrates that a shift is occurring among leading entities from 
a “data custodianship” model to a “data stewardship” model. Central to the 
success of this shift is the adoption of good governance practices, specifically 
in privacy governance, research governance, information governance, and 
network governance.
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This aspect of governance ensures appropriate use of confidential data in 
carefully defined circumstances and under specific conditions. Principles may 
be put in place to guide access to and protection of personal confidential data.
The six best practice entities have dedicated processes to evaluate privacy 
concerns when enabling data access. For example, MCHP operates within the 
context of Manitoba legislation where the Health Information Privacy Committee 
is responsible for approving health research projects that use personal health 
information held by a government department or agency. In Wales, SAIL’s 
Information Governance Review Panel (IGRP) is dedicated to privacy review, 
which ensures appropriate de-identification of data and addresses research 
ethics concerns. In Ontario, data from the BORN database are certified to 
indicate that they are de-identified in an approved way, and data from ICES 
are governed by internal procedures set in consultation with the Information 
and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.
Research Governance
The processes and entities that govern the research enterprise in Canada face 
special challenges in connection with research using health and health-related 
data. While research governance entails many aspects, the panel chose to 
focus on the REB process. Of particular importance are the requirements for 
research projects to be approved in advance by an REB, and for data access 
requests to be approved, often through a separate process. Timeframes for 
these approvals vary widely across organizations and jurisdictions in Canada, 
ranging from months to years. Ethics approval for research projects that involve 
more than one centre or more than one province/territory, in particular, can 
involve time-consuming (and duplicative) approval processes. 
This issue has been addressed in New Zealand and Wales, as well as in two 
Canadian provinces, through a reduced number of REBs. Alberta decreased 
its REBs from six to three. Newfoundland and Labrador has created a central 
research ethics authority that oversees ethics review but can also approve 
reviews from other boards within and outside the province, thereby avoiding 
duplicate reviews. 
Best Practices – Privacy Governance
Dedicated Privacy Evaluation: The best practice entities have developed dedicated 
processes (parallel to REBs) that specifically evaluate privacy concerns when enabling 
data access.
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Another challenge arises when REBs and other boards are inconsistent in 
interpreting ethical and legal guidelines, for example, regarding what constitutes 
identifiable information. To overcome this potential problem, many countries 
and Canadian provinces have established a separate review process for data 
access requests (e.g., HIPC in Manitoba).
Information Governance
Information governance addresses how information is handled within an 
organization or among organizations. It covers data organizations and their 
employees, researchers accessing data, and public input. This aspect of 
governance is concerned with enabling access to data, and doing so within a 
reasonable timeframe. The best practice entities have made enabling access 
one of their central purposes, and, as a result, are moving towards a culture 
of data stewardship. 
Physical and technical measures are also required to enable access to data. 
However, approaches to data access are on a spectrum, with progressively 
greater security and precautions as data are less aggressively de-identified. 
Some organizations allow researchers to access data sets containing 
identifiable information only at secure locations, often called “safe havens” 
(e.g., MCHP, ICES, Statistics Canada), or through secure internet connections 
(e.g., Statistics Netherlands, Population Health Research Network in Australia). 
For both identifiable and de-identified data, however, the researcher is typically 
bound by confidentiality agreements and/or the research is subject to pre-
approval. Data that are very strongly de-identified may be made publically 
available by large entities. For example, Statistics Canada provides public-use 
files for data that are rendered non-identifiable within the meaning of the 
Statistics Act. In some cases, however, these highly de-identified data are much 
less valuable for research.
Best Practices – Research Governance
Harmonized REB process: To minimize the number of approvals when 
performing cross-subject or cross-jurisdictional research — and therefore to improve 
timeliness — certain jurisdictions such as Alberta, New Zealand, and Wales have 
harmonized the REB process.
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Linking data sets across organizations could raise the possibility that many 
employees can access large amounts of identifiable data. To address this, 
institutional structures can be established to minimize the risks. One way to 
manage employee access, referred to as the separation principle, is to separate 
data into a demographic component (with identifying information such as 
name, address, etc.) and a content component (with information such as 
medicines prescribed, test results, etc.). This prevents any given individual from 
seeing both components. The separation principle can be observed by using 
an external organization to deal with identifying information or by managing 
all data internally but ensuring that identifying data and content data are 
administratively — and sometimes physically — separated.
A critical element of any information governance model is the determination 
of an “acceptable” level of risk, which relies on the development of a method 
to characterize risk. To address this need in the context of product safety, 
the European Commission has developed a risk assessment matrix. The 
Farr Institute @ Scotland has adopted a “proportionate governance” approach 
in which the level of scrutiny for a data linkage request depends on the level 
of risk that it entails.
To analyze data across provincial or national boundaries, innovative methods 
are being undertaken. Through CNODES, data on drug effects are analyzed in 
each province using standardized methods, and a meta-analysis is conducted on 
a national level to determine the scale of effects for Canada. Other suggestions 
include encryption of raw data, and security of core identifiable data with release 
of summary statistics for analysis via the internet. Various techniques are used 
to ensure that the system works effectively and efficiently. Common features 
include (i) adoption of privacy management programs, (ii) adoption of an 
effective risk management framework, and (iii) adoption and documentation 
of a “reasonable” process of de-identification. 
In summary, application of information governance practices can effectively 
deal with the public concern of risks such as inadvertent access to data and 
accidental release of data through loss or theft. 
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Best Practices – Information Governance
Data access: Certain entities successfully maintain data confidentiality through 
safe havens and/or encrypted access. Key features of a well-functioning safe haven 
include mechanisms to approve researchers, robust internal and external monitoring 
and oversight, and ongoing review of governance arrangements over time.
Enabling data use: Appropriate provision of data to researchers is central to the 
best practice entities. For example, the mission statements of the Farr Institute @ 
Scotland, SAIL, Data Linkage WA, ICES, and MCHP clearly lay out that enabling 
appropriate use of data is a core purpose of their organization.
Privacy management: Entities have developed comprehensive researcher-custodian 
agreements to ensure that researchers maintain the confidentiality of the information 
that they receive.
Appropriate institutional structure, respecting separation principle: Entities that 
use the separation principle have minimized the risk of inadvertent and inappropriate 
access to data by staff.
De-identification of data: Robust de-identification techniques that have met legal 
standards (i.e., de-identification is “reasonable”) have made it possible to reduce 
the risk of re-identification to a level that is appropriate for a given access mode 
(and its accompanying security controls). These include practices to ensure that 
de-identification is documented, transparent, and meets statistical thresholds for 
re-identification risk while maintaining data utility.
Technology’s role in enabling access to and safeguarding data: New technologies 
can be adopted and developed to improve the safeguards on confidentiality. Given 
the central importance of technology, it is critical to have individuals with knowledge 
of its importance involved in governance. 
Acceptable level of risk: The European Commission has developed a systematic 
method for characterizing risk. Scotland has integrated a proportionate approach 
to risk in its governance system.
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Network Governance
The creation of collaborative research networks, potentially involving not just 
a circle of researchers but also other stakeholders such as data custodians and 
funding agencies, has the potential to maximize social benefits flowing from 
data-oriented research. Given Canada’s complex and heterogeneous set of 
actors and stakeholders, governance to create and maintain these networks 
is vital for standardizing data collection and developing policies for national 
and international data sharing. 
Among the benefits of building a research network is that it may be the only 
way to amass enough data to conduct a study. A by-product of network-driven 
collaborations is that definitions and standards must be defined in advance to 
make the data involved comparable. Thus, networks are a central contributor to 
standardization and harmonization. Standardization has been a core function 
of CIHI and the WHO, whose boards and committees represent another type 
of network, composed of individuals who may have different research interests 
and diverse professional backgrounds but who share the common goal of 
developing national or international standards. Standardization is also a main 
objective of Statistics Canada.
It is also important that networks develop standardized data security protocols. 
Genetics initiatives such as the International Cancer Genome Consortium 
(ICGC) are among the most advanced in their successful development of 
policies for international sharing of individual-level data. 
Networks may play a role in mitigating inaccuracy of research results. Analysis 
of large data sets involves complex statistics, and results can be erroneous if 
there is a lack of expertise in this area. Networks can put in place standards 
for statistical analysis and share information about issues in statistical methods. 
If incorrect research conclusions are publicly released, networks can act to 
address these both within the scientific community and vis-à-vis the public. 
xxviii Accessing Health and Health-Related Data in Canada
A “Best Practice” Governance Model
The jurisdictions involving some of the best practice entities chosen by the Panel, 
in particular Wales and Scotland, consciously decided to redesign their entire 
complex environment of entities involved in health and health-related data for 
research. Their aim was to prevent overlap, duplication, and confusion, and 
more effectively address the challenges of privacy, information, research, and 
network governance. For example, one element of Scotland’s good governance 
framework is a mechanism based on proportionate governance to ensure that 
data access requests with lower risks receive lighter touch governance. Another 
element is an “account of responsibilities” of key actors and decision-makers. 
In contrast, the new system in Wales incorporates all governance into a single 
governance review panel. Clarifying the responsibilities of key entities in 
Canada’s complex environment could be a positive step in enabling timely 
access to health and health-related data for research. Chapter 5 of the report 
summarizes the roles of different groups (e.g., researchers, data custodians, 
policy makers) and governing bodies (e.g., REBs, privacy monitoring boards) 
in overseeing various aspects of governance and provides examples of entities 
that are following best practice by successfully performing these roles.
Best Practices – Network Governance
Data harmonization: To enable prospective data harmonization, entities such as 
the WHO and CIHI have put standards in place prior to data collection.
Distributed analysis: When it is not possible to pool individual-level data, other 
models, such as CNODES in Canada and DataShield in Europe, have been successful 
in enabling statistical analysis across jurisdictions.
Multinational sharing: When legal systems differ, methods have been developed 
to further research by multinational consortia such as the International Cancer 
Genome Consortium.
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CONCLUSION
To ensure that Canadians continue to have access to high-quality health care, 
and benefit from effective health policies, the country’s health researchers 
and system innovators need to make effective use of health and health-related 
data, including administrative health and social data. This need will increase 
in the future as technology continues to develop and digitized data such as 
EHRs become ever more abundant. 
However, timely access to health and health-related data for research varies 
across Canada. While some jurisdictions have developed processes that provide 
access to data within four months, the target provided to the Panel, others can 
take a year or longer. The reasons for delays are multifold, such as concerns 
over data quality, lack of a roadmap on how to access data, limited budgets 
for supporting research, fear of potential legal liabilities in the case of data 
breaches, or broader fears that the research may generate embarrassing results 
(e.g., evidence of poor performance).
The Panel found that legal definitions and interpretations differ across provinces/
territories and countries, which can lead to confusion or overly cautious 
interpretations of whether data can be accessed or shared. As a result, careful 
ethical judgments must be taken sometimes in the absence of specific laws. 
However, good governance ensures that data can be accessed while respecting 
ethical principles and the law. In searching for models of good governance, 
the Panel found that successful entities in Canada and abroad have developed 
systems of governance incorporating four cross-cutting aspects — namely 
privacy, information, research, and network governance — that achieve this 
goal. The Panel has identified specific “best practices” within these aspects of 
governance that can provide the necessary guidance to help transform what 
is known as a culture of caution to a culture of trust.
The Panel concluded that, although access to health and health-related data 
vary across Canada, the exemplary practices identified in this report clearly 
indicate the feasibility of an elevated standard of appropriate data access for 
bona fide public interest research.
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1 Introduction
Canadians care deeply about their country’s health-care sector, and look to 
their governments and health-care providers to ensure that it remains healthy 
and vibrant. For this to be achievable, however, those who are charged with 
stewardship of this sector must continuously search for ways to improve it and 
the health outcomes it generates, including more effective interventions and 
other ways to improve patient care, better ways to address population health, 
more efficient models for health-care delivery, and innovative approaches 
to overall system design. All of these potential areas of improvements are 
fundamentally dependent on research, and that research is fundamentally 
dependent on data.3 
Much of the data relevant to health research arise simply from the myriad of 
interactions between individuals and the various parts of the health system. Every 
encounter with a physician, a pharmacist, a laboratory technician, or hospital 
staff generates data, and much health research relies on gaining access to the 
records of such encounters. Increasingly, other forms of data are also being 
generated within the health-care sector, for example by imaging technologies 
and genetic testing, and research can increasingly take advantage of those 
new forms of data. Finally, there is a long-standing appreciation that health 
research needs to include other kinds of data in addition to those from health-
care encounters, ranging from risk factors like obesity and physical activity to 
social and economic backgrounds, which in turn require access to social data 
from census results, survey data, and administrative data collected by others. 
The current state of affairs in health research and its dependency on data 
can be summed up as follows. First, there has been an explosion in the sheer 
volume and variety of data generated by and available to the health-care sector 
and those responsible for Canadians’ health. Second, advances in information 
technology (e.g., lower costs of data storage) are helpful; however, to leverage 
these data for research and innovation, significant investment in data integration, 
data linkage, and data analysis is essential. Finally, such data constitute an 
extremely valuable resource in meeting the challenges of improving health 
outcomes, managing costs, and accelerating health-care sector innovation. 
3 The Panel uses “research” and “researchers” in this report as generic terms to describe analysis 
of data and those analyzing data, regardless of whether they are in academia or government.
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As the following quotation from Neelie Kroes, former Vice-President of the 
European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda, indicates, there are still 
important challenges in gaining access to and using the health and health-related 
data that are becoming so critical to research and health system innovation:
Because research in genomics, pharmacology or the fight against cancer 
increasingly depends on the availability and sophisticated analysis of 
large datasets, sharing such data means researchers can collaborate, 
compare, and creatively explore whole new realms. We cannot afford 
for access to scientific knowledge to become a luxury, and the results 
of publicly funded research in particular should be spread as widely 
as possible. 
(Kroes, 2011)
In short, data are only useful if they can be accessed and shared. Their value 
increases when they can be compared with or “linked to” other data collected 
elsewhere for other purposes. This presents two sorts of challenges.
First, if data have been recorded using different definitions and different 
methodologies, the process of integrating or comparing databases for joint 
analysis becomes more complex and may require new analytical tools.
Second, depending on the protocol being followed, connecting different 
databases (each containing data about an individual’s encounters with the 
health-care or social service system, or their response to a survey) may require 
that someone has access to information that could identify the individual involved. 
This creates potential risks to the confidentiality of the individual’s data, even if 
the person with access privileges has no interest in the identity of the individual.
Fortunately, access to health data does not occur in a vacuum, but rather within 
an extensive infrastructure of organizations, each with its own arrangements 
for the security of computers, networks, and physical records, and each with 
its own policies and guidelines on how and when access is to be provided. The 
key challenge then is to ensure that the overarching principles governing the 
policies and guidelines of these organizations accomplish both fundamental 
goals involved: enabling access to health and health-related data for sound and 
ethically robust research while protecting confidentiality of personal information. 
There are many success stories in Canada and in other countries where 
organizations have developed policies and practices allowing appropriate 
and timely access to health data while at the same time managing potential 
risks to confidentiality. This report attempts to capture the lessons that might 
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collectively be learned from these success stories. Of these, maintaining public 
trust in how data are accessed and used is critical. Fostering greater public 
understanding of the benefits of research, consulting patients on design and 
evaluation of health research, and communicating the steps taken to protect 
their data play a role in maintaining public trust. 
1.1 CHARGE TO THE PANEL
In 2013, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR; the Sponsor) 
asked the Council of Canadian Academies (the Council) to respond to the 
following charge: 
What is the current state of knowledge surrounding timely access to health and 
social data for health research and health system innovation in Canada?
The charge also included five sub-questions:
• What is known about how to address technological and methodological 
challenges (such as variable data quality and comparability) associated with 
linkage of health and social data from various sources and across jurisdictions?
• What is known about the benefits, risks and barriers to timely access to health 
and social data for health research and health system innovation in Canada?
• What are the ethical, legal, and social implications of timely access to such data?
• What are best practices for improving access to such data for researchers while 
ensuring appropriate privacy safeguards and also taking full advantage of 
the digital data revolution?
• What are best practices in Canada and internationally for governance 
frameworks that facilitate access to such data and maintain public trust in 
the research enterprise?
To address these questions, the Council formed the Expert Panel on Timely 
Access to Health and Social Data for Health Research and Health System 
Innovation (the Panel). The Panel was made up of 14 experts from the health-
care sector, academia, and industry. Panel members had experience as data 
custodians, researchers, managers of health research organizations, or in legal 
aspects of health research. The Panel met four times over the course of 2014 
to review evidence, deliberate, and formulate its findings. 
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At the outset, the Sponsor gave further direction on interpreting and refining 
the charge. First, the Sponsor defined timely access as access granted within four 
months of submitting a data request to an organization responsible for providing 
the data. Second, the assessment should concern only public interest research 
(i.e., research conducted by public bodies and/or supported by public funds). 
Thus, health and health-related data used by private, commercial companies 
were excluded. Third, the assessment should identify best practices in Canada 
and other countries for timely access to data that can be linked and integrated 
for research purposes, rather than explore barriers to accessing data in general. 
Finally, the Panel’s work should encompass all types of health data related 
to publicly funded research, ranging from administrative health data to 
genomic data. 
Within this context, the Panel chose to use the Health Indicator Framework 
developed by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) and 
Statistics Canada to define health data as data on health status of individuals 
(e.g., well-being, health conditions), health system performance (e.g., accessibility, 
effectiveness), and community and health system characteristics (e.g., resources) 
(CIHI, 2014h). The Panel understood the inclusion of social data as non-
health data that could influence health outcomes, and hence uses the term 
health-related data. This term encompasses non-medical determinants of health 
such as health behaviours, living and working conditions, personal resources, 
and environmental factors (CIHI, 2014h). Although many of the challenges 
and examples discussed throughout the report pertain to health data, the 
Panel acknowledges that access to social data may also be challenging, and 
that social data have proven critical for providing an overall picture of health 
(for an example, see Box 3.3). 
The Panel did not intend to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of the state of 
access to health data in Canada (for a report with this objective, see Meagher 
and McGrail (2013)); instead, it focused on solutions and good practices. The 
Panel found many examples of good practice, including approaches for dealing 
with legal and ethical considerations. These are highlighted in Chapter 4. 
However, in accordance with the charge, the Panel only identified best practice 4 
related to governance that could be put in place to enable access to health 
4 For the purposes of this report, best practice is defined as policies and practices currently in use 
by entities that collect, analyze, provide access to, and regulate laws surrounding access to, data, 
that — according to evidence identified by the Panel — are already helping to improve timely 
access while still protecting privacy. In contrast, good practice refers to policies and practices that 
— based on a combination of anecdotal evidence, literature review, and Panel analysis — have 
the potential to improve timely access while still protecting privacy.
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data. It took such governance to include policies and practices for both data 
custodians and researchers, among others. Best practices for governance are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
1.2 THE PANEL’S APPROACH
To address the charge, the Panel reviewed evidence on how institutions 
provide access to data as described in online descriptions and in journal 
articles. In particular, the Panel looked at institutions that it felt had enabled 
access particularly well, as well as some that had not. The Panel also drew on 
Strengthening Health Information Infrastructure for Health Care Quality Governance, 
an OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) report 
(OECD, 2013d). The Panel benefitted from presentations and discussions at the 
2nd International Health Data Linkage Conference held in Vancouver on 
April 28–30, 2014. 
As it examined institutional practices, the Panel noted those that were common 
to institutions that had enabled access to data and how they differed from 
practices used by institutions that had not. Enabling access to researchers 
outside the data-collecting organization was particularly important, as many 
countries have developed highly advanced systems of gathering health-related 
data for clinical care, but their method of enabling access for researchers is 
less advanced. 
The Panel developed a tri-level distinction useful for clarifying the different 
concepts, challenges, and governance aspects involved in timely access to data 
(Figure 1.1). This distinction is used throughout the report to highlight the 
issues and best practices that apply to each level of access.
The Panel also focused on jurisdictions with databases housed at different levels 
of governments or institutions (such as hospitals), particularly where there were 
variations in legal frameworks across those levels. Many organizations have 
developed advanced systems to share information within their organizations, 
but many of the fundamental challenges for researchers based in Canada are 
related to accessing and sharing information across organizations (Level 1) and 
jurisdictions (Levels 2 and 3). The Panel was especially interested in institutions 
operating in jurisdictions and countries with publicly funded health care that are 
not only facing, but have also overcome, challenges similar to those in Canada. 
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From this broad group of institutions and programs, the Panel selected six “best 
practice entities” (three from Canada and three from other countries) using 
the following criteria: if not Canadian, the organizations needed to be from 
jurisdictions with similar legal systems to Canada; they must have developed and 
implemented governance that has successfully enabled timely access to health 
and health-related data within a four-month timeframe; and they must have 
effectively linked databases across organizations within their legally-mandated 
jurisdiction, all the while affording an appropriate level of privacy protection. 
The six entities are:
• Farr Institute @ Scotland5 
• Wales Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank (SAIL)
• Data Linkage Western Australia (Data Linkage WA)
• Ontario – Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES)
• Ontario – Better Outcomes Registry and Network (BORN)
• Manitoba Centre for Health Policy (MCHP)
5 The Farr Institute @ Scotland builds on the success of the Scottish Informatics Programme 
(SHIP), which ran from 2009 to 2013 (SHIP, n.d.-a).
A B
LEVEL 1
Access within a 
province or 
territory
LEVEL 2
Access within Canada 
when data need to 
cross provincial or 
territorial boundaries
LEVEL 3
Access when data need to cross 
multiple countries
1 2
3
Figure 1.1 
Levels of Data Access
(A) Depending on the research question being asked, access to health and/or health-related data may 
be required from one or more data sets all within one province or territory (Level 1), from data sets 
spanning multiple provinces or territories (Level 2), or from data sets collected or residing in multiple 
countries (Level 3). Although more challenges arise when broader access (Levels 2 and 3) is needed, 
there are challenges related to sharing data across organizations and institutions even within a single 
jurisdiction. (B) Throughout the report, the Panel uses these graphics to indicate the access levels to 
which a given concept or issue applies.
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The six entities identified all fit within the first level of access (Figure 1.1) 
because they deal with data from within a single jurisdiction though, in all cases, 
from multiple organizations. The Panel found many best practices in the other 
institutions it examined. For example, Population Data BC provides access 
to data within one province. Although best practices from single jurisdiction 
examples were more plentiful, the Panel learned from effective practices at 
several pan-Canadian (Level 2) entities, including CIHI and Statistics Canada; 
these lessons are incorporated in the report where appropriate. Most Level 3 
examples identified by the Panel, where results have been generated using data 
from multiple studies across countries, involve genetic data.
The Panel found common priorities underpinning the governance of these 
entities: enabling appropriate use of data in research, managing risk, protecting 
privacy, and maintaining public trust. In turn, these priorities are reflected in 
and inform four cross-cutting aspects of a complete governance approach to 
access to health and health-related data:
• Privacy governance: monitors the risk to privacy posed by data requests from 
researchers, and the practices of data custodians in providing data (information 
governance) to ensure that confidentiality is respected. Such governance 
requires specialized knowledge of technology, law, and statistical methods.6 
• Research governance: ensures that the benefits to society of research outweigh 
any risks, from both an ethical and legal perspective. 
• Information governance: determines how organizations and individuals 
manage information in the health and social services systems to maintain 
confidentiality of the data while also ensuring appropriate access. 
• Network governance: involves establishing and publicizing common standards 
for data collection and developing policies for data sharing within research 
networks that may span multiple countries. 
6 In this report, the Panel distinguished between the concepts of privacy and confidentiality. 
Privacy is a broad concept that in Canadian law encompasses personal privacy (protection of one’s 
physical self), territorial privacy (protection of one’s private physical space), and informational 
privacy (protection of information about oneself and one’s activities) (SCC, 2004). In contrast 
to privacy, which is a right, confidentiality involves duties. More specifically, confidentiality refers 
to the duties and practices of people and organizations to ensure that individuals’ personal 
information only flows from one entity to another according to legislated or otherwise broadly 
accepted norms and policies. Maintaining confidentiality in accord with relevant legislation, 
norms, and policies thereby respects individuals’ informational privacy. This report does not 
touch on any other aspects of privacy. In the context of health data, restrictions on and authorities 
for communicating personal information arise primarily from legislation, duties relating to 
professional obligations, or contracts. In these cases, confidentiality is breached whenever 
personal information is communicated that is not authorized by legislation, professional 
obligations, or under contractual duties.
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Each aspect of governance establishes best practices to ensure that the risk 
of a loss of confidentiality is managed while fully capturing the benefits of 
improved health outcomes and appropriate innovation in the health system. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
The report is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 outlines how researchers access data in Canada and describes how 
databases can be combined and linked to enable research and analysis, and 
hence the generation of information that can improve health outcomes and 
health-care sector efficiency.
Chapter 3 discusses the benefits and risks of linking and accessing health and 
health-related data, and some key barriers to doing so. It uses examples from 
Canada to illustrate the health outcomes and health sector enhancements that 
can be achieved from effective data access and linkage. 
Chapter 4 looks at Canada’s legal and ethical framework for accessing data for 
research purposes and identifies good practices in this area. While laws and 
ethics should guide choices on whether and how to access data, in practice some 
provinces have succeeded better than others at making their data accessible 
(Level 1), and differences in legal provisions and interpretations across Canada 
(Level 2) generally make bona fide research access difficult. Research access is 
even more difficult internationally (Level 3).
Chapter 5 identifies best practices underlying effective governance that 
defines distinct roles and processes for privacy, research, information, and 
network governance. 
Chapter 6 outlines the report’s main conclusions and findings, and synthesizes 
the evidence and analysis of previous chapters to answer the questions that 
make up the charge.
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2 Data Access, Integration, and Linkage in Canada
This chapter outlines sources of data that are or could be used for social, 
health, and health services research; the form in which these data are available; 
methods for using the data (e.g., pooling, linking, and comparing data from 
different sources); and current procedures for Canadian-based researchers 
requesting access to health and health-related data. The digitization of data 
and proliferation of new monitoring and health-care instruments have led 
to dramatic growth in individual-level data on factors that affect individual 
health, social well-being, and the provision of health care. Although routinely 
collected health-care and social administrative data have been used for health 
research and system innovation for decades, the rapidly expanding scope of 
Key Findings
• For effective research with Canada’s health and health-related data, many disparate 
sources of data must be brought together and provided in an “analysis-ready” 
format, thereby allowing statistical relationships or patterns to be derived. 
• Individual-level data held in different databases are more easily compared if they 
are collected in a standardized manner; otherwise, retrospective harmonization (a 
second best approach compared with prospective harmonization or standardization) 
is required to make them comparable. 
• Pooled data analysis, which involves physical transfer of individual-level data to a 
central server, is often hindered by interpretation and implementation of privacy 
and other laws. Approaches that involve sharing of summary statistics, rather than 
individual-level data, represent alternative solutions.
• When data are provided to researchers, two different spectra become relevant: an 
access spectrum (which ranges from secure physical locations, to secure online 
links, to publicly available websites), and an identifiability spectrum (which involves 
individual-level data ranging from mildly de-identified to strongly de-identified, 
followed by aggregated data or data analysis results). As data become more strongly 
de-identified, the degree of risk to privacy, the access controls, and the scientific 
value of the data are lowered.
• The ability to access and link data within reasonable timeframes is uneven across 
Canada or even lacking. Current rules and procedures to authorize research and 
allow data access overlap and are often time-consuming, processes and requirements 
for access are sometimes unclear, and access decisions are not always consistent. 
Delays may be caused by slow approval from research ethics boards, other governing 
bodies, or data custodians, or by incomplete applications from researchers.
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electronic data provides new opportunities. For example, the sheer scale of 
big data analytics enables the study of rare diseases, widespread factors with 
weaker effects, and underserved populations, which may be problematic in 
conventional research. In addition, the costs of analyzing existing data are 
substantially lower than those required to perform a new study (Kohane, 2011). 
2.1 THE EXPLOSION IN DATA
It is hard to appreciate the tremendous volume of data being created in our 
current digitized society or to put the pace of its growth in context. In simple 
numerical terms, the worldwide amount of digital information is expected to 
grow by a factor of 300 from 2005 to 2020, from 130 exabytes to 40,000 exabytes 
(or 5,200 gigabytes for each person in the world), doubling every two years. 
Global information technology (IT) market intelligence firm International 
Data Corporation (IDC) estimates that up to one-third of these data would be 
valuable if analyzed, including correlations between scientific data from separate 
studies and between medical and sociological data (Gantz & Reinsel, 2012). 
In the commercial world, many leading firms such as Amazon, Google, and 
Facebook have made extensive use of data to increase sales and the impacts 
of advertising. These organizations have an advantage, in that the data are 
held in their own computer systems and their internet presence is pervasive 
(Berner et al., 2014; Galbraith, 2014). By contrast, the dispersed nature of the 
health-care sector — in which data are recorded everywhere from doctors’ 
offices to pharmacies to hospitals — means that data are gathered in many 
sites. To support high-quality patient care and research, health-care data 
must be shared across organizations; however, data sharing raises a number 
of challenging issues (van Panhuis et al., 2014). The challenges are different 
for social data, where the volume of computerized administrative records 
(from schools, courts, social assistance, and other sources) is considerably 
smaller than for health-care data. Social data, however, are often much 
more varied in form and content, and more dispersed across organizations 
(Roos et al., 2008; IOM, 2014). 
In the future, data provided by self-monitoring from individuals could also be 
linked to medical records, thanks to greater interconnection between devices 
and the emerging “Internet of Things”7  (Simonite, 2013). For example, 
real-time monitoring of blood pressure and heart rhythm is already being 
7 Many electronic devices such as light switches, thermostats and refrigerators are now able to 
connect and share data via the Internet, and they can be controlled directly via the Internet as 
well. These devices are broadly defined as the “Internet of Things” (Simonite, 2013). According 
to Gartner Inc. (2013), there will be nearly 26 billion devices in the Internet of Things by 2020.
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fed into medical information systems to provide warning of heart attacks 
(CHI, 2014b). Private-sector companies are working on a “smart contact lens” 
to provide a continuous, minimally invasive measurement of the body’s glucose 
levels (Novartis, 2014). 
An example of the power and practical applications of health data analysis 
is a sophisticated study performed by Dr. Douglas Lee and colleagues at the 
University of Toronto and ICES in Ontario. Using comprehensive provincial 
health data and validated diagnostic information, they developed a computer 
algorithm to predict the probability of death within seven days of presentation 
with acute heart failure at any one of 86 major hospitals in the province. 
The algorithm can be loaded on a hand-held device and used by staff in 
emergency departments to inform clinical judgment on which patients require 
admission to hospital for more intensive management and which patients can 
be safely discharged. With universal health coverage, the health data for a study 
like this one are comprehensive, capturing deaths and other major clinical 
outcomes occurring anywhere in the province and in all provincial institutions. 
In the future, this type of research will be improved by linkage to 
electronic medical records (EMRs) and laboratory data, and by the increasing 
availability of genomic and other sophisticated bioinformatics data 
(Bodnar, 2012; Lee et al., 2012). This example illustrates the potential for the 
novel use of data for health-care innovation.
Another major avenue for the use of such data is for research into patterns 
of diseases or of health-care service utilization. In these cases, the focus is not 
on the care of particular individuals, but on correlations and other statistical 
relationships that become apparent only from data spanning large numbers of 
individuals. Identification of these associations is valuable for directing future 
inquiries that may reveal causal relationships. An important example is adverse 
drug reactions (ADRs). ADRs that occur rarely may not be identified or linked 
to use of a specific drug unless records of many individuals receiving the drug 
can be analyzed (Senate, 2014). 
Similarly, in social science research a large amount of individual-level data is 
needed to undertake statistical analyses, but individual identities are irrelevant. 
For example, the Statistics Canada demographic projection model (see Box 3.7) 
involves access to a wide range of administrative data (on immigrants, births 
and deaths, and other demographic factors), as well as census and survey data, 
to produce widely used projections of population characteristics across Canada 
in future years (StatCan, 2010a).
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Despite the explosion of electronic systems and records in all aspects of society, 
health-care data are not yet fully digital. In 2014, 77% of family physicians used 
EMRs, up from 41% in 2010 and 64% in 2013 (CHI, 2014a; NPS, 2014). As greater 
use is made of these new kinds of computerized data, major contributions to 
research and health system innovation can be expected. Chapter 3 discusses the 
potential benefits of such data for different fields of research (e.g., epidemiology 
and genetics). However, it should be noted that adoption of EMRs by physicians 
does not guarantee their availability or usability for research (Rose et al., 2005). 
Although initiatives to collect and analyze data from individual EMRs across 
Canada are under way (e.g., the Canadian Primary Care Sentinel Surveillance 
Network (CPCSSN, 2013)), in some provinces there is currently no clear 
framework governing the flow of data from a physician’s EMR to the system-
wide electronic health record (EHR) (OMA, 2013). In addition, differences 
in the design of EMR software by competing vendors lead to challenges in 
interpreting and integrating data collected by physicians using different systems 
(OMA, 2013).
Whether used for research, quality improvement, health system management, 
or innovation, timely access to data is essential. Lengthy delays in accessing 
data can affect the efficiency of research and relevance of findings, and, 
ultimately, result in lost opportunities to realize benefits that are in the public 
interest. Further, data that have already been collected for one purpose, such 
as patient care, provide greater value if they can be used for multiple purposes 
and in different ways. Clinical practice and policy innovations are ideally 
based on evidence, sound performance measurement, variance analysis, and 
management of these measures and variances towards a defined clinical end. 
The data infrastructure required for research, analytics, and innovation is for 
practical purposes the same, although there will be differences in the ways the 
data are used (NSS, n.d.-b).
2.2 THE SOURCES OF DATA
The focus of the Panel’s work is primarily individual-level data because timely 
access for research has been the greatest challenge for these data, and they offer 
great potential for research and health sector innovation. The vast majority 
of current individual-level data are created for reasons other than research, 
such as direct patient care or other types of service provision, which in turn 
involves transaction processing (for example, writing a prescription, ordering 
and retrieving a laboratory test or x-ray image for a specific patient) and 
“narrow” administrative uses (such as billing by physicians remunerated on a 
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fee-for-service basis). The growing use of EMRs and EHRs has tremendous 
potential to enhance the quality of computerized data for health research. 
These electronic records provide an opportunity to close a major data gap in 
primary health care and other settings by improving the timeliness, quality, 
and completeness of data, while reducing the burden of data collection 
and structuring. 
Significant progress has been achieved across Canada in the adoption of EMRs 
and EHRs; this progress has been driven primarily by the needs of patient care. 
However, the companion software systems, governance, funding, and analytical 
capacity needed to support research and statistical data analysis from this rich 
array of digitized patient care data vary across the country. While Canadian 
entities such as ICES in Ontario and MCHP in Manitoba are world-renowned, 
in other cases practice in Canada significantly lags behind best practice in 
other countries.
Data are generated at every encounter between an individual and health-care 
providers: doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories, and home-care providers. 
Figure 2.1 shows the many players involved when moving from collecting 
primary data (on the left) to combining and integrating data (on the right) 
to provide the richly detailed and large-sample data sets that hold the greatest 
promise for contemporary research and analysis. Current programs that pool 
these data at the health region and health ministry levels, and nationally at 
CIHI, mainly support health system management and health policy. In some 
cases, data also flow to provincial health quality councils and university-based 
research centres, such as MCHP, Population Data BC, and ICES. These research 
centres (at Level 1) are among the most sophisticated and prolific producers 
of health services and related research in Canada.
From a broader health perspective, health-care encounter data are increasingly 
being combined with health and health-related survey data. This was pioneered 
by Statistics Canada, as well as a number of within-province efforts, and more 
recently was joined by the pan-Canadian plans of large-scale research platforms 
such as the Canadian Longitudinal Study of Aging (CLSA) and the Canadian 
Partnership for Tomorrow Project (CPTP), discussed in this section. Linkage of 
data across provinces (Level 2) remains a major challenge for these platforms. 
In social sciences, other administrative data sets are being combined to improve 
timeliness and accuracy of information; for example, Statistics Canada combines 
household surveys and university student profiles with income tax records 
under the auspices of the Statistics Act (Finnie et al., 2014).
16 Accessing Health and Health-Related Data in Canada
Increasingly, administrative data are also being reused. Reuse of data not only 
lowers the burden on the population and the health-care sector of responding 
to surveys and filling in forms. It also substantially eliminates issues of selection 
bias in analysis because the entire population (for example, all births or all 
cases of cancer) is often captured in these data. This enables valid statistical 
analysis, thereby fostering research breakthroughs (Jutte et al., 2011). Other 
benefits of re-using data are discussed in Section 3.2. 
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Figure 2.1 
Creation and Flow of Data in Canada
This figure shows the different entities that are involved when primary data move from their original 
holders to subsequent holders to entities that are able to integrate data from multiple sources and 
provide them to researchers. For example, in Manitoba, prescription drug data from all pharmacies 
flow to an online database (the Drug Program Information Network) maintained by Manitoba Health. 
The MCHP at the University of Manitoba houses these data in a large repository, which includes health, 
social, education, justice, and other data. Researchers may apply to access these data through the MCHP.
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Primary encounter data are held, in the first instance, by a data custodian. Data 
custodians collect data and make initial decisions on data use, disclosure, 
retention, and disposal. They play a central role in enabling or inhibiting access 
to health and health-related data by implementing policies on data collection, 
use, and disclosure. They also endeavour to ensure that their employees follow 
appropriate practices, such as keeping data secure (Chapman, 2005; Province 
of B.C. & DataBC, 2014). Data custodians include ministries of health, 
hospitals, physicians, and regional health authorities (Cavoukian, 2005). 
In addition to data on health encounters, parallel data sets are being collected 
and pooled or linked in other domains. Social service encounters, interpreted 
broadly, include those concerning housing or disability support, educational 
attainment and performance, and immigration. For example, data on students 
(at all levels of formal education) are typically generated by their teachers 
and various kinds of standardized tests. These data flow initially to school 
boards, and then may be used at provincial education ministries, and 
then at  the national level by the Council of Ministers of Education. 
These education data are now starting to be used for analysis with 
health-care encounter data (Brownell et al., 2006; Roos et al., 2006). An example 
of this is given in Box 3.3.
Other potentially important data from a research perspective are generated 
by various government ministries, such as immigration data, as a by-product of 
service delivery. Individual income tax returns from the Canada Revenue Agency 
now provide the large majority of income data in lieu of income questions on 
Statistics Canada’s surveys, and income data are widely used in both health 
and social science research. 
Researchers are also creating data infrastructures through developing specific 
longitudinal panels, such as the CPTP and the CLSA. These databases are 
referred to as platforms since they provide the foundation on which many more 
focused studies can build. The CPTP research platform recently met its initial 
target, with nearly 300,000 people enrolled. From questionnaire data, biomarker 
samples, and various physical measures provided by the participants, researchers 
in Canada and around the world will investigate why cancer and other chronic 
diseases develop (CPTP, 2011). The CLSA “is a large, national, longitudinal study 
that will follow approximately 50,000 men and women between the ages of 45 
and 85 for at least 20 years. The study will collect information on the changing 
biological, medical, psychological, social, lifestyle, and economic aspects of 
people’s lives. These factors will be studied to understand how, individually 
and in combination, they have an impact [on] both maintaining health and 
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[on] the development of disease and disability as people age” (CLSA, 2009). 
The challenges of conducting these two nationwide longitudinal cohort studies 
are discussed in Section 2.5.4 and Box 3.11.
2.3 THE FORM OF THE DATA
An important role of modern IT systems is gathering large amounts of data to 
use as raw inputs into complex analyses, which transform the raw data to useful 
information. Information is the output of processes that analyze, summarize, 
interpret and otherwise represent data to convey meaning (DH, 2013). The 
form in which health and health-related data are available varies greatly at the 
moment. Some can be “processed, searched, queried, combined, and analyzed 
relatively straightforwardly,” whereas others, typically more qualitative in nature, 
are harder to combine and analyze (Kitchin, 2014). Together, these data, as 
well as other types of data that may not seem immediately connected to health, 
can potentially provide a holistic view of the factors that may be influencing 
an individual’s health and well-being (Weber et al., 2014).
2.3.1 Structured and Unstructured Data
Health and health-related data typically consist of information on various 
entities (units of analysis) such as individuals, health-care providers, health-
care encounters, and social service encounters. In turn, the information on 
each of these units of analysis consists of a set of attributes. For an individual, 
these attributes usually include age, sex, and other demographic characteristics 
and, in the health-care context, symptoms, diagnoses, and interventions. For a 
health-care encounter, relevant attributes might include time and location and 
who the providers were. While such use is still nascent, in the future another 
attribute may be a real-time data stream from a personal health monitoring 
device, such as the glucose-sensing contact lens mentioned in Section 2.1. 
Much of these basic data can easily be input in standard formats and handled 
by automated databases; these are considered structured data (Raghupathi 
& Raghupathi, 2014). Other information (e.g., diagnoses) can be codified 
using a controlled vocabulary such as the World Health Organization (WHO) 
International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision (ICD-10) (Kohane, 2011). 
In contrast to structured data, unstructured data (e.g., free-form text, such as 
written interpretations of x-rays) do not have a common identifiable structure. 
These data can often be searched as long as they are digital, but they are more 
difficult to use for computer analyses (Kitchin, 2014). Non-digital, unstructured 
data, such as the paper notes and forms that still occupy entire walls of cabinets 
in doctors’ offices, can be used for research only with great expense and time 
commitment to “chart review” (Lapointe et al., 2012). Although there are 
challenges in reliably extracting meaningful content from free-form digital text, 
19Chapter 2 Data Access, Integration, and Linkage in Canada
natural language processing software, which converts textual files into codified 
terms or tags drawn from controlled vocabularies (Kohane, 2011), has the 
potential to enable more efficient use of unstructured data within EMRs. Other 
forms of unstructured data include information generated from the clinical 
interpretation of diagnostic imaging data and streaming instrument data from 
wearable biomonitors (MCHP, 2004; Kaminska & New, 2005). In these cases, 
standardized procedures are needed to generate structured information. This 
task is routine in some cases: beginning in 2004, Ontario has moved pathology 
reporting from the traditional narrative structure to reporting based on common 
standards (CCO, 2012). 
Unstructured data can make analysis more time-consuming, but structuring 
data to be useful has presented challenges. In some settings, there are no 
implemented standards in electronic records for coding such key data elements 
as symptoms and diagnoses. Furthermore, clinicians may find it easier — or 
at least perceive that it is easier — and more informative to use free-form 
notes (Raghupathi & Raghupathi, 2014). In addition, even where coded data 
(rather than free-form text) are used in EMRs, in many cases, software vendors 
have not adopted open standards, such as controlled medical vocabularies 
(Krist et al., 2014).
2.3.2 Big Data
The term big data is becoming increasingly popular (Atkinson, 2014). According 
to the McKinsey Global Institute, it “refers to datasets whose size is beyond the 
ability of typical database software tools to capture, store, manage, and analyze” 
(Manyika et al., 2011). Big data are characterized by the “3 Vs” — volume, 
variety, and velocity (large amounts of diverse types and formats are generated 
quickly, possibly in real time) (CHI, 2013). A fourth “V” — veracity — has also 
been introduced. Veracity is a goal (rather than a characteristic) that refers 
to the desire for big data itself, as well the outcomes from analyzing it, to be 
error-free and credible (Raghupathi & Raghupathi, 2014). 
Under the above definition and characteristics, certain heath data, such as 
genomic data and streamed data generated from machines and sensors, could 
be considered big data. Other health data, such as EMRs, medical imaging 
and laboratory data, and pharmacy and billing data, have been identified as 
big data by the literature (Atkinson, 2014; Raghupathi & Raghupathi, 2014; 
Ross et al., 2014); however, this latter list includes data that are able to be stored 
and analyzed using typical hardware and software, and thus their categorization 
as big data is arguable. For the purposes of this report, the Panel also considers 
administrative data from schools and social services, and large-scale surveys 
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including the CPTP and CLSA and those conducted by Statistics Canada 
(especially the Canadian Community Health Surveys), as potential sources 
of big data.
Regardless of their precise categorization, analytical approaches designed for 
big data may still be applied to this varied list of health and health-related 
data (CHI, 2013), particularly if they are used in combination with other big 
data. In health and health care, the major research potential of big data lies 
in linking newer forms of data (e.g., genomic data) with more traditional 
forms to generate and test hypotheses (Raghupathi & Raghupathi, 2014; 
Weber et al., 2014). Further, by mining (i.e., using increasingly sophisticated 
statistical methods to analyze) very large data sets, researchers can expand from 
a hypothesis-driven approach (in which relationships that they expect to see 
are tested) to a more exploratory approach in which unexpected relationships 
are uncovered. However, further analysis is generally needed before correlative 
relationships identified by data mining techniques can be considered causal 
(Atkinson, 2014). Analysis of big data also often involves processing 
unstructured data. Whether derived from structured or unstructured data or 
some combination, new frameworks, technologies, and processes are required 
to find patterns (CHI, 2013). Applications and challenges of exploring big 
data are discussed in Section 2.4.4.
2.3.3 Identifiable and De-Identified Data
A simple dichotomy for categorizing the information that is made available for 
research is to view it as either identifiable or de-identified. As will be discussed 
later in this chapter, though, in practice there is a spectrum of identifiability. 
The reason is that there is usually a critical trade-off: the stronger the 
de-identification of the data, the poorer its value for analysis (AMS, 2006). For 
example, de-identification typically first involves the removal by the data custodian 
of obvious personal identifiers, such as name and address, from the data file 
provided to researchers. But depending on what other information is in the 
data set, further suppression or blurring of the data may be needed to assure 
de-identification — for example, perturbing birth date, geographic detail, 
marital status, and the dates of key events like a heart attack. As a result, various 
degrees of de-identification are coupled with corresponding ease or restrictions 
on who can access the data, and under which circumstances. Another point 
to consider is that the level of identifiability — and consequently, the rules 
surrounding access — may change over time for a given data set. Since the path 
of a data set cannot be predicted, this point may be taken into account prior 
to release of data to researchers when risk is assessed (see Chapters 4 and 5).
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A central Canadian standard for identifiable information is laid out in the 
Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS), which is the governing ethical standard 
for Canada’s three research granting agencies (known as the Tri-Council) that 
fund academic research (CIHR et al., 2014).8  The TCPS states that data are 
identifiable if they, alone or when combined with other available information, 
may reasonably be expected to identify an individual (CIHR et al., 2014). There 
is a lack of clarity about what constitutes “reasonably expected to identify” 
in practice. 
To avoid common confusion about what de-identification means, the Panel 
has incorporated its concept of reasonableness in the following definition: if 
data custodians de-identify data, they are undertaking a defensible, repeatable, 
and auditable process that consistently provides assurance, based on proven 
and repeatable statistical methodologies, that there is a very small risk of 
re-identification of any data that are made accessible to researchers 
(El Emam, 2013b). The Panel has also chosen to use the word de-identify rather 
than other terms in common usage that have various interpretations (such 
as obfuscate or anonymize). Best practices with respect to this process are 
outlined in Chapter 5.
There are different rules governing access to de-identified and identifiable 
data. Depending on the detailed extent of de-identification, de-identified data 
may be made accessible to researchers pursuant to a spectrum of conditions. 
In general, there are two main approaches. Under one approach, most often 
used in smaller academic studies, data are either considered to be de-identified 
or not. Once they are considered de-identified, researchers have a wider array 
of options for data access; in some cases, they may be permitted to keep a 
copy of the data set on their personal computer at home or at their office, 
and, in others, they may be required to store the data on a secure network 
(CIHI, 2014b). But for most major research activities involving large volumes 
of sensitive data, researchers’ access to the data involves a combination of 
de-identification and controlled access. This is the case with data held by ICES, 
MCHP, and Statistics Canada, for example. Ethics approval by a research ethics 
board (REB) may be a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for 
undertaking research using such data, including virtually all linked health data 
in Canada (ICES, 2014d; MCHP, 2014d; StatCan, 2014h).
8 The Tri-Council comprises the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).
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2.4 USING THE DATA: TRANSFORMING DATA  
TO INFORMATION
The Panel’s mandate to assess timely access to health and health-related data 
derives from the potential of these data to support research and innovation. In 
some cases (e.g., those that require collection of all incident cases of a disease in 
a population), collecting these data by other means would be virtually impossible 
or require major new investments. The goal is to enable use of these data to 
produce innovative information. However, the process of transforming data 
into useful and accessible information requires both data of high quality and 
an appropriate infrastructure for managing access to and analysis of the data.9
Quality assurance is important for maintaining useful data. Data quality involves 
dimensions such as accuracy, comparability, usability, relevancy, and whether 
the data are current at the time they are released to researchers (CIHI, 2014a). 
The results are documented, problems are noted, and summaries are provided 
to users so they are aware of issues.10  Management of data can be facilitated by 
expert networks that coordinate data dissemination, access, and analysis, such 
as the Canadian Network for Observational Drug Effect Studies (CNODES), 
discussed in in Box 3.6.
In many instances, individual data sets are not sufficient to answer the questions 
addressed; instead, investigators require access to combined data sets. The 
remainder of this section reviews processes or technical aspects for enabling 
researchers to make use of multiple data sets (e.g., by comparing or combining 
information held in different databases). Section 2.5 reviews methods to authorize 
access. While these sections are presented separately for ease of explanation, 
in practice there can be complex interactions between the two. 
2.4.1 Harmonization to Enable Comparison of Data
The full potential of Canada’s health and health-related data can only be realized 
by bringing different data sets together. These data sets may be from the same 
province/territory or multiple provinces and territories. An international 
perspective on health and social issues can, of course, only be acquired by jointly 
analyzing data from multiple countries. But doing so meaningfully requires that 
9 The Panel noted that Canada has an excellent cadre of health researchers; therefore, a sufficient 
supply of researchers able to analyze these kinds of data is not an issue. However, some learning 
would be necessary for certain researchers to transition from the analysis of small or medium 
sized data to much larger data sets.
10 Similar practices exist elsewhere in Canada, such as at MCHP, which has developed macros 
that automate the data evaluation process. These are available for use and development under 
a General Publication License (MCHP, 2014g).
1 2
3
23Chapter 2 Data Access, Integration, and Linkage in Canada
the precise meaning of any given data element — whether it is a date, a clinical 
procedure code, a diagnosis, or a characteristic like “obesity” — is as close as 
possible across the different data sets being combined (Rabin et al., 2004). 
When data elements are harmonized, they are considered “inferentially 
equivalent,” and can thus be compared or combined and used meaningfully 
in statistical analysis (e.g., regression). Harmonization therefore enables 
data integration, an approach that can be driven by different scientific 
rationales, including the requirement to obtain sufficient statistical power 
to investigate relatively rare events or complex interactions. Naturally, when 
data are collected using identical (i.e., standard) methods and tools, data 
integration and comparison are facilitated. This is referred to as prospective 
harmonization. However, it can be challenging to develop and implement a set 
of standards — particularly if underlying consensus is absent — and to maintain 
standard data collection procedures through time (Fortier et al., 2010, 2012). 
On a multi-jurisdictional level, this challenge is amplified in Canada since health 
care is largely provincial rather than federal, thus making it harder to implement 
pan-Canadian standards (CIHR, 2011). Nonetheless, organizations such as 
Statistics Canada since its inception (e.g., cause of death coding) and CIHI since 
1994 (e.g., hospital procedure and diagnostic codes) have met this mandate 
(see examples of harmonization below) (CIHI, 2014c).
Even if data were not collected in a standardized/prospectively harmonized 
manner, valid comparison of information from different studies or databases 
may still be possible; this approach is referred to as retrospective harmonization, 
and is often critical for making use of existing data (Fortier et al., 2012). 
Retrospective harmonization could be achieved using rigorous methods, 
when similar information is collected across data sets. But, the potential to 
harmonize existing information is necessarily always limited by the heterogeneity 
of the data collected (Fortier et al., 2011). In addition, certain domains of 
information are more difficult to harmonize than others. For example, in 
one study examining the potential for data harmonization, nutritional habit 
variables were not amenable to harmonization, but almost all variables related 
to disease history and medication use were compatible with the harmonization 
tool under investigation (Doiron et al., 2013a).
Examples of Data Harmonization
Prospective harmonization, the ideal approach for data integration, has been 
achieved in many contexts across Canada, such as acute hospital visits, births, 
deaths, and cancer information. CIHI plays a central role in supporting data 
harmonization for health-care encounters, as it is responsible for developing 
and maintaining health data standards for hospitals, long-term care facilities, 
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and home-care agencies, among others. Through these standards, CIHI has 
enabled the production of harmonized data that can be integrated across the 
provinces and territories. Standards for the collection and interpretation of 
clinical data are helping to support point-of-care data capture and care delivery. 
For example, CIHI launched the Continuing Care Reporting System in 2003 
to 2004, which uses a standardized clinical assessment instrument to document 
the characteristics of individuals receiving continuing care (CIHI, 2014d).
To ensure the use of consistent variables and definitions, best practice involves a 
terminology management strategy, such as that led by the Canadian Partnership 
Against Cancer on clinical synoptic reporting for surgery (CPAC, n.d.). For 
such a strategy, the appropriate tools, including thesauruses and glossaries of 
concepts, need to be developed. These contain, as a minimum for each concept, 
a standardized term, definition, detailed source information, and related terms.
To process data that have been collected using different standards, retrospective 
harmonization is required. One such approach is to map one set of clinical 
diagnostic codes to another — for example, converting ICD codes to Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) codes or vice versa (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health, 2014). Although Canada currently uses the WHO’s 
ICD-10 codes, research with data from previous years within Canada, or with 
multiple countries, might require transformation from one version (ICD-9) 
to the next (ICD-10). In these cases, WHO and member countries collaborate 
in the construction of “crosswalks” between successive versions of the ICD 
(AMA, 2012; CIHI, 2014e). 
In other contexts, techniques such as DataSHaPER developed by Maelstrom 
Research (P3G, 2015) have been created to support retrospective harmonization 
and help determine whether appropriate and valid inferences can be drawn 
(or not) from variables across different studies (Fortier et al., 2011). The methods 
and software developed by Maelstrom are currently being used to harmonize and 
integrate the data collected across major European cohorts (Doiron et al., 2013a) 
and across the CPTP’s five provincial population-based cohorts (with a total of 
300,000 enrollees across Canada) (CPTP, 2011; P3G, 2015). Despite the limitations 
of retrospective harmonization discussed above, generation of such harmonized 
data structures is one key for leveraging Canadian research innovation through 
use of existing data.
2.4.2 Data Linkage 
Data linkage is the process of bringing together individual-level data from two or 
more different sources containing data relating to the same individual, family, 
place, or event (Holman et al., 2008). In the simplest case, these databases 
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can be linked if a personal health identifier (PHI) — a health card number, 
for example — is recorded in each of the data sets, allowing different types 
of data for the same individual to be matched. Other personal identifiers 
used to link data might be names, addresses, birth dates, or postal codes 
(CIHR, 2005; CIHR et al., 2014). Because the goal of data linkage is to gather 
different types of information about one individual, who — for the most 
part — receives health and health-related services in a single province or 
territory, it typically requires access to data from one jurisdiction (Level 1 
access), but in some cases from more than one organization (e.g., see Box 3.3). 
If there is a unique identifier available for virtually all the individuals in the 
two data sets to be linked, then it is possible to perform an “exact” linkage. 
But even in this case, there may be errors in the way the identifier has been 
recorded (e.g., reversed digits), or individuals with missing identifiers. In 
these situations, it is still possible to perform highly reliable linkages using 
probabilistic methods.11  In such a linkage process, even though an exact match 
may not be possible, two records where the individual characteristics are very 
similar can be matched. If data sets are strongly de-identified using proper 
procedures, it will generally not be possible to link them. Thus, if data need 
to be linked, the simplest way, if possible, is to link prior to de-identification. 
However, secure linkage technologies have been developed, which allow the 
linking of de-identified data using cryptographic techniques to protect the 
fields needed for linkage (El Emam & Arbuckle, 2013).
To reduce the risk of loss of confidentiality during linkage of databases, personal 
identifiers used to make the linkage are usually stripped from the linked file 
as soon as the linkage is completed and stored separately (StatCan, 2011). As 
well, the resulting individual-level databases do not always need to be linked 
permanently to undertake most research. Instead, the critical feature is that 
the databases are “linkable” (i.e., that records on a single individual can be 
brought together when needed for a specific analysis) but the link enabling the 
fusion of an individual’s data from different databases can be broken after the 
research is completed. Alternatively, the link can be kept completely separate by 
a trusted third party, especially when it is anticipated that subsequent research 
projects will need similarly linked data. Decisions on whether to establish a link 
are made on a case-by-case basis, including consideration of concerns relating 
to privacy and the potential risks to confidentiality.
11 Probabilistic linking was originally developed and applied at Statistics Canada in the 1960s for 
cancer research (Marion & Thomas, 2004).
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An example in which data linkage can play an important role is for 
pharmacovigilance, the detection, assessment, understanding, and prevention 
of adverse effects or any other drug-related problems, which is only feasible 
through examining data that link an individual’s drug use to subsequent adverse 
health events. Without such linkage, if an individual suffers an adverse reaction 
to a drug and has to go to hospital, researchers in the health-care system may 
not be able to identify the association between the drug prescription and the 
hospital admission because the data on each for the same individual are stored 
in separate databases (Kirby, 2014). 
2.4.3 Data Pooling and Alternatives
Data pooling is the process of bringing multiple data sets together for analysis. 
It often involves data on individuals with the same or similar content but for 
different population groups or samples. One key purpose of data pooling is 
to increase sample size. At present, a main driver of data pooling in health 
research is population genetics: because there are billions of base pairs in a 
person’s DNA, statistical associations require samples in the millions. Although 
pooling can occur within or across jurisdictions, it is often most relevant to 
multi-jurisdictional data access (Levels 2 and 3) since data from different 
provinces or territories will likely be collected and stored in different databases. 
Bona fide pooled data analysis involves physical transfer of individual-level data 
to a central server, where the data are then analyzed as they would be if they 
were from the same study (with statistical adjustments if needed). Several 
genomic initiatives are using this approach (see Section 5.2). In numerous 
important cases, issues involving interpretation and implementation of privacy 
and other laws (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) are hindering the pooling of 
data from multiple jurisdictions, and are therefore a significant concern of 
researchers. Pooled analysis may also be impeded by data sets that are too large 
to be physically shared (Gaye et al., 2014).
Various approaches have been developed to avoid the need to pool individual-
level data. One such method is summary data meta-analysis, which involves 
harmonization of individual-level data across different studies followed by 
statistical analyses at each study site, and, finally, pooling of the non-confidential 
summary statistics to obtain an overall result (Gaye et al., 2014). One example 
that — for the most part — uses this approach is the Sentinel System which 
is currently being developed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), to 
monitor the safety of drugs and other medicinal products using electronic health 
data on approximately 100 million people. Mini-Sentinel, a pilot launched in 
2009, allows the FDA to query privately held health-care data representing 
approximately 60 million patients (FDA, 2010; Mini-Sentinel, 2014b). In 
2
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this system, identifiable data remain in their existing secure environments. 
Administrative and clinical information held by each collaborating data partner 
are standardized using the Common Data Model. The Coordinating Center 
receives a safety question from the FDA and submits it to each partner. Partners 
then execute standardized computer programs and share summary results, 
which are typically aggregated data but may include de-identified individual-
level data (Mini-Sentinel, 2014a, 2014b). The Coordinating Center further 
aggregates each data set it receives and sends its overall findings to the FDA 
(FDA, 2010). The potential of this approach is illustrated by the sharing of this 
data infrastructure with other networks, including the National Patient-Centered 
Clinical Research Network and the National Institutes of Health Distributed 
Research Network (Curtis et al., 2014).
CNODES is another example of summary data meta-analysis. Similar to the 
Sentinel System, the CNODES approach allows all data to remain in the province 
in which they were collected. Information from each database is analyzed in situ 
and only then combined as aggregated and non-confidential data; specifically, 
the only information that crosses provincial borders is statistical results such 
as regression coefficients. In contrast to the Sentinel System, CNODES does 
not use a common data model. Instead, a common analytical protocol is 
jointly developed and shared, which can be executed in each centre, despite 
differences in the structures of the databases (Suissa et al., 2012). See Box 3.6 
for a detailed explanation of the CNODES methodology. 
The European Best Information through Regional Outcomes in Diabetes 
(EUBIROD) project provides a multi-country (Level 3) example of summary 
data meta-analysis. The project “aims to build a common European infrastructure 
for exchange of standardized information about diabetes through connected 
regional diabetes registers” (Di Iorio et al., 2009). Each data partner uses the 
same standardized tools and procedures to produce aggregated statistical objects 
that are sent to the central statistical engine for global analysis. The type of data 
exchange envisaged by the project is legally viable, as long as all participating 
countries have fully implemented the EU Data Protection Directive in their 
national laws, thus guaranteeing an “adequate” level of privacy protection 
across countries (Di Iorio et al., 2009).
The above approaches may be considered for situations in which answers to 
research questions are required, but legal issues, costs, and other barriers 
preclude pooling of individual-level data (Suissa et al., 2012). However, there 
are circumstances where pooling of data across jurisdictional boundaries 
improves the analysis, and may even be necessary to avoid invalid conclusions. 
DataSHIELD, represents an important technical innovation that addresses 
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these conflicting issues (Wolfson et al., 2010). DataSHIELD is an example of 
federated data analysis, which mimics pooled data analysis without requiring 
that individual-level data be moved to a central computer. Under this approach, 
a central analysis computer sends simple analytic commands to secure servers 
that are storing individual-level data (Gaye et al., 2014). Simultaneous analyses 
are carried out on each data computer and summary statistics are returned 
to the analysis computer. In contrast to summary data meta-analysis, which 
requires that each partner produces its summary statistics in a timely manner, 
this method enables real-time analysis while still allowing partners to maintain 
control of their data (Doiron et al., 2013a). In this respect, DataSHIELD operates 
in a similar manner to the Sentinel Initiative.
2.4.4 Making Use of Big Data
In traditional data analytics projects, structured data are loaded and processed 
to produce cross-tabulations or other statistical results, which in turn form 
the core of a report or research study. Analysis can usually be performed with 
software installed on a stand-alone system (e.g., a laptop). For big data analytics, 
however, the volumes of data are so large that processing must be distributed 
across multiple high-performance computer clusters, which rapidly ingest 
and process raw data (both structured and unstructured), in near real time 
as needed. These clusters may use platforms that are available in the cloud 
(CHI, 2013; Peters & Buntrock, 2014; Raghupathi & Raghupathi, 2014).
Big data analytics allows researchers to reveal patterns in massive volumes of 
existing data without the need for prior specific hypotheses about where these 
patterns may exist (e.g., are there any genetic variations that correlate with 
development of a specific disease?). This “exploratory data analysis” approach 
contrasts with more conventional data analysis, which is focused on testing one 
or a few hypotheses (Peters & Buntrock, 2014). More conventional hypothesis 
testing is, of course, also possible — and indeed statistically more powerful — with 
big data. In either case, however, there will remain concerns that the statistical 
results for this observational data analysis need not be revealing valid causal 
pathways. While the gold standard for establishing causality in health research 
remains randomized experimentation, such an approach is often completely 
infeasible. For example, it is not possible to vary experimentally an individual’s 
genetic endowment to see whether he or she develops a disease. As a result, 
in observational research, reliance is instead placed on having closely similar 
findings from a range of study populations.12  
12 The value of purely observational studies is debated in the statistical and epidemiological 
literature, and there are other important features for high quality analysis, such as properly 
accounting for confounders. Nevertheless, properly conducted observational analyses are 
generally very widely accepted scientifically.
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Big data analytics combined with data pooling and record linkage has the 
potential to lower the costs and increase the speed of large-scale studies. For 
example, Box 2.1 provides an illustration with two types of big data — EHR 
and genetic data.
Box 2.1 
Linking EHRs and DNA Biobanks to Support Genomic Research
Genomic research identifies genetic variations among individuals that are associated 
with various observable traits (phenotypes), such as development of a disease or 
disease subtype, or better/worse response to treatment. Before the advent of EHRs 
and DNA biobanks, genomic studies typically involved recruitment of participants, 
collection of saliva or blood samples for DNA extraction, and questioning of patients 
for phenotype information. This model requires funding for biobanking infrastructure, 
research staff, and processing of samples and data from research participants. A more 
recent model, which has been referred to as EHR-driven genomic research (EDGR), 
derives genetic data from samples stored in biobanks (some of which were originally 
collected for clinical care) and phenotype data from EHRs. Since EDGR involves reuse 
of pre-existing data, it has the potential to generate results faster with significantly 
lower costs (Kohane, 2011; Denny, 2012). 
A critical aspect of EDGR is the establishment of a link between genetic and phenotypic 
databases. In the United States, the electronic Medical Records and Genomics 
(eMERGE) Network involves several medical institutions that maintain biobanks 
linked to EMRs. The network has published numerous studies that link traits such as 
body mass index in children, adult height, and risk of hematologic cancer to variations 
across the genome (Namjou et al., 2013; Schick et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2014). 
Studies based on an EDGR model currently face several challenges; one is the 
development of an acceptable consent regimen. Since samples are often obtained as 
part of medical care, some research networks and biobanks use an opt-in procedure 
to recruit patients, whereas others require patients to opt out if they do not want their 
clinical samples to be used for genomic studies (Kohane, 2011). Another challenge 
involves developing algorithms that accurately identify cases and controls from 
phenotypic data in EMRs (Denny, 2012).
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2.4.5 Data Management
To cope with the tide of big data and associated analytics, organizations are 
increasingly formalizing their data management and use practices. This trend 
results from legal requirements, recognition of the importance of public 
trust, and opportunities to improve service through the effective use of data. 
Data management involves policies and procedures covering the full data life 
cycle (creation, storage, security, archiving, destruction, etc.). In turn, these 
activities are tied together through data governance: “authority, control, and 
shared decision-making (planning, monitoring, and enforcement) over the 
management of data assets” (Mosley, 2008). Data management and governance 
are becoming central to IT systems as well as key functions of data custodians.
The transition from data to information is also shaped by legal, ethical, 
and other norms or guidelines that influence data custodians, as well as the 
effort and cost required to structure data for analysis, as discussed further in 
Chapter 3. These have led many data custodians to develop a culture of caution 
in sharing information. This tendency is widespread: the U.K. House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee recently noted that, in the context of 
genomic medicine, the “Department of Health guidance suggests that this 
domain is affected by 43 relevant pieces of legislation. There were 12 sets of 
relevant standards and eight professional codes of conduct. What this has 
bred is a culture of caution, confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency” 
(House of Lords, 2009). As Willison et al. (2011) note, “nobody wants to be on the 
wrong side of the law, so initial policy interpretations of the legal requirements 
have tended to err on the side of restricting access.”
2.5 ACCESSING DATA IN CANADA 
Researchers usually need access to subsets of data relevant to the particular 
research to be conducted, rather than to the whole data set. Depending on the 
data and the degree of identifying information needed, a variety of methods 
are used to enable access. Aggregated data may be made publicly available 
on a website; individual-level data may be strongly de-identified and sent to 
the researcher; less strongly de-identified data may be made available to the 
researcher through secure online links; or individual-level mildly de-identified 
data may be made available to a researcher who visits a secure physical facility. 
The weaker the level of de-identification of the data (e.g., the lesser the extent 
of data blurring and/or data suppression), the tighter the security and controls 
placed on the use and user of the data, and the more scientifically useful the 
data that can then be made accessible to the researcher. 
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Typically, access to more mildly de-identified data is limited to bona fide 
researchers: those who are formally affiliated with an institution of higher 
learning, who generate new knowledge and understanding using rigorous 
scientific methods, who intend to publish their research and share their methods, 
and who conduct research in compliance with ethical and legal requirements 
as well as recognized good practice (MRC, n.d.). Access to data sets through 
the Farr Institute @ Scotland (a Level 1 example), for example, may occur via 
a safe haven — a secure computer system that bona fide researchers can access 
physically by an on-site visit or remotely through secure internet connections 
(ISD Scotland, 2010b) — or through direct transfer. Before being permitted 
access, researchers must gain the status of an approved researcher, which has five 
requirements, including demonstration of appropriate Information Governance 
training and affiliation with an approved organization (ISD Scotland, 2010a). 
Some organizations in Canada, such as Statistics Canada and ICES, also offer 
data access through safe havens (El Emam, 2014; ICES, 2014c).
There is no uniform procedure to access data across Canada; indeed, there are 
large variations both within (Level 1) and across provinces (Level 2), as well as 
across different kinds of data. This leads to uneven access for bona fide researchers 
and analysts. Sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.5 discuss the different requirements for 
access in each of the following contexts: an analyst concerned with health-care 
quality and innovation in a public-sector agency, a university-based researcher 
working in one of Canada’s leading health services research organizations, a 
university-based social or health science researcher accessing data from Statistics 
Canada, a researcher belonging to a major health research consortium, and a 
university-based researcher conducting a small project. 
2.5.1 Government and Quasi-Governmental Agencies 
Distinguishing features
• Little or no need for formal or external REB ethics approval, since access is governed 
by legislation, policy, and other means 
• No need for external funding or grant applications
• Often full and streamlined access (varies across provinces)
• Generally for health system management or support of health policy rather than 
for academic research
• Access requirements under legislation may be less onerous than for academic 
research, although in practice there is often little or no difference
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There are a number of sophisticated analytical groups across Canada working 
inside government or quasi-governmental organizations, all of which fall under 
Level 1 access. These include the Institut National de Santé Publique du Québec 
(INSPQ), the Saskatchewan Health Quality Council, the Alberta Ministry of 
Health, the Newfoundland and Labrador Centre for Health Information, 
and CIHI, among others. In general, these analysts can access individual-level 
provincial health-care encounter data that either have been linked or could be 
linked both longitudinally and across types of encounters (for example, both 
hospital and physician encounters). Depending on the province’s legislation, 
access for staff of these agencies may be governed differently than for university-
based researchers. For example, in Quebec, for the INSPQ to gain access to a 
new data set requires approval of the Commission d’accès à l’information du 
Québec for each request, with less demanding provisions for analysis of data 
on health-care quality in comparison with academic research. Approval by an 
REB is not required if certain conditions are met.
2.5.2  Academic Centres with Special Relationships to Provincial 
Ministries of Health
Leading-edge data analysis is also concentrated in university-affiliated centres 
that have been specially organized or supported by their provincial ministries 
of health precisely for providing access to and/or analyzing provincial health-
care encounter data. Population Data BC, MCHP in Manitoba, and ICES in 
Ontario are Canada’s leaders. These centres hold digital copies of virtually the 
entire collection of routinely collected administrative health-care encounter 
data in their respective provinces — though this still leaves many omissions, 
including privately paid care such as dentists and portions of nursing home 
Distinguishing features
• Substantial core-funded infrastructure (programmers, data analysts, physical 
premises, computers, creation and maintenance of major linked databases, etc.)
• Physically and electronically secure premises; researchers must work on premises 
or access data remotely on a secure network
• Close working relationships with provincial ministry of health
• Mix of internal work and projects proposed by external researchers 
• Substantial cost recovery often required
• Researchers need REB approval and usually require grant funding
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costs, in some provinces the actual values of lab tests (e.g., cholesterol levels, 
not just whether this test was ordered and paid for by the province), and actual 
diagnoses from physician visits rather than only billing fee codes. 
These centres are similar in many ways, but may house data in different forms, 
use different access procedures, and provide different services. For example, 
data held by Population Data BC and ICES contain patient identifiers such 
as names and addresses, but these do not appear in any data sets provided 
to researchers. Data at MCHP do not include identifiers, but by combining 
information from several sources, it might be possible to re-identify someone. 
Population Data BC and ICES have both developed systems that allow researchers 
to access and process data remotely over secure networks. Researchers can work 
from their own computers, but data sets remain in protected environments 
on central servers and only specific research outputs are permitted to leave 
these environments (ICES, 2014c; PopData BC, 2015b). MCHP data can be 
accessed at several designated sites throughout Winnipeg (MCHP, 2014d). 
Scientists associated with MCHP and ICES perform their own research 
(ICES, 2014e; MCHP, 2014c), whereas Population Data BC acts only as a data 
provider (PopData BC, 2015c).
Even though specific projects differ, a typical use of the data would start with a 
bona fide researcher developing a research funding proposal involving statistical 
analysis of specified portions of a group of patients’ records — for example 
to determine how the treatment pathways (e.g., kinds of surgery, extent of 
chemotherapy and radiotherapy) for breast cancer vary with the patient’s age, 
cancer stage, and hormone receptor status. In this case, ethics approval is part 
of the process. Further, the cancer stage data may not have been included in 
the data from the health ministry, so a record linkage with data from the cancer 
agency may also be required.
Given the level of detail needed for the analysis, the data may still be considered 
identifiable even though obvious identifiers such as name, address, and health 
insurance number have been removed. As a result, the computer where the 
statistical routines are run is in a physically and electronically secure location. 
A further implication is that the research may be relatively costly. The research 
grant has to cover both the costs of the data analyst and a fee to allow the 
centre to recover the costs of its physical space, computers, and such. As 
the analysis progresses, only tables or statistical results that are clearly non-
confidential are allowed to be used outside of the secure facility (CIHR et al., 2014; 
van Panhuis et al., 2014).
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2.5.3 Via Statistics Canada
As an important Level 2 example, Statistics Canada holds the largest concentration 
of data for social science and health research in the country. Under the 
Statistics Act, part of the mandate of Statistics Canada includes “to collect, compile, 
analyze, abstract and publish statistical information relating to the commercial, 
industrial, financial, social, economic and general activities and condition of the 
people” (GOC, 2014a). While a considerable amount of analysis is conducted 
in-house, Statistics Canada facilitates the use of its data by researchers, provided 
this research is consistent with its mandate. As a result, there are many ways 
bona fide researchers can access data from Statistics Canada, including the 
individual-level data that are the focus of this report. From a researcher’s 
perspective, the simplest mode of access is via a public-use microdata file. These 
are data from a sample survey containing one record per individual respondent. 
The data have been carefully screened and sufficient data elements suppressed 
so that Statistics Canada has judged there to be no significant risk that any 
individual in the data set can be identified (StatCan, 2014f). 
Notably, it is a criminal offence to divulge “identifiable” data (Sections 17 and 34 
of the Statistics Act). In addition, to maintain the trust of Canadians for the 
volume of data that Statistics Canada collects, it is critical that there never 
be a data breach (GOC, 2014a).
Distinguishing features
• Legislative mandate to “collect, compile, analyze, abstract and publish” data for 
the benefit of Canadians
• Large and very detailed individual-level data holdings; wide range of subjects
• Wide spectrum of modes of access for researchers, ranging from access to:
 – aggregate Census and Canadian Community Health Survey data from community 
profiles on web site
 – public-use microdata (individual-level, strongly de-identified) files
 – researcher submission of statistical analyses over the Internet
 – Research Data Centres in universities and in Ottawa (individual-level, mildly 
de-identified microdata files)
• Each option along this spectrum involves more stringent rules enabling broader 
and more detailed access to the individual-level data
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Statistics Canada recognizes that much of the data it holds would be useless 
for research purposes if they had to be sufficiently suppressed or blurred to 
be non-identifiable within the meaning of the Statistics Act. For example, the 
only public-use microdata files are from cross-sectional surveys such as the 
Canadian Community Health Survey (StatCan, 2014c). Longitudinal surveys, 
such as the National Population Health Survey and longitudinally linked health-
care files that have been provided to Statistics Canada by provinces, are not 
provided in public-use files because blurring the data sufficiently to render them 
non-identifiable (in the meaning of the Statistics Act) would destroy their value 
for research (StatCan, 2012).
As a result, Statistics Canada has developed other ways of providing access to 
bona fide researchers while assuring the data remain confidential. One such 
method is remote data access, where the researcher emails the code for a 
statistical analysis of a given data set to Statistics Canada where it is run, the 
output is checked to make sure it does not contain any confidential data, and 
the results are emailed to the researcher (StatCan, 2014b). Turnaround time 
with this approach is quite slow.
Another approach is to request access to data at one of Statistics Canada’s 
Research Data Centres (RDCs). More than 26 RDCs are located on university 
campuses across the country. Researchers first submit a relatively short description 
of their planned statistical analysis to the funding agency (SSHRC or CIHR), 
mainly to ensure the proposal meets basic scientific standards (StatCan, 2015). 
At this stage, the proposal then goes to Statistics Canada, mainly to assess its 
technical feasibility. Following the review by Statistics Canada, the researcher 
undergoes a security check, swears an oath to uphold the Statistics Act, and is 
granted access to the data in an RDC as a deemed employee of Statistics Canada 
(RDC, 2005; StatCan, 2013). RDCs are physically and electronically secure 
facilities, where researchers are free to apply their statistical analyses to the 
data. Then, whenever the researcher wishes to take any statistical results out 
of the RDC, the tables, coefficients, and such must be screened to ensure that 
no confidential information is divulged (RDC, 2005). While these procedures 
are onerous, they are deliberately so because sensitive data are made accessible 
within the RDCs — not only data from longitudinal surveys, but also from 
the census, tax returns, and health-care encounters, including data that have 
been linked to health surveys (StatCan, 2014d). Notably, Statistics Netherlands 
provides an important example in which researchers have access to similarly 
highly detailed data under more flexible arrangements (see Section 2.6).
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Statistics Canada itself conducts many record linkages, among other reasons to 
improve statistical quality, to reduce respondent burdens, and to economize. 
Researchers may also apply for custom record linkages. For example, researchers 
have initiated record linkages connecting air pollution data (based on air quality 
data by postal code) to hospitalization and mortality data. 
Statistics Canada has a detailed policy governing when record linkages are 
permissible. Essentially, it requires that the analysis to be undertaken with the 
linked data is in the public interest, and no other means to conduct the research 
is available at reasonable cost. A description of every linkage is posted on Statistics 
Canada’s website. Any novel linkage requires approval at the most senior level 
of the organization (StatCan, 2011).
No ethics approval from an REB is required by Statistics Canada for any of these 
modes of access. In the case of record linkages, senior management approval 
includes ethics approval. However, the agencies that fund any of these statistical 
analyses may require formal ethics approval. For example, the Canadian Health 
Measures Survey, which had substantial funding from Health Canada and included 
precedent-setting collections of physical measures, underwent a very extensive 
review by that department’s REB, and also produced a very lengthy privacy impact 
assessment for the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in Canada. 
2.5.4 Current Major Health Research Consortia 
One of the frontiers in health research is bringing together Canada’s wealth 
of health-care encounter data with sample surveys of the population. The 
main reason is that a host of factors involved in understanding the dynamics of 
health and disease are not gathered in the routine encounter data — including 
risk factors like smoking and physical activity; socio-economic background like 
education, income, and family status; and a growing range of biomarkers from 
blood pressure to vitamin D to genetics. But such data collections are very large 
Distinguishing features
• Massive funding (tens of millions of dollars); multiple sources
• Large groups of researchers (100 or more)
• Very lengthy development periods
• Primary data collections have begun
• Major unresolved issues for pooling linked health-care encounter data
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enterprises, costing in the tens of millions of dollars. As a result, they require 
a large coalition of researchers to put together the proposals and to develop 
needed staffing and infrastructure.
At present, there are two main pan-Canadian consortia, the CLSA and CPTP. 
Their data collections are in the early stages (see Section 2.2). Others that have 
already been completed (e.g., the Canadian Study of Health and Aging, which 
examined the epidemiology of dementia in Canada) were smaller in scale. 
The bulk of the funding for the CLSA and CPTP is devoted to gathering data 
from survey respondents, including interviews, anthropometry, and blood, 
urine, and saliva samples. But a crucial planned component is linking these 
individuals’ data to their health-care encounter records where they have given 
consent. For example, both studies are fundamentally concerned with observing 
and assessing the likelihoods of developing diseases like cancer in the years 
following the initial survey data collection to determine reliably the main risk 
and protective factors — especially factors that are not routinely collected in 
health-care encounter data.
Both the CLSA and CPTP consortia have begun to work with provincial data 
custodians (Level 1) to link the health-care encounter records of the respondents 
in each province to their survey and examination (e.g., biomarker) data. A key 
unresolved challenge (falling under Level 2) is whether provincial data custodians 
will allow them to bring the linked data across provincial boundaries so as to 
achieve the significant and intended benefits of large pan-Canadian samples. 
Barriers to the CLSA are discussed in Box 3.11.
2.5.5 Other University-Based Researchers 
Distinguishing features
• Very heterogeneous
• Mostly smaller projects
• Potential for lengthy, multiple REB approval processes
• Barriers to accessing health-care encounter data
• Negligible capacity/infrastructure to share experiences
• Researchers may need assistance to determine where to find and how  
to access quality data
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In addition to the health research undertaken by university-based researchers via 
one of the approaches enumerated above, timely access to health and health-care 
data is central in many typically smaller research projects. One critical step in 
accessing the data for the research is ethics approval. Since the vast majority of this 
research is funded by a granting council, prior approval by an REB is required. 
Once approval is obtained, which itself can be time-consuming, there are further, 
often time-consuming and frustrating, steps required to gain access to the data. 
REBs are expected to give research proposals a thorough review for ethical and 
legal standards, generally based on the TCPS guidelines. The REB judges whether 
a project’s benefits outweigh harms (including the risk of revealing confidential 
information about individuals or groups), drawing on ethical guidelines as well as 
legal requirements (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3) (CIHR et al., 2014). 
To ensure that REBs come to well-informed decisions, the TCPS lays out appropriate 
competencies that must be reflected in membership of the REB panel, such 
as having members with specialist legal and ethical backgrounds, as well as 
representatives of the community. The TCPS does not mandate expertise in 
privacy practice or law, although such expertise is recommended. Data and 
privacy are becoming important topics falling within the purview of REBs, but 
many aspects of technologies related to data do not fall within the traditional 
knowledge base of all REBs. This absence may have led to concerns that REBs 
are inconsistent in interpreting ethical and legal guidelines and thus unduly 
limit the sharing of non-identifiable information (Gershon & Tu, 2008; Willison 
et al., 2008; Caulfield et al., 2011; Yiannakoulias, 2011; CIHR et al., 2014). These 
concerns highlight the fact that REBs are now facing an overwhelming list of 
responsibilities, suggesting that it may be more effective to have dedicated 
processes in place for evaluation of privacy issues so that the burden does not 
fall exclusively on REB members without enough expertise in the area. This idea 
is discussed further in Section 5.2.1.
The REB process evolved in a research context of studies where some intervention 
was being tested on a sample of patients, mainly at a single centre. Modern research, 
however, is conducted increasingly in multiple centres and across jurisdictions. 
Further, the research that is the focus of this Panel does not involve any physical 
contact with patients at all. Rather, the objective is secondary analysis of data 
where the identity of the individuals is almost always completely irrelevant. But, 
complicating matters, the research increasingly requires combining multiple 
databases to ensure that the sample size is large enough, or when the skills of 
many researchers are required. As a result, a multiplicity of REB panels may be 
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involved, and experience has shown that collections of REBs can have inconsistent 
views. The result too often is significantly repetitious work for researchers and 
significant delays in the start of research.
An example of the complexity of the REB review process is CARTaGENE (CaG), 
a longitudinal population cohort of 40,000 citizens of Quebec (aged 40 to 69). 
It includes both socio-demographic and self-reported health data as well as 
data from blood and urine tests and anthropometry (CaG, n.d.-c). Participants 
are asked and typically provide broad consent for future unspecified research. 
Permission to recontact participants and researcher access to data are subject 
to approvals from both ethics and access committees. 
Today, CaG is well under way, based at the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire 
Sainte-Justine. CaG is governed by the REB of the hospital and has its own 
independent Sample and Data Access (SDAC) committee. The access procedure 
is straightforward, requiring an evaluation of feasibility of the proposed project, 
submission of required documents (including proof of ethical approval 
from the applicants’ local REB), scientific and ethical reviews by the SDAC 
and Sainte-Justine, and signing of a Samples and Data Access Agreement 
(CaG, n.d.-b). In contrast, due to its novel character, the process of initially 
establishing CaG was complex and time-consuming. See Box 2.2 for a discussion 
of the challenges involved.
An additional challenge for researchers who are carrying out their own smaller 
projects is initially identifying which data are available, who they should 
approach for access to these data, and what the terms of access are. Constantly 
evolving legal and ethical standards, a multitude of guidance documents from 
different governing bodies and organizations, and varying interpretations of 
these documents have all led to confusion and delays (AMS, 2006). To assist 
researchers, entities such as MCHP maintain a repository of data organized 
into overarching classes (e.g., health, social, education, and justice data) and 
further sub-categorized into specific types. For each type (e.g., immunization 
data), researchers can retrieve a summary that includes, among other details, 
information about the source agency, the purpose of the data set, the years 
for which data are available, how the data were collected, and requirements 
for accessing the data (MCHP, 2014f). This type of guidance is invaluable for 
researchers who are unfamiliar with the scope of existing data and how to 
obtain access.
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2.6 AN EXAMPLE OF DATA ACCESS IN THE NETHERLANDS
Other countries have developed a variety of approaches to enabling access 
to highly sensitive individual-level data, including linked data. For example, 
the U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. National Center for Health Statistics have 
both created data enclaves on various university campuses similar to Statistics 
Canada’s RDCs. In Denmark, special arrangements are available for bona fide 
researchers to access and analyze their world famous twin registry (SDU, 2014).
Box 2.2 
Setting up CARTaGENE
After five years of consultations, efforts to begin collecting data for CaG began 
in 2007. The Quebec government insurance board (RAMQ) randomly selected potential 
participants and, with the permission of the Commission d’accès à l’information du 
Québec, set up a recruitment calling centre. Since CaG researchers could not contact 
participants directly, a ministerial decree had to be obtained to allow the RAMQ to 
be involved in CaG (Awadalla et al., 2013). 
CaG is both a population-based biobank and a prospective cohort study (Awadalla 
et al., 2013). It is an example of a research infrastructure or platform, which means 
that researchers other than those who initiated the data collection and assembly 
can also conduct research with these important and innovative data. As a result, 
it must comply with a multitude of provincial, national, and international legal 
and ethical guidelines, including (but not limited to) the Quebec Charter of Human 
Rights, the Civil Code of Quebec, the TCPS (2010), the Helsinki Declaration of the 
World Medical Association (revised in 2013), and UNESCO’s Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) (CaG, n.d.-a).
While participants had provided consent for research, the ethics approval process 
became burdensome, ultimately requiring two parallel ethics review systems. The 
first was a multi-centre approval process with a lead REB that received comments 
and approvals from 10 local ethics committees. Two did not approve. In addition 
to seeking approvals from these committees and from the Commission d’accès à 
l’information du Québec, the Université de Montréal also required ethics approval 
from its own central REB. As a result, actual recruitment could not begin until the last 
year of the project. In addition, participants gave consent for access to their RAMQ 
health-care administrative data, but access to these data is proving to be difficult. 
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A leading example is Statistics Netherlands (CBS), which has, over the past 
decade, significantly improved the ability of researchers to access detailed 
highly confidential microdata (anonymous data at the level of individual 
persons and businesses) for approved research. Staff at Statistics Netherlands’ 
Centre for Policy Related Statistics (CvB) will either carry out custom studies 
for researchers using these microdata or, under certain conditions, make 
them available to researchers outside of the CBS. To use the data, researchers 
must work for organizations that are granted access by the Director General of 
statistics. Approval by the Central Commission for Statistics is also required in 
some cases (CBS, 2014b). The data must be used “for the purposes of statistical 
or academic research” and may only be provided if “appropriate measures 
have been taken to prevent identification of individual persons, households, 
companies or institutions from [the] data” (CBS, 2004).
 A valuable feature for researchers, which is not allowed under Statistics Canada’s 
current legislation, is the option to access data remotely using a secure internet 
connection. All data sets used by researchers remain on the secure network 
environment at CBS and only statistical results are exported for use outside of 
this environment (CBS, 2014b).
CBS outlines several criteria that must be met by a researcher’s institution, so 
that he or she may be granted access to microdata:
1. “The exclusive purpose of the institution is to conduct scientific or 
statistical research.
2. If the institution has scientific or statistical research as its primary task, 
but also performs other tasks or activities, the research component 
must be effectively separated from these other tasks and activities.
3. The institution must provide public access to its published results, 
also in the case of research commissioned by a third party: the results 
of all research for which microdata are used must be made publicly 
accessible in their entirety immediately and in principle free of charge.
4. The institution must be reputable.”
(CBS, 2014a)
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As an example, researchers at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic 
Institute (NIDI) are studying the impact of the period during World War II 
when there was a famine in Amsterdam. They have data on individuals whose 
mothers were pregnant in each trimester during the famine. They are now 
working with CBS to link these individuals with labour force, hospitalization, 
and mortality records over the last 25 years to assess the long-term impacts of 
these extreme prenatal stresses. With NIDI as an “approved organization,” there 
is a secure PC on site with a fingerprint reader. NIDI researchers are themselves 
approved, as are their specific record linkage and research projects. They are 
therefore able to access the data and conduct their research at computers only 
a few steps away from their offices, at any time of day or night.
Based on the criteria quoted above, CBS has approved similar arrangements for 
researchers at several U.S. and Australian universities, as well as EU universities. 
CBS has positioned itself as an organization with the potential to become a 
leading Level 3 example. CBS is also developing means for researchers to 
use confidential microdata as inputs to researchers’ own software such as 
simulation models.
Clauses to improve access for researchers were added to the Statistics Netherlands 
Act in January 2004 (CBS, 2004). Canada’s Statistics Act contains does not 
contain similar clauses (GOC, 2014a). As a result, in Canada it would not be 
possible under current legislation for Statistics Canada to emulate the Dutch 
approach for more flexibly providing researchers with access to its data, nor 
for it to act as a safe and similarly accessible data custodian for other important 
pan-Canadian data.
2.7 TIMELINESS
A central charge for this assessment was to examine best practice and governance 
with respect to timely access (see Chapter 1). To this end, the Panel examined 
available evidence on the time currently taken to access data.
To identify timelines for access to health administrative data across Canada, 
and factors affecting those timelines, in 2013 researchers at Population 
Data BC administered a survey of provincial ministries or organizations 
responsible for access to these data. The study found that when researchers 
actively pursued an application for data, it took anywhere between 1 to 18 
months for them to receive the data. The survey asked organizations what they 
considered an ideal and realistic length of time for access, and many respondents 
supported a timeframe of two to four months. Only four (Alberta Health Services, 
MCHP in Manitoba, ICES in Ontario, and the Dalhousie Population Health 
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Research Unit in Nova Scotia) of the nine provincial centres participating 
in the survey reported that they were able to meet this timeframe 
(Meagher & McGrail, 2013).
In advance of reporting data access times for each organization, Meagher and 
McGrail (2013) make some important points in their report. They recognize 
that it is difficult to separate numbers from context, such as variations in the 
types of data and methods of access offered, as well as “when each centre 
starts counting time” (Meagher & McGrail, 2013). For example, in all of the 
centres investigated, research requests required REB approval, with only a 
few exceptions. However, the approach to data custodian review was more 
variable, with some centres always requiring individual approval from the 
originating custodians of each data set, others not including a formal data 
custodian review but instead considering approval implicit through completion 
of research agreements, and others setting up access committees to perform 
the function of data custodians. The first case (individual custodian approval) 
applied to all projects requiring linked external data. A few centres included 
additional review processes that were explicitly referred to as privacy reviews 
(Meagher & McGrail, 2013).
Population Data BC is an example of the first case identified above, in which 
access is always granted by a designated data steward from each agency that 
provides data to the organization. Although Population Data BC “acts as the 
custodian of, and access point for, [its] various data holdings,” the holdings 
themselves “remain under the stewardship of the agency that originally collected 
the data” (Arabsky et al., 2014). 
Arabsky et al. (2014) examined the time it takes to prepare data for a data-based 
research project at Population Data BC, from the time the initial contact is 
made between the researcher and Population Data BC, to the time that data 
are delivered. Given that a detailed study on timelines was available for this 
organization, the Panel chose to use it as an example. However, access to data 
from Population Data BC takes longer than access to data held at the best 
practice entities identified by the Panel. The entire process takes an average of 
just over 15 months (median 10 months). The initial preparation for accessing 
data (stage one), including developing a linkage approach, clarifying variables 
requested, and completing forms for ethics approval, takes an average of 
4.7 months (median 3 months). Factors affecting the length of this process 
(referred to as time drivers) include the familiarity of the researcher with the 
application process, which affects how well he or she completes the initial 
application, as well as the responsiveness of the researcher during back-and-
forth communication with Population Data BC. 
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Obtaining approval from data custodians (stage two) takes an average of 
5.6 months (median 4 months), as data custodians review, clarify, and modify 
applications. During this stage, the data access request must be shown to comply 
with ethical requirements and privacy legislation. A central time driver at this 
point is the complexity of the project (e.g., the number of data sources being 
linked). Population Data BC has made efforts to make stage two more efficient; 
as a result, the time declined from a median of approximately one year in 2011 
to four months in 2013 (Arabsky et al., 2014).
The third stage, which includes completion of agreements related to research, 
information sharing, and confidentiality, takes an average of four months 
(median two months). Time drivers at this stage include the responsiveness 
of all parties involved and the capacity of external data providers to produce 
the requested data. The final stage of data preparation and delivery takes one 
month and timing is mainly affected by project complexity (Arabsky et al., 2014). 
Access times may be prolonged not only by the complexity of the project, 
but also by the complexity of the approval process. For example, a request to 
the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner in Quebec requires 
two levels of approval compared with just one in other jurisdictions 
(C. Bétie, CAI, personal communication, 2014). Furthermore, the REB 
process operates separately from review by data custodians. As noted by 
Arabsky et al. (2014), the current process and requirements are not harmonized 
between data custodians and REBs.
For comparison, the timelines and access rates for the best practice entities 
selected by the Panel for governance review are reflected in Table 2.1. Similar 
to the study by Meagher and McGrail (2013), the numbers in the table reflect 
data provided by the entities themselves and have not been cross-validated by 
the researcher community, external data sources, or others. They represent 
the time it takes for a researcher to access data starting from the point at which 
the researcher submits a completed application and ending when the data are 
released to the researcher. This is roughly equivalent to the start of stage two 
in the Population Data BC process, and therefore does not include the time 
taken for less experienced researchers to submit finalized applications.
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Table 2.1 
Access Rate and Timelines for the Six “Best Practice Entities” Identified by the Panel
Organization Access time (from point of 
completed application to point  
of data delivery)
Number of requests  
per year
MCHP Approximately 2–4 months 40–50
ICES* Approximately 1–2 months Approximately 300
SAIL Approximately 1–2.5 months 
(average of 53 days)
Approve 30–50 projects 
BORN Approximately 4–6 weeks 3
Farr Institute @ 
Scotland
Approximately 1–3 months Provide access to approximately  
150 research project data sets
Data Linkage WA Approximately 2–3 months 50–100
* Historically, ICES has provided data to researchers appointed as ICES Scientists. Beginning in 
March 2014, it launched the ICES Data & Analytic Services, which allows any researcher in Ontario to 
apply for access to data. The numbers in the table reflect the amount of time it takes for ICES Scientists 
(and not external researchers) to access ICES data.
As described throughout this section, many factors can affect access times, 
making it difficult to directly compare organizations. (Note that descriptions 
of the best practice entities chosen by the Panel are provided in Box 5.2.) One 
critical factor is the scope of information to which the organization provides 
access. For example, Data Linkage WA offers access to a wide array of both 
health and non-health data; many requests require data from one or more 
external providers, such as those that are part of the transport, justice, or social 
services sectors (D. Rosman, Data Linkage WA, personal communication). 
Organizations with a more targeted focus (e.g., ICES, health data only; BORN, 
data related to pregnancy, birth, and childhood) may be in a better position to 
streamline data access and researchers working in the relevant fields may have 
the opportunity to become more familiar with data access protocols. Another 
factor is whether the request involves existing linkages or requires new, custom-
made linkages. For example, while SAIL is able to store pre-linked data, the 
Farr Institute @ Scotland is required to create new linkages for each request 
(S. Pavis, Farr Institute, personal communication). Thus, the information 
in Table 2.1 must be considered in the context of these and other variations 
among the best practice entities.
2.8 CONCLUSION
Tremendous volumes of digitized health and health-related data are generated 
on a daily basis. These data are created every time individuals interact with 
health-care providers, educational institutions, and government departments. 
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These data can take many forms (e.g., free-form text or standard database 
entries such as age and other demographic characteristics). When the data 
are provided to researchers, they may be in a form anywhere along a spectrum 
of identifiability: individual-level data can shift from fully identifiable (made 
available only under the strictest and most secure conditions) to mildly 
de-identified to strongly de-identified. The far end of the spectrum does not 
involve individual-level data; instead, data are aggregated to produce statistical 
information and only this aggregated information is made accessible.
Canada has health and health-related data with world-class research potential. 
However, much of this potential is not being fully realized due to an incoherent 
maze of rules, procedures, and practices, and a general tendency of many data 
custodians to err on the side of caution when it comes to granting access. Much 
of this research potential involves secondary use of data — accessing data whose 
collection is driven, in the first instance, by other very important objectives, 
including patient care and remuneration of health-care providers. As a result, 
these data are often not “analysis-ready.” They require substantial technical and 
methodological efforts (e.g., creating derived variables like number of doctor 
visits in the last year) to make them suitable for statistical analysis. Finally, with 
health care primarily in provincial or territorial jurisdiction, there is often 
important variation in nominally similar data collected in different jurisdictions. 
Therefore, unless they are using data available from CIHI or Statistics Canada, 
researchers undertaking pan-Canadian analysis face two significant problems: 
harmonizing data from different provinces and territories, and actually bringing 
data together across jurisdictional boundaries. Addressing the barriers to 
pooling data across jurisdictional boundaries would dramatically improve the 
extent and quality of health research in Canada.
The context of each data custodian and the type of research to be conducted 
influence the degree of access. As a result, there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach 
to accessing data; custodians provide and researchers obtain access to data in 
a variety of ways. As well, long processes to receive access can delay research 
and engender increased costs, or amount to a de facto denial of access. Among 
the most problematic of these processes are REB approvals, which may involve 
multiple submissions with differing requirements to many bodies, any one of 
which may delay or deny approval. Delays may also result from other bodies 
governing data access (e.g., the Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec) 
or data custodians. Incomplete applications from researchers can also increase 
access times. Common approaches that clarify and allocate responsibilities 
would facilitate and accelerate appropriate access.
47Chapter 3 Accessing Health and Health-Related Data: Benefits, Risks, and Barriers
• Benefits of Health Research 
• Benefits of Accessing and Linking Data  
for Health Research 
• How Data Access and Linkage Can Improve 
Health Outcomes and Health Sector Innovation
• Risks of Research Using Health and  
Health-Related Data
• Barriers to Accessing Data
• Conclusion
3
Accessing Health and Health-Related Data: 
Benefits, Risks, and Barriers
48 Accessing Health and Health-Related Data in Canada
3 Accessing Health and Health-Related Data: 
Benefits, Risks, and Barriers
This chapter outlines and provides illustrative examples of the main benefits 
of research based on individual-level data, including analyses of integrated 
databases and linked health and health-related data. It also reviews the main 
risks involved and the challenges of using such data. Despite the concerns that 
an individual could be identified from these rich databases and the often highly 
sensitive information they contain, the examples demonstrate that important and 
beneficial research can advance in Canada while confidentiality is maintained. 
3.1 BENEFITS OF HEALTH RESEARCH 
In 2013, health-care spending in Canada was projected to reach $211 billion — or 
$5,988 per person — which represents 11.2% of national gross domestic product. 
Governments’ share of health spending has been consistently at around 70% 
in Canada, with over 90% of government contributions through provincial 
and territorial governments (CIHI, 2013c). There are widespread fears that, 
over coming decades, an aging Canadian population and intensification of 
treatment will increase health-care expenditures (CHSRF, 2011; PBO, 2013). 
Key Findings
• There are major benefits to increasing the appropriate use of individual-level health 
and health-related data to improve patient care and health and social services.
• Based on evidence from business and government, the main privacy risks of 
working with identifiable data are deliberate (e.g., malicious attack) or inadvertent 
(e.g., human error) data release. Although health data breaches can cause serious 
harm, the risk of a breach actually occurring in the context of research is low, 
particularly if effective governance mechanisms are in place and if they are respected 
by care providers, researchers, and data custodians. 
• De-identification of individual-level data combined with corresponding regulation 
of data access is another effective strategy for managing privacy risks. 
• An additional risk arises from research on specific communities, which has the 
potential to make individuals within these communities feel stigmatized. This risk 
can be appropriately mitigated by involving communities in the research process.
• Numerous barriers can impede health data research, including logistical and ethical 
barriers to achieving access, reluctance of organizations to share data, and issues 
with the data themselves, such as lack of comparability between data sets.
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However, ample evidence shows that better management of health services is key 
to containing growing health-care costs (Evans et al., 2001). Such management 
depends critically on being able to work smarter, not harder.
In Canada, economic returns have been estimated for health research projects 
in general; for instance, a one-time investment of $1 in cardiovascular disease 
research by public or charitable sources yields a continuing stream of benefits 
of roughly $0.21 to the Canadian economy each year going forward through 
better health outcomes (de Oliveira et al., 2013). While there does not seem to 
be clear evidence on the aggregate contribution of health research in Canada, 
organizations such as the National Alliance of Provincial Health Research 
Organizations are demonstrating impact through performance measures, 
such as the recently developed Canadian Academy of Health Sciences (CAHS) 
framework to measure returns on investment in health research (CAHS, 2009). 
This framework has been widely used to measure the impacts of health research 
in Canada (CCA, 2013). 
Regularly collected data, including those capturing individuals’ health-care 
encounters, remain a significantly underutilized resource with the potential to 
enhance many aspects of health care. Research using these data can improve 
health outcomes and patient safety, better inform a range of health and social 
policies, enable beneficial innovations, reduce health-care practices of little 
or no benefit, and slow the growth in health-care costs (Roos et al., 2008; 
Taylor & Lynch, 2010; Jutte et al., 2011; Lewis, 2011). However, much of 
this research is predicated both on timely access to these data and, in some 
cases, on the ability to link data across jurisdictions. The Panel found many 
examples of compelling and pertinent research around the world from such data 
(see Lewis (2011) for a review). It was, however, difficult to quantify the resulting 
benefits. More information on the scale of these benefits would allow the 
perceptions and realities of any risks and harms from a potential loss of data 
confidentiality to be placed in context.
The importance of timely access to health data is effectively demonstrated by 
examples of the damage that can be done without population-wide collection 
and prompt analysis of these data. One such example is the story of pemoline, a 
mild central nervous system stimulant that was approved in 1975 for treatment 
of children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In 1995, 
researchers at the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto reported the case of 
a 14-year-old boy diagnosed with ADHD who had been receiving pemoline for 
16 months and methylphenidate for 2 months. The boy died following acute 
liver failure and an unsuccessful liver transplant. The practitioners who cared 
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for the boy found two other published cases of acute liver failure associated 
with pemoline in the United States, but the FDA and the manufacturer were not 
aware of any others. After the Toronto case was published, additional cases were 
reported, and pemoline was withdrawn in 1999 and 2005 from the Canadian 
and U.S. markets, respectively. A 2008 study showed that analysis of existing 
data could have revealed a significant signal associating pemoline with acute 
liver failure as early as 1978 (Etwel et al., 2008). Thus, for a period of 25 years, 
children taking pemoline were unknowingly at risk for a fatal adverse reaction.
3.2 BENEFITS OF ACCESSING AND LINKING DATA  
FOR HEALTH RESEARCH 
There are a variety of well-documented reasons for accessing and linking data 
sets (Taylor & Lynch, 2010; Jutte et al., 2011). This section outlines some of them: 
• Providing local health benefits: Improved research benefits policy development 
and leads to improvements in quality of local health organizations. Medical 
and scientific knowledge from research improves services and care, and leads 
to reforms in policy and legislation. For example, in the case of Data Linkage 
Western Australia, “reforms in mental health legislation and service delivery 
can be attributed to research based on linked data” (Taylor & Lynch, 2010). 
• Lowering costs and saving time for new research: Data are often expensive 
to collect, especially in standardized and computer-accessible forms. Thus, it 
is cost-effective to take data that were originally collected for administrative 
or operational reasons and use them for research purposes. Data linkage 
(see Section 2.4.2) is particularly economical because the costs of 
developing procedures that make the data linkable are only incurred once 
(Chamberlayne et al., 1998), thus minimizing costs for new research. Existing 
information in EMRs also has the potential to simplify expensive, time-
consuming clinical trials in certain circumstances, such as those in which 
approved drugs are evaluated for their comparative effectiveness. Rather than 
recruiting new participants, researchers can evaluate the outcome of different 
drugs in patients who are already taking them (Manchester University, 2014).
• Opening new avenues for research: Data linkage allows the same data 
to be used for many different research programs (Holman et al., 2008). 
Existing population-based data collections can be used more efficiently and 
effectively than individual longitudinal field studies (Sibthorpe et al., 1995; 
Brook et al., 2008). Data linked from sources that are seemingly unrelated 
allow outcomes from different areas (e.g., medical and educational outcomes) 
to be examined in the same cohort (Jutte et al., 2011). Without linkable data, 
such research could not be undertaken. 
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• Enabling hypothesis generation: As discussed in Chapter 2, the mining of 
large data sets and big data can uncover potentially important and previously 
unconsidered relationships, which can then be investigated further using 
other approaches, such as retrospective or prospective observational studies, 
replication in other populations, or, if possible, randomized controlled trials. 
• Improving assessment of overall well-being throughout life: Linking various 
health and social data allows researchers to get a more complete picture of 
the disparate factors that contribute to the physical and mental health of a 
population. If data collection is ongoing, researchers can evaluate exposure 
effects over the life span and reach a more sophisticated understanding of 
temporal relationships (e.g., the impact of conditions during childhood on 
outcomes later in life) (Hanlon et al., 2007; Jutte et al., 2011). The monitoring, 
surveillance, and analytical assessment of a wide array of variables within 
a population may enable knowledge gaps to be addressed.
• Improving data quality and integrity: Efforts that promote more extensive use 
of existing data, such as research involving data linkage, often improve the 
quality and integrity of these data (Christen & Goiser, 2007). More accurate 
recording of administrative data may also result from data linkage, as many 
duplication errors and other technical glitches may be resolved in the linkage 
process (Holman et al., 2008). The use of data on entire populations — an 
opportunity for Canada because of its universal health system — would 
therefore be more accurate.
• Providing larger, more comprehensive samples: By enabling researchers 
to access larger samples, population-wide health and health-related data 
enable the study of rare events (e.g., rare diseases or rare adverse reactions 
to treatments), as well as weaker but more pervasive relationships. In 
jurisdictions with databases that capture information on the entire population 
(e.g., those with population registries such as Manitoba), this allows the 
outcomes of individuals who did not receive a service to be included in analyses 
(Jutte et al., 2011). In some cases, individuals who miss a screening program 
may be among those most at risk for negative outcomes (Brownell et al., 2011).
• Reducing bias: If researchers are able to access existing data without seeking 
consent from individuals, this can reduce selection, recruitment, and 
participation biases. These biases, which result from the higher likelihood 
of certain groups to give consent for access to their records, can potentially 
lead to inaccurate, misleading results (Tu et al., 2004; Al-Shahi et al., 2005; 
AMS, 2006; Harris et al., 2008). See Section 4.5.3 for further discussion of 
this issue.
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• Improving data handling and confidentiality: Computerized records in 
appropriate physical, hardware, and software environments are generally 
much more secure than paper records. For example, automated logging 
of all access to data is more secure than undocumented access to paper 
records, which may be held in unsecured environments. Moreover, since data 
linkage decreases the need for researchers to have access to names and other 
personal identifiers, it better protects patient confidentiality. Epidemiological 
and health service research projects using named data from major health 
collections in Western Australia fell to 36% in 2003 from over 90% before 
Data Linkage Western Australia was established (Holman et al., 2008). 
New electronic methods mean that researchers no longer need to find and 
gather information on individuals manually, a process that was less secure 
and far more expensive. 
• Lowering response burden: Filling out forms and answering the same 
question from different government departments and agencies can be 
burdensome and costly for citizens. Asking the questions once (in a doctor’s 
office for patient care or an initial study), and then sharing that response 
between providers and agencies, lowers the response burden for individuals 
(Jones, 2012). A study in Finland, for example, found that using administrative 
data is less costly than using dedicated surveys (Gissler & Haukka, 2004). 
• Increasing communication: Data reuse, including via record linkage, usually 
results in more communication between researchers, clinicians, administrators, 
data custodians, consumer groups, and the media (Holman et al., 2008). It 
“increases team working, allows for improved cooperation and identification 
of future possibilities and allows for debate about the uses of data and results 
of any subsequent research” (Taylor & Lynch, 2010).
3.3 HOW DATA ACCESS AND LINKAGE CAN IMPROVE 
HEALTH OUTCOMES AND HEALTH SECTOR INNOVATION
To illustrate how data access and linkage have been and could be used to 
enhance health outcomes and health system innovation, the Panel selected some 
examples of research studies in Canada. These studies have been undertaken 
by institutions with effective mechanisms to enable timely access to health and 
health-related data and effectively linkable databases. The research done at 
these institutions (and at many others in Canada and internationally) is achieved 
within strong privacy and confidentiality frameworks. Boxes 3.1 to 3.4 provide 
examples of research using data from within a single province (Level 1), and 
Boxes 3.5 to 3.8 are examples of pan-Canadian research (Level 2).
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Box 3.1 describes research from ICES and Public Health Ontario that used 
linkage of survey data to show the actions that Ontarians can take, based on 
sound evidence, to improve their longevity. 
Box 3.1 
Ontarians Can Live Longer by Living Healthier
Health behaviours play a central role in determining longevity. Researchers at ICES 
and Public Health Ontario wanted to estimate the risks of death associated with 
smoking, unhealthy alcohol consumption, poor diet, physical inactivity, and high stress. 
Information about these risk factors for Ontarians was collected from the Canadian 
Community Health Surveys completed between 2001 and 2005. Well over 90% of 
survey respondents agreed to have their responses linked to their provincial health 
records, which enabled researchers to track mortality rates to 2010. The statistical 
results were then applied to the 2007 Canadian Community Health Survey, to estimate 
life expectancy and health-adjusted life expectancy for all Ontarians, and to see how 
much they changed depending on these five health risk factors. 
The results showed that people with the unhealthiest behaviour for all five risks had 
much shorter life expectancies (68.5 years for men and 71.5 years for women) than 
people with none of the risks (88.6 for men and 92.5 for women), thereby reducing 
life expectancy by an average 7.5 years. Three behaviours, in particular, had the 
greatest association with reduced life expectancy: smoking, physical inactivity, and 
unhealthy eating. Linked data used in this study demonstrated the real benefits of 
interventions that can effectively address the most important of these risk factors.
(ICES & PHO, 2012a, 2012b) 
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Linking data from research cohorts with administrative databases such as 
medical records can also provide direction for health and social services, as 
illustrated in Box 3.2.
Box 3.2 
Linked Databases Identify Risk and Resilience  
Factors at One Year of Age
Researchers in Alberta used linked databases to determine what factors protect 
against adverse outcomes in children at risk of poor developmental outcomes at one 
year of age. The research used data from a cohort study in Alberta of 3,200 mothers 
and their children, followed from pregnancy through to school age. The cohort study, 
called “All Our Babies,” was started in 2008 and currently has rich health and social 
data on the mothers and children over five years. Participating mothers consented 
to linkage of study data with administrative data from medical records and provided 
biological samples and infant cord blood as well. Under data sharing agreements, 
qualified researchers can access the cohort data, subject to research ethics approval 
of each research project. 
Linkage of cohort study data with medical records clearly showed factors that help 
children at risk because of poverty, language barriers, or mothers with mental health 
problems or exposure to abuse. Children did well if their caregiver used community 
supports (such as programs in the community for “Mom and Tot,” recreational 
programs for mothers, or drop-in child care), or played imitation games and read to 
their children. However, infants born preterm remained at high risk for poor outcomes 
and required additional supports and services to those described above to alleviate 
risk of developmental delays. This research provided support for low-cost interventions 
such as imitation games and reading to children as well as for community programs 
for mothers and children.
(Gracie et al., 2010; McDonald et al., 2013)
1
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As an example of social research, Box 3.3 shows how record linkage can provide 
more accurate information about the correlation between socio-economic 
status and educational achievement than standards test results alone. Assessing 
student performance can be a useful way to compare education levels across 
regions and hold education systems accountable for quality education. 
It can also provide information about educational achievement and 
socio-economic status.
Box 3.3 
Low Income Affects Educational Achievement More  
Than Previously Thought
While grade 12 testing in Canada has traditionally shown a correlation between 
low income and educational achievements, these tests consider only students who 
remain in school until grade 12, and who write the test. Researchers at MCHP used 
record linkage to analyze data from their Population Health Research Data Repository, 
including all children who were born and remained in Manitoba until age 18. Linkage 
between the population registry and the educational enrolment file enabled researchers 
to identify children and adolescents who were delayed a grade or more or who had 
withdrawn from school (Brownell et al., 2006; Roos et al., 2006). The analysis showed 
a stronger relationship between socio-economic status (SES) and achievement than 
previously found when examining grade 12 standards tests: “only 14% of children 
whose families had at some point received income assistance passed the grade 12 
test on time compared with the 80% of students living in high SES areas” (Roos et 
al., 2011). The previous approach of looking at the data only for those children who 
had taken the test had shown that 76% of children from families receiving income 
assistance passed the test compared with 96% of students living in more affluent 
areas. Without the data linkage, this considerable discrepancy would not have come 
to light (Brownell et al., 2006; Roos et al., 2006).
Although many officials in the Manitoba Department of Education had known that 
there was a relationship between SES and educational performance, when presented 
with the evidence from the study, government representatives were surprised at the 
strength of this relationship (Roos et al., 2011).
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Box 3.4 demonstrates how data from divergent administrative databases can 
be linked to provide insight into the health of the population and their use of 
the health system. The Ministry of Health in British Columbia developed the 
Health System Matrix to understand the current needs and estimate the future 
demand for health care in the province.
Box 3.5 shows how record linkage revealed that seniors are at risk from adverse 
reactions to drugs. Applying lessons from this study can lead to better health 
outcomes for seniors, while decreasing the cost associated with unnecessary 
hospital admissions.
Box 3.4 
Health System Matrix Links Public Health System Data  
to Understand Health-Care Needs of B.C. Residents 
A patient may have multiple encounters with the health system, and information on 
the encounters is typically collected in separate databases. This presents a significant 
challenge for both providers and those managing the health system because every 
encounter may tell only part of the story. The Health System Matrix project in 
British Columbia creates a summary view of an individual’s encounters with the health 
system over the year by bringing together all major B.C. public health system data 
sources in a single database. The summary view includes basic socio-demographic 
data, chronic conditions, and summaries of health-care services that each resident 
uses. The data are then divided into 13 health status categories (ranging from healthy 
to end-of-life) and categorized into 25 service lines to show how different population 
segments use health-care services over time.
The Health System Matrix emphasizes the importance of taking into account the entire 
health system, which is possible only by combining data sources. The key conclusion 
from this approach has been that various groups within the population have different 
health-care needs, use different bundles of services, and move between health states 
at different rates. This insight has helped to focus the Ministry of Health’s strategic 
planning on prevention, care for people with chronic conditions, and the trajectory 
to residential care. The Matrix has been used in modelling health care and estimating 
future demand for it. It has also been incorporated into the population needs-based 
funding allocation model, one of the tools the Ministry uses to decide on funding 
for health authorities. 
(B.C. Ministry of Health, personal communication, 2014)
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Box 3.6 shows another approach when data pooling is not possible. Pharmaceutical 
use is a significant element of Canadian health care. ADRs may be found only 
after a drug has been approved for use because the small sample sizes typical 
of the drug trials used for regulatory approval may not provide evidence on 
infrequent ADRs. As a result, more comprehensive monitoring for ADRs requires 
data on large populations. A seminal Institute of Medicine (IOM) study in the 
United States found ADRs to be a major cause of death (IOM, 2000).
Based on studies like that of the IOM, Health Canada recently funded the 
establishment of a research program to undertake more rigorous post-marketing 
surveillance. The program assesses possible ADRs by drawing on the linked 
data sets in a number of provinces. However, because data custodians in the 
participating provinces were unable to find a means for pooling their data, an 
alternative approach using “distributed analysis” has been used.
Box 3.5 
Seniors are Five Times Likelier to be Hospitalized  
for Adverse Drug Reactions 
Seniors are at an increased risk for adverse drug reactions (ADRs) because of the 
higher number of drugs they take and the higher prevalence of chronic conditions 
affecting them. This leads to a higher-than-average rate of hospitalization for people 
over age 65. In early 2013, CIHI analyzed data for seniors from two of its databases 
(Discharge Abstract Database or DAD, and Hospital Morbidity Database) in all Canadian 
provinces and territories over a five-year period. Data from the DAD were linked with 
drug claims data from the public drug programs in Alberta, Manitoba, and Prince Edward 
Island — provinces for which linkable data were available. The analysis showed that 
seniors were five times more likely than the rest of the population to be hospitalized 
for ADRs. The most likely reasons for hospitalization depended on the type of drug 
(e.g., blood thinners causing bleeding or opioids causing constipation). Other factors 
affecting the risk of serious ADRs included maintaining the proper dosage, the total number 
of drugs taken, drug interactions, patient age, and hospitalization in the previous year. 
The linked data revealed serious risks for the first time, and found some of the 
influences on these risks. The results also put a sharper focus on ways to avoid 
ADRs in seniors. Medications can be reviewed and managed using drug information 
systems. A complete picture of an individual’s medications can help reduce costly 
hospital admissions due to ADRs resulting from overmedication. 
(CIHI, 2013a)
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Box 3.6 
CNODES Network Uncovers Adverse Drug Reactions 
2
 
across Canada 
Until recently, the principal means by which ADRs were detected in Canada was 
through a voluntary system in which physicians reported side effects to Health 
Canada.* Confirmation and estimation of risk relied on individual investigators 
obtaining funding to access and analyze data from individual provinces. This ad hoc 
arrangement was uncertain and time-consuming. Since 2011, CNODES, created by CIHR 
and funded by Health Canada, has supported and coordinated a distributed network 
of provincial teams comprising academic researchers, clinical content experts, and 
analysts who obtain expedited access to linked data held in provincial repositories. 
Because of restrictions on linking health-care data across provinces, the statistical 
analysis is undertaken in two steps. First, using an agreed and common methodology 
and analytical protocol, each provincial group analyzes its de-identified individual-
level data to see if there is an association between using the drug and a clinical 
effect (e.g., kidney damage or diabetes). Local sites have been extensively involved 
in developing the scientific and analytical protocols and have gained experience 
estimating complex statistical relationships. Aggregate data (regression coefficients) 
from each province-level analysis are then sent to a central methods group that 
looks at whether different provincial findings agree and performs a meta-analysis 
to provide a Canada-wide estimate of effect.
The value of the network has been demonstrated by CNODES studies highlighting the 
risks of developing kidney damage and diabetes from using high-dose cholesterol-
lowering drugs (statins). The studies of statins have involved over two million users 
identified across seven provinces — something that would be impossible with data 
from a single province. While the distributed analysis used by CNODES is a significant 
improvement, there are other approaches. One new approach that achieves the benefits 
of data pooling without actually requiring data to flow outside any jurisdiction is the 
DataSHIELD method (discussed in Section 2.4.3).
(Dormuth et al., 2013, 2014)
*  Vioxx, an anti-inflammatory drug, provides a vivid example in which a clear and serious side effect, 
heart attack, could not be detected by the voluntary system. The correlation was not easily seen 
because individual physicians typically have many patients taking Vioxx, of which many have heart 
attacks. The relationship was seen clearly only after a statistical analysis of millions of patient 
records in which individual data on drug prescriptions and hospital visits for heart attacks were 
linked (Graham et al., 2005).
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Box 3.7 shows how record linkage can lead to development of a richer picture 
of the Canadian population, which can provide a more precise context for 
health policy (StatCan, 2010a). The Canadian population has changed rapidly 
in recent decades owing to persistent low fertility and strong immigration. 
Such changes have implications for public policy, which can be better informed 
by regional population projections concerning variations in visible minority 
groups, religious affiliation, and mother tongue (StatCan, 2010b).
Box 3.8 showcases how data integration, through the use of common data 
standards and measurement tools, can help improve the health system. Canadian 
hospital administrators continue to search for ways to optimize the duration 
of hospital stays while ensuring quality rehabilitation programs and support.
Box 3.7 
Population Trends Can be Projected to Improve 
2
 
Targeted Policies 
Public policy can be improved through better information on future demographic 
trends. In 2004, Statistics Canada developed Demosim, a population projection 
model that uses a method called microsimulation, in which projections are done at 
the individual level for a representative sample of about seven million Canadians 
who participated in the former long-form census (and currently its successor, the 
National Household Survey, in 2011). Demosim also makes extensive use of linked 
data sets, including census, mortality, income tax, immigration, National Household 
Survey, and Aboriginal population data — data collected for other primary purposes. 
The first published Demosim projections indicated that by 2017 more than 50% of 
Toronto’s population would be visible minorities. 
The results of the Demosim projections respond directly to policy needs of federal 
government departments and provide important information to a spectrum of 
Canadians and Canadian organizations. For example, Demosim is being used to 
project Canada’s Aboriginal population and ethnocultural diversity.
(StatCan, 2010b)
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3.4 RISKS OF RESEARCH USING HEALTH  
AND HEALTH-RELATED DATA
In the context of health and social data, the conversation between a doctor and 
patient and the information in a drug prescription are examples of private, 
personal information that an individual may not want to be revealed. These 
data could be misused by others outside the health-care context, and lead to 
stigmatization or discrimination. Hence, in allowing access to data for research 
purposes, one of the key objectives is to maintain confidentiality of identifiable 
information. In addition to privacy risks, research on specific communities 
(e.g., people affected by a particular disease such as HIV) can carry the additional 
risks of stigmatization or exploitation. 
Box 3.8 
Secondary Use of Data Leads to Lower Cost and  
Shorter Length of Stay in Stroke Rehabilitation Units 
Health services research to lower costs and improve service delivery to individual 
patients can benefit from secondary use of data.
In 2001, CIHI developed the National Rehabilitation Reporting System to collect data 
on patients admitted to rehabilitation programs in hospitals and other centres across 
Canada. The data gathered include organizational information, patient identifiers, 
socio-demographic data, administrative data, and clinical information. CIHI then 
de-identifies and analyzes the data to produce reports for health-care providers 
across the country. 
One such report showed that timely access to care for patients who have suffered 
a stroke could be improved through better matching of patients to appropriate 
rehabilitation services. In response, the Calgary Stroke Program developed a new 
triage system. This triage allowed the program to align patients’ needs with the most 
appropriate rehabilitation services, while discharging low-risk clients to rehabilitate 
at home with community- and home-based rehabilitation supports. This initiative has 
resulted in a significant decrease in the cost and average length of stay for individuals 
in stroke rehabilitation (from an average 72 to 42 days), enabling more patients to 
have timelier access to the stroke unit.
(CIHI, 2013b) 
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3.4.1 Risks to Privacy
In allowing the use of health and health-related data, one risk is that private 
information will be revealed. The level of risk to individuals is determined by 
the probability of revealing the data, and the potential harm from such an 
event. The Panel identified four main risks (Box 3.9) from using individual-
level data, each of which is influenced by the practices of the data custodians 
and the way in which data are stored and accessed. 
Box 3.9  
Four Main Privacy Risks of Using Individual-Level Health Data
Risk type 1: Accidental release of data. One risk that attracts much attention 
is the accidental release of identifiable data — to the public or to unauthorized 
researchers — when proper security and privacy protocols are not followed, such as 
forgetting or losing unencrypted USB keys containing large amounts of confidential 
data in a public place. Any of those with access to data place confidentiality at risk 
if their data handling procedures are not appropriate.
Risk type 2: Illicit access. Hacking into databases would allow intruders to access 
data that could be used for illicit purposes. Misuse of data by employees (e.g., 
employee snooping) may also occur. 
Risk type 3: Inadvertent access. Many people may get access to health data in 
the course of doing their day-to-day jobs. They may inadvertently recognize someone 
they know in the data set during these activities. Such a spontaneous or inadvertent 
recognition of someone is considered a breach in the disclosure control community. 
For example, an employee of the data custodian doing statistical analysis on a data 
set could inadvertently recognize a neighbour or relative in the database. This is one 
of the reasons the number of individuals who come into contact with identifiable 
data needs to be limited, and why proper de-identification needs to be put in place 
when data will be accessed by many people.
Risk type 4: Data re-identification. Removing information that could identify 
individuals (de-identification) from data released to researchers greatly lowers the 
risk of harm. However, if de-identification is done poorly, the data could still contain 
sufficient information that individuals could be identified and their sensitive information 
revealed. This is especially true when data are used in conjunction with other public 
databases and social media. Hence, re-identification risk is the possibility of turning 
de-identified data back into identifiable data through the use of data matching or 
similar techniques (ICO, 2012).
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Risk types 1 and 2 apply to any type of data (identifiable or de-identified), 
but are only potentially harmful to individuals if they involve identifiable 
data; release, loss, or theft of properly de-identified data is not considered 
a privacy breach. Risk type 3 applies to a small subset of individuals who are 
authorized to work with identifiable data or with data that are improperly or 
inadequately de-identified. Risk type 4 primarily applies to data that have not 
been properly de-identified. 
A study by the Ponemon Institute (2013) examining data breaches in 16 industry 
sectors (including health care, pharmaceuticals, research, and education) 
suggests that in reality human error (which falls under risk type 1), malicious 
or criminal attack (risk type 2), and system glitches (which could contribute 
to types 1, 2, and 3) are the most serious concerns with identifiable data. 
Shey (2013) reports that, of all sources of data breach, inadvertent misuse by 
insiders constitutes 36% of cases, and loss or theft of corporate assets (e.g., 
servers or laptops) accounts for a further 32%. Indeed, concerns over the risks 
of identifiable data release to unauthorized individuals have become widespread, 
given media attention to the stories of National Security Agency hacking and 
thefts of millions of credit card and related data from various large companies. 
One, however, should be cautious in generalizing from the national security 
context and a retail context to a research context. Nonetheless, the Panel is 
aware of a few data breaches of personal health information by researchers 
in Canada, as well as breaches from research databases (see below). However, 
there appears to have been no study focusing on the frequency or rarity of 
such breaches arising specifically within the research domain.
Use of cloud computing for storage of health and health-related data may 
strengthen data security or add an additional layer of risk. Current systems 
of governance and accountability are designed with the assumption that data 
custodians are in full possession of their respective databases and maintain full 
control over access policies and procedures. In a cloud-based system, health-
care and health data organizations are the clients and IT vendors are the 
providers. When clients entrust their data to systems managed by cloud providers, 
depending on contractual or other arrangements, they may relinquish some control 
and may be “unable to exercise technical and managerial measures to ensure access, 
integrity, confidentiality and transferability of the data” (Seddon & Currie, 2013). 
For example, providers may have servers in countries or continents outside the 
jurisdiction from which the data originated, or researchers in one country may 
access data in another. As discussed in Chapter 4, there is a lack of consensus 
on which jurisdiction’s laws apply (Seddon & Currie, 2013). On the other 
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hand, private clouds (cloud infrastructures set up for single organizations, which 
govern and control the cloud for their own purposes) can take advantage of 
many of the benefits of cloud computing, while potentially providing greater 
security compared with data held on local computers by researchers without 
an appropriate infrastructure for secure data handling (CHI, 2012). 
Examples of Health Data Breaches
Risk type 1 has been influenced by the widespread use of mobile devices such as 
laptops and USB keys. Two breaches of identifiable health-care data in Canada 
involved laptop thefts. In one case, a hospital policy requiring data encryption 
was not followed because the encryption software had not been properly 
installed. In the other, a laptop containing identifiable data was stolen from a 
vehicle after it had been removed for research purposes — despite the fact that 
use of identifiable health information for research was against the hospital’s 
policy. Another Canadian breach resulted from loss of a USB key containing 
personal health information of individuals who attended flu immunization 
clinics. An investigation revealed that problems establishing a virtual private 
network (VPN) had resulted in the use of USB keys to transfer data between 
eight community clinics (IPCO & CHEO, 2011).
Risk type 1 also includes inappropriate access to identifiable data by researchers, 
which is more likely if they are working directly from unsecured data sources 
(e.g., hospital paper charts) without access controls. In this scenario, investigators 
may or may not be aware that they are violating any research ethics standards. 
This situation occurred when Canadian university researchers worked on site at 
a health-care centre to create a registry of health and employment information 
for individuals in the community working as miners. Although the registry only 
included information from those who had provided consent, researchers also 
accessed medical charts from patients who had not consented and created an 
additional database with de-identified information for statistical purposes. The 
university maintains that the actions of their researchers did not violate privacy 
laws or ethical standards, but an investigation by the Office of the Information 
and Privacy Commissioner concluded that there had been “an improper 
disclosure and an improper collection of personal information” (Ring, 2011).
Even organizations that house large volumes of health-care data and routinely 
provide them to researchers can be sources of data breaches if employees do 
not comply with confidentiality requirements. For example, at one provincial 
ministry of health, there were three separate incidents involving disclosure 
of identifiable health information on portable storage devices. In one case, 
for unknown reasons, the identifiers were not removed from the file; in the 
other two cases, the employees were not authorized to disclose data to other 
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employees or external researchers. The disclosures may have been prevented 
by audit logs or other security measures to detect the access or copying of 
identifiable information onto unencrypted storage devices (Denham, 2013).
Risk type 2 (illicit access) is a common public concern, but actual breaches 
rarely involve data that researchers access from secure facilities, in part because 
they are often de-identified. Hacking of health-care databases with identifiable 
information may provide a greater incentive. For example, in August 2014, 
one of the largest hospital networks in the United States reported that the 
names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and Social Security numbers of 
4.5 million patients were stolen from their databases (Weise, 2014). Employee 
snooping is another type of illicit access, but it is more likely to occur 
when identifiable information relating to a famous individual is known to 
be housed at a particular location (e.g., medical records of a celebrity) 
(Parker-Pope, 2008; Grant, 2014). 
Risk type 4 has attracted much attention in the media because high-profile 
individuals have been re-identified. In one example from 1997, as a proof of 
principle, a graduate student easily identified the Governor of Massachusetts’s 
medical data within an insurance data set using several pieces of existing 
knowledge and information from one other database. However, re-identification 
attempts by data intruders without this knowledge face much stronger challenges; 
therefore, this example does not support the claim that re-identification is easy 
and common (Barth-Jones, 2012). 
In a systematic review of re-identification attempts on health data, El Emam 
et al. (2011b) showed that most examples of successful re-identification were 
demonstration attacks performed by researchers to investigate whether a risk was 
present. Furthermore, most of the data that were successfully re-identified were 
not de-identified properly in the first place; thus, if existing de-identification 
standards are adhered to, the risk of re-identification is very low.
All of these examples point to a common theme: the risk of data breach is 
extremely low if protocols are in place, these protocols are adequate, and they 
are followed by care providers and their staff, as well as researchers and data 
custodians. In other words, the level of potential harm resulting from these 
risks depends on whether there are effective governance mechanisms in place 
that are being respected. 
Another important conclusion from these examples is that breaches rarely occur 
at institutions with databases set up specifically for maintaining large volumes of 
health and health-related data for research and administrative purposes; they are 
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more likely to occur when researchers or employees are accessing data directly 
from health-care centres. Importantly, there are no examples of breaches at the 
six “best practice entities” identified by the Panel (see Chapter 1). Risk types 
1 to 3 can be limited by good information governance (e.g., secure access to 
data) and risk type 4 can be contained by proper de-identification techniques.
3.4.2 Risk of Eroding Public Trust
Re-identification of the Massachusetts Governor (discussed above) demonstrated 
the possibility of correctly identifying a single individual in a database, 
but only with considerable foreknowledge, which a data intruder may not 
necessarily possess. Nonetheless, this incident influenced public opinion and 
the development of privacy policies in the United States (Barth-Jones, 2012). 
While this successful attack resulted in no gain for the “intruder,” it undermined 
public trust in the processes being used to safeguard privacy. 
A significant harm that can result from the erosion of public trust is a change in 
the behaviour of individuals to protect the privacy of their health information. 
As reviewed by Malin et al. (2013), privacy protective behaviours may involve 
“going to another doctor, paying out-of-pocket when insured to avoid disclosure, 
not seeking care to avoid disclosure to an employer, giving inaccurate or 
incomplete information on medical history, self-treating or self-medicating 
rather than seeing a provider, or asking a doctor not to write down the health 
problem or record a less serious or embarrassing condition.”
Much of the research investigating patients’ perspectives on medical 
confidentiality has been conducted with so-called “vulnerable populations,” 
such as those with mental health issues, those seeking genetic or HIV testing, 
and adolescents (Sankar et al., 2003). In one study, a quarter of the adolescents 
surveyed reported that they would not seek care for health concerns if they 
thought their parents, friends, or teachers might find out (Cheng et al., 1993). 
Issues for which adolescents are more likely to withhold information 
include sexual orientation, drug use, depression, and suicidal thoughts 
(Lothen-Kline et al., 2003; Sankar et al., 2003). A broader perspective on this 
issue is offered by Canadian survey data from across the provinces and territories 
and including individuals aged 16 and older. These data suggest that although 
85% of Canadians believe that people withhold health-related information from 
their doctors, only 28% believe that they do so because of concerns about the 
security of their health information (Ipsos Reid, 2012). 
Patients may attempt to exercise control over their health information at the 
level of doctor-patient interaction. In turn, physicians may be reluctant to share 
patient data. In a study involving focus groups with family doctors, reasons for 
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reluctance included lack of trust in data handling practices of organizations 
collecting patient data; uncertainty surrounding who the information would 
be shared with, what it would be used for, and how sharing it would benefit 
patients; and lack of feedback from public health agencies, which resulted in 
less motivation to provide data. Physicians felt that data should be de-identified 
before sharing, and patients should be notified (e.g., through posters in 
physicians’ offices) that their de-identified information might be released to 
researchers (El Emam et al., 2011c).
3.4.3 Risks of Community Research and Social Sorting
Research using health and health-related data collected from specific communities 
or groups of people may lead individuals within these groups to feel exploited 
or stigmatized. However, many of the examples supporting this idea stem from 
flawed practices. For a sound and ethical study, concerns about the potential 
for stigmatization need to be balanced with a broader consideration of the 
potential benefits of the study. Furthermore, as discussed below, collaboration 
can help to reduce the tension between specific communities and researchers. 
There are cases of exploitation of indigenous communities, which resulted 
from poor research practices lacking in ethical standards, failure to appreciate 
and respect the culture of the research participants, and failure to collaborate 
with communities when designing studies (Antone et al., 2014). In two of 
these instances of exploitation, researchers collected samples from indigenous 
communities to investigate a particular condition and, without consent, shared 
them with other researchers and used them for additional purposes (Wiwchar, 
2004; Mello & Wolf, 2010).
Genetically isolated communities are often of particular interest to researchers for 
the study of rare genetic disorders. These communities can benefit significantly 
from that research. However, there are concerns about how the research 
is conducted, whether and how research results are shared, whether the 
results could lead to stigmatization and discrimination, and to what extent the 
community has access to the benefits of the research (e.g., genetic counselling 
and testing). For example, in the U.S. case of Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
Hospital, members of families affected by Canavan disease, who participated in 
research on the disease and played a substantial role in fundraising and recruiting 
research subjects, were disturbed that researchers and research institutions had 
signed restrictive licensing agreements on the genetic tests developed from the 
research. This meant that they had to pay for access to prenatal testing, which 
they argued impeded access to the benefits of the research in which they and 
their family members had participated (Greenfield, 2006).
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The above risks of community research can be mitigated by collaborating 
with community members and organizations representing these communities. 
This has been demonstrated by ICES, which entered into a data governance 
agreement (DGA) with the Chiefs of Ontario to protect the interests of First 
Nations communities (Antone et al., 2014). Because ICES uses de-identified 
data, it “is able to protect community privacy, thereby respecting First Nations 
information and governance principles” (Antone et al., 2014). Under the DGA, 
ICES acts as a steward for First Nations communities, but does not actually own 
First Nations data (Antone et al., 2014).
Electronic records have supported the process of social sorting, which refers to 
the use of “personal and group data in order to classify people and populations 
according to varying criteria, to determine who should be targeted for special 
treatment, suspicion, eligibility, inclusion, access, and so on” (Lyon, 2003). 
Data linkage can make it easier to collect a wide variety of information on an 
individual, which could be used to monitor his or her behaviour. For example, 
the Ontario Works program uses a system of databases to monitor welfare 
fraud. By linking to government databases, information about a recipient can 
be collected from the Canada Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada, and Service Canada, among others. Computer applications can use 
this information along with other data in a recipient’s electronic case file to 
determine how likely an individual is to commit fraud. Various flags may trigger 
the assessment of a file, such as a recent move or application to post-secondary 
education. Thus, individuals may feel that they are being unjustly categorized as 
suspicious (Maki, 2011). This issue is not specific to health and health-related 
research, but it may be valuable for researchers to consider whether their 
studies could cause individuals to feel targeted or exploited. 
3.5 BARRIERS TO ACCESSING DATA
Despite the potential benefits of using detailed individual-level data, especially linked 
data, their use is uneven. Barriers to accessing data and linking data sets have been 
documented (Taylor & Lynch, 2010), and these barriers result in potential delays 
in accessing data, ranging from three months (Arabsky et al., 2014) to over a year 
(Meagher & McGrail, 2013), if the data are made available at all. Barriers can 
also limit potential or interest to use data to generate research and innovation. 
Several barriers can affect timely access to available data.
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Barriers related to access: 
• The access process may be unclear for researchers, and they may lack the 
skills or time to determine how they should proceed (AMS, 2006).
• Easily understandable documentation related to the data sets may be difficult 
to obtain, but researchers need such documentation to evaluate the usefulness 
of the data. This includes information on data available (list of variables 
collected), data format (codes and their meaning), and data collection 
procedures (population targeted, mode of collection, etc.).
• Access to data can differ depending on the type of users (internal or external).
• There is a lack of resources available for data custodians to generate 
the data sets required by researchers and to answer their questions 
(van Panhuis et al., 2014).
• Cost is a factor in enabling timely access to data. Adequate and stable funding is 
needed to set up a sound infrastructure, attract and retain skilled staff members, 
and support the continued success of an organization (Marchessault, 2011).
• The many approval processes can cause delays in accessing the data. (For a 
detailed discussion of REBs and their timelines for approval, see Chapter 2.) 
In addition to REB review, steps include formulation of the request, review 
by the data custodian, and delivery of the data (Arabsky et al., 2014). 
• To protect confidentiality, the data may be available only through a physical 
safe haven, but the number of these centres across Canada is relatively limited. 
Researchers may therefore have to travel to conduct their work.
Barriers resulting from reluctance to share:
• Preparing data to be shared with researchers can be costly; thus, in the 
context of many competing priorities, data custodians may be reluctant to 
share if they do not have an adequate budget and/or a specific mandate 
to support research uses of their data.
• Organizations may fear that their data could be revealed as sub-optimal by 
others (van Panhuis et al., 2014).
• Anecdotal evidence from Panel members indicates that health professionals 
and health-care institutions may hesitate to share health and administrative 
data, including billing data, prescription data, patient safety information, 
quality assessments, and wait times, which may expose deficiencies that could 
affect funding or performance evaluation.
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• Privacy laws and ethics guidelines or rules may be unclear. Fear of lawsuits 
may result in incorrect or overly conservative interpretations of legislation 
(Davies & Collins, 2006), thereby impeding data sharing and other processes 
that could expedite data access, such as harmonization of REB review.
• The public and health professionals may be afraid to share information 
due to mistrust of the systems in place to protect data (AMS, 2006; 
El Emam et al., 2011c). This lack of trust may be influenced by extensive 
media coverage of data breaches.
• Public bodies and researchers may feel a sense of ownership over their data. 
For researchers, reluctance to share data may be influenced by competitions 
for funding, patents or publications, professional recognition among peers, 
or promotional opportunities (van Panhuis et al., 2014).
• Data custodians may fear that their actions could lead to a data breach, which 
may damage their reputation or result in public harm; on the other hand, 
they will likely not personally benefit from providing access. Thus, they face 
an unbalanced or asymmetric risk when they opt to share data.
Barriers related to data quality, utility, and comparability:
• Data collected for a targeted purpose (e.g., physician billing) are not necessarily 
ideal to meet the secondary usage objectives of research and innovation. 
Specifically, the content and structure of the data are not always adaptable 
or relevant to the intended use for research. (The Panel notes, however, that 
problems with data sets can only be recognized and remedied if researchers 
attempt to use them despite their imperfections.) 
• Data can require significant processing to be useful for research purposes, 
which is time-consuming. Institutions need to keep up with rapid changes 
in data technologies and improve their standards to produce analysis-ready 
data (van Panhuis et al., 2014).
• Incompatibilities between data management systems across institutions pose 
a barrier to sharing, linking, or harmonizing data (van Panhuis et al., 2014).
• Heterogeneity of data across pooled or linked data sets can necessitate 
harmonization (see Chapter 2), which can render the process particularly 
challenging and time-consuming (Flowers & Ferguson, 2010).
Examples of Other Barriers:
In some cases, barriers arise from the inability to link to certain types of data 
and difficulties pooling across provinces. An additional barrier involves the 
implementation of overly restrictive privacy legislation based on assumptions 
about what the public may find acceptable. These barriers are explored below 
using several examples. Box 3.10 is a within-province (Level 1) example, and 
Boxes 3.11 and 3.12 deal with linking and/or pooling data across Canada 
(Level 2).
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Box 3.10 outlines how linkage of detailed health and administrative data sets 
are required to enable effective health services and system research. Modelling 
of aspects of the health system is possible in one province because of the 
existence of linked data sets, whereas it is proving a challenge in another 
province lacking such data. 
Box 3.10  
Breast Cancer Screening
There is considerable controversy regarding the age threshold at which women should 
be offered mammographic screening. Genome Canada and CIHR recently awarded 
a substantial grant to researchers examining the option of shifting breast cancer 
screening from being based primarily on age to being based on personal risk factors 
(GenomeCanada & CIHR, 2012), including conventional factors such as fertility history 
as well as genetic factors. As part of this project, a specialized computer simulation 
model is being built. The model uses detailed data on the population distribution 
of these risk factors to project what would happen if risk-based screening were 
introduced. The model considers costs of breast screening programs, as well as 
the number of women currently going through these programs, and then through 
diagnostic work-up, treatment, follow-up, and disease progression. It also considers 
the effects of screening and follow-up on women’s ability to carry on daily activities 
such as paid employment. 
Adopting risk-based cancer screening will depend, in part, on weighing the costs 
of screening different populations for each provincial health system against the 
potential benefit in terms of breast cancer deaths likely to be averted. To make these 
determinations, linked individual-level data are required to complete the model. 
Extensive use is being made of Ontario data held by ICES, which, in collaboration 
with Cancer Care Ontario, has linked detailed cancer incidence data to health-
care records. The researchers also wished to use the model for Quebec residents 
(ICES, 2014f). However, since Quebec has no comparable organization to ICES in 
Ontario, gaining access to and linking the required data is proving a significant 
challenge. This project illustrates the benefits of linked health and administrative 
data in considering a fundamental change to a health service.
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Box 3.11 outlines how the CLSA has been built to develop insights into Canada’s 
aging population, a challenge that much of the rest of the world is also now 
facing. However, as a result of legislative or other barriers, these data have so 
far not been linked to administrative data or pooled to develop further insights.
Box 3.11  
Canadian Longitudinal Study on Aging 
The CLSA is a large, long-term cohort study following the health, psychological, social, 
and economic aspects affecting 50,000 Canadians for a period of 20 years. It aims 
to understand the impact of these many factors on health, disease and disability as 
people age. The participants provide a core set of data on demographic, lifestyle, 
social, and socio-economic factors, among others (CIHR, 2013d). 
Those involved in managing the CLSA anticipated that significant benefits would 
result from linking the original data generated by the study to administrative 
health-care data (e.g., physician visits, hospitalizations, and prescription drug use). 
The power of this approach has been demonstrated by the Aging in Manitoba (AIM) 
Longitudinal Study involving almost 9,000 older Manitobans. The study includes 
data from several waves of personal interviews collected between 1971 and 2001, 
which are linked to health services utilization data housed at the MCHP (University of 
Manitoba, 2014). In general, linkage of population-based administrative data with 
various external health and social data sets in Manitoba has created an “information-rich” 
environment for studying health determinants and outcomes (Roos et al., 2004; 2008). 
Having realized the research opportunities provided by linking administrative health 
databases and large cohort studies, consent forms for CLSA participants included 
questions about data linkage (Doiron et al., 2013b). However, a mechanism for such 
linkage has not yet been implemented, and will require strong coordination and 
long-term commitment from all stakeholders. 
Another significant challenge for the CLSA is that some provinces interpret privacy 
legislation as not allowing administrative data to cross provincial jurisdictional 
boundaries. Hence, although legislation would permit the CLSA to link data within 
each province if the mechanisms were in place, pooling of the linked data would be 
prohibited. Moreover, some data custodians have indicated that their resources and 
capacity are too limited to meet data access, extraction, and linkage requests. As a 
result, data access requests from researchers are generally met only “when, and if, 
there is time” (Doiron et al., 2013b).
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Box 3.12 illustrates how, despite the potential benefits to health services or 
system research of accessing linked data, there are many instances where the 
maximum potential of research has not been fulfilled. The issues in this case 
were legislative and inter-jurisdictional barriers to integrating data, and an 
inability to link databases due to unavailable identifying information.
Box 3.12  
Integrating Data across Canada 
By integrating hospital discharge records across Canada, it has long been possible to 
observe large variations in treatments by geographical area. However, understanding 
the effects of these unexplained variations on Canadians’ health has generally 
remained difficult. As demonstrated in the unique study below, some important 
progress has been made by integrating patient records, but the interpretation of 
these variations remains limited. 
Researchers at Statistics Canada (Johansen et al., 2009) used data from the federal 
agency’s Health Person-Oriented Information Database to analyze both treatment and 
30-day survival outcomes for heart attack patients from seven Canadian provinces for 
1995–1996 and 2003–2004. The results showed a 3:1 variation in the likelihood of 
having a major health-care intervention for heart attack (heart bypass or angioplasty, 
with rates between 20% and 60%) with no discernible benefit in terms of survival 
within 30 days of the heart attack. Moreover, the study showed that some regions 
with high intervention rates had relatively high mortality rates, while some regions 
with lower treatment rates also had low mortality rates (Johansen et al., 2009).
These results suggest potentially critical inefficiencies in Canada’s health-care system, 
as well as large variations across the country in heart attack treatment without any 
obvious explanation. It was very difficult, even with the authority of the Statistics 
Act, to extract and analyze these data. Moreover, the data were still very limited; 
for example, the analysts were unable to examine longer mortality follow-up (such 
as mortality rates after one year) because the identifying information needed to 
link patients to death certificates was not available. To understand why these large 
variations exist and are growing, more data would be required to help clinicians 
and researchers determine which types of heart attack treatment would be most 
appropriate (Johansen et al., 2009). For such longer-term follow-up, accessing these 
data was impossible because most provinces’ officials were reluctant to provide 
Statistics Canada with identifying patient data (M.C. Wolfson, University of Ottawa, 
personal communication).
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The final barrier discussed in this section is concerned with the potential for 
lack of public engagement to hinder research. A report by the Academy of 
Medical Sciences in the United Kingdom on the use of health information for 
medical research recognizes this issue, stating that a lack of communication 
with the public about their opinions on the use of personal data for research 
leads to “defensive and restrictive interpretations of the law, which may not 
represent the wishes of an informed public” (AMS, 2006).
Although more evidence is available on public attitudes towards the use of 
health data for care and treatment (rather than research) (AMS, 2006), polling 
data indicate that 80% of Canadians generally support the use of EHRs for 
research, with support increasing to 88% if details such as their name and 
address are hidden from researchers (Ipsos Reid, 2012). Canadians consider 
the protection of health information to be extremely important, but many 
are unaware of specific privacy laws that are in place, suggesting unfamiliarity 
with their rights concerning protection of personal health information 
(EKOS, 2007; Ipsos Reid, 2012). Informing the public of both the controls that 
have been implemented to safeguard information, as well as the benefits that have 
resulted from research using health data, has the potential to increase confidence 
in and enthusiasm for this type of research (AMS, 2006). However, public 
engagement is not a trivial task — it requires transparency and receptiveness 
at multiple stages of the health-care process (Henke et al., 2012), along with 
sound research to determine how best to involve the public (see Section 5.2.5 
for further discussion).
3.6 CONCLUSION
The Panel found evidence of clear benefits to enabling access to health data 
by researchers. There are many instances of successful research leading 
to improvements in health care or services, without any significant loss of 
confidentiality. Ideally, understanding the scale of potential benefits to health 
care would guide appropriate judgment on regulations and processes facilitating 
access to health data for research. However, the current lack of evidence 
describing measurable benefits of research, coupled with public concern over 
risks of confidentiality loss, can unduly tilt the balance against further enabling 
access to data. In addition, when working with specific communities, there may 
be real risks of stigmatization or distrust that investigators need to address in 
their research approach.
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The Panel identified a highly exaggerated perception that data linkage increases 
the likelihood of disclosure of personal health information. While laws and 
regulations govern protection of this information, they may be inconsistent. 
Furthermore, a single regulation is often interpreted inconsistently or too 
conservatively. These issues have led to uneven data and information governance 
across Canada and internationally, which prevent access to data that could 
provide substantial public benefit. Access is also hindered by technical barriers 
and reluctance to share data. There are numerous reasons for this reluctance. 
One may be a lack of resources for data custodians, who are faced with many 
competing priorities. The Panel provided anecdotal evidence that organizations 
and groups involved in delivering health care may also fear negative publicity 
if research were to reveal poor performance.
However, there are several solutions to overcome these obstacles. Proper 
de-identification of data and effective governance mechanisms — which are 
respected by care providers, researchers, and data custodians — provide effective 
methods for substantially limiting the risk of identifying people from individual-
level data. Public engagement has the potential to increase confidence in and 
support for research with health data.
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4 Accessing Data for Research Purposes: Canada’s 
Current Legal and Ethical Framework
Enabling access to data collected about individuals rests on legal and ethical norms. 
In Canada and in many other countries, respect for privacy and confidentiality 
of personal health and social information is protected by laws. In addition to the 
legal framework, ethical principles applied during approval for research use of 
individual-level data seek to protect privacy, but also recognize the public benefit 
of research; that is, they recognize the benefits of research to individuals and the 
public at large, and support measures that facilitate such research. 
Key Findings
• There are ethical imperatives to protect the confidentiality of individuals’ data, on 
the one hand, and to provide access to quality data that enable research in the 
public interest, on the other. These two imperatives need not conflict.
• Data custodians have fundamental legal duties to protect confidentiality of personal 
data, and these duties underpin their conduct. These duties can lead to cautious and 
conservative interpretations of allowable access when a complementary mandate 
to enable access to data for research is not made explicit.
• Canadian federal and provincial/territorial laws generally address identifiable 
information and do not constrain researchers’ access to de-identified or non-
identifiable information.
• Given the imprecise and inconsistent definitions of the term identifiable information 
in laws and ethical guidelines from different jurisdictions, it is difficult to be 
sure whether a data set qualifies as non-identifiable. Instead, it is useful to view 
de-identification as a continuum and to adjust access controls accordingly to 
mitigate re-identification risk.
• Canada’s governance of research ethics is fragmented, with significant differences 
across the provinces/territories. As well, laws on sharing data across provinces/
territories and between countries differ or are lacking, sometimes leading to confusion 
for researchers and REBs about whether, or on what basis, data can be shared.
• While participant consent is a cornerstone of experimental research involving humans, 
the ethical and legal considerations for accessing personal information are not the 
same as those for physical involvement in research. There may be sound ethical 
reasons to pursue research with health and health-related data without consent in 
some circumstances, notably when risk is managed and the research benefits the 
public good. Appropriate risk management involves keeping measures to protect 
privacy proportional to the potential harms of proposed research. 
77Chapter 4 Accessing Data for Research Purposes: Canada’s Current Legal and Ethical Framework
This chapter looks at the broader framework of the law and ethical guidelines in 
Canada. This framework guides the balance between access and confidentiality. 
However, implementing these considerations in practice when data custodians 
grant researchers access to data may be challenging, as not all implications 
have been articulated and clarified. Because of the pace of recent technological 
changes and the rapid growth of information sharing, best practices for many 
of the legal and ethical issues involved in data sharing are evolving. As well, the 
law differs among provinces/territories within Canada, as well as internationally, 
which means that best practices in one context may not be directly applicable in 
another. Therefore, the Panel did not identify best practices in this chapter, but 
instead highlighted good practices where possible (see Glossary for definitions 
of good and best practice).
4.1 CANADA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This section reviews the legal structures governing the sharing of health 
information, both internationally and in Canada. The federal government and 
the provinces and territories have legislation governing the use and sharing of 
health information for research purposes. Once legal requirements are met, 
decision-makers also apply ethical guidelines and principles in evaluating 
research proposals for the use of health information. A detailed compendium 
of these provisions is found in Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter. 
4.2 BASIC PRIVACY PROTECTIONS: INTERNATIONAL  
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Internationally, most industrialized nations have laws protecting personal 
information or health information. However, there is large variation in the 
regulations, their objectives, and their restrictions on data sharing across 
international borders. In Europe, for example, data protection is treated as 
a fundamental right (EU, 2000), and a common legislative framework that 
currently influences member states (the Data Protection Directive) has been 
undergoing revisions. If successful, the reforms will result in a new Data Protection 
Regulation that will have the direct force of law and be directly applicable in 
the member states of the European Union. It will serve as the basis for a single, 
uniform approach across domestic laws in EU countries. By contrast, data 
confidentiality is not conceived as a right in several other jurisdictions, such as 
the United States (EU, 2000). The permissibility of cross-border data sharing 
may depend on the level of legal protection of data in the country providing 
the data (as applies, for example, to the European Union), or, alternatively, on 
the measures taken by the individual person or organization that receives the 
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data (such as in Canada), or on the receiving jurisdiction’s ability to realize the 
benefits of electronic commerce (for example, in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation region) (Kuner, 2013).
4.3 BASIC PRIVACY PROTECTIONS: CANADIAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORKS
Domestically, Canadian legislation strives to both protect health information 
privacy and facilitate information sharing for the purpose of health research. 
At the national level, key legislation includes the Statistics Act (1985), the 
Privacy Act (1985), and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act (2000) (PIPEDA). However, most of the relevant legislation is at the provincial 
level (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; GO, 2010; GPEI, 2012; GDQ, 
2014a, 2014b; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of BC, 2014b, 2014c; Govt. of MB, 
2014b). As detailed in Table 4.1 and discussed below, these provincial health 
information laws have differences as well as some common features. 
4.3.1 Sharing of Health Data that Have Been De-Identified 
In all provinces, “de-identified” health information is not subject to legislative 
regulation, and data that are not identifiable may generally be shared and used 
freely by data custodians and researchers (see Table 4.1, row 1). However, there 
is variation among the provinces in how identifiable is defined: in some provinces, 
it means information from which a person can reasonably be identified, yet in 
others, it means data from which a person’s identity is “readily ascertainable” 
(see Table 4.1, row 2). Box 4.1 shows the narrowest legislative definition, from 
Alberta’s law. 
Box 4.1 
Defining Identifiable in Alberta Legislation
The Alberta Health Information Act (GOA, 2014b) defines individually identifying 
health information as when “the identity of the individual who is the subject of the 
information can be readily ascertained from the information.” It goes on to define 
non-identifying to mean that “the identity of the individual who is the subject of 
the information cannot be readily ascertained from the information.” By using this 
standard of information from which identity can be “readily ascertained,” either 
from the information itself or from the base information combined with other health 
information, the Alberta legislation has a narrower definition of “identifiable” than 
other provinces (GOA, 2014b).
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Furthermore, there are different definitions flowing from ethical guidelines 
and court decisions. The Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS) governing 
ethical research in Canada offers a standard definition of identifiable that REBs 
across Canada follow. It states that “information is identifiable if it, alone or 
in combination with other available information, may reasonably be expected 
to identify an individual” (CIHR et al., 2014). Among relevant legal cases, in a 
2001 Ontario case involving disclosure of the medical procedure charges of the 
highest billing physician in Toronto, the Ontario Superior Court established that 
information can be considered personal if “there is a reasonable expectation 
that, when the information in it is combined with information from sources 
otherwise available, the individual can be identified. A person is also identifiable 
from a record where he or she could be identified by those familiar with the 
particular circumstances or events contained in the record” (OSCJ, 2001). 
In a 2008 case involving open access to the Canadian Adverse Drug Reaction 
Information System database, the Federal Court held that “[i]nformation will 
be about an identifiable individual where there is a serious possibility that an 
individual could be identified through the use of that information, alone or 
in combination with other available information” (FCC, 2008).
These variable interpretations of the terms identifiable and de-identified make it 
confusing to base data sharing guidelines on the notion that “non-identifiable 
data” can be used freely. It is difficult to be sure whether a data set qualifies 
as non-identifiable. In reality, it is only clear that data may be fully identifiable 
(i.e., no identifiers removed) or de-identified to some degree. The term anonymized 
is commonly used to describe data that have been de-identified very aggressively, 
to the point that it is impossible for a researcher to link any information back to 
a specific individual; however, de-identification is not a perfect tool, since there is 
always some risk, however small, of re-identification. Thus, anonymity cannot be 
guaranteed. Instead, the only certainty is that any attempt at de-identification places 
data somewhere along a spectrum involving progressively stronger de-identification, 
which is correlated with a progressively lower chance of re-identification. The key, 
therefore, lies in finding an appropriate level of access control for the given level 
of de-identification. This will require a certain degree of customization when data 
sharing agreements are prepared to ensure that researchers receive useful data 
and data custodians are satisfied with the controls that are in place to mitigate 
re-identification risk (Cavoukian & El Emam, 2011).
Good Practice: Instead of classifying data as identifiable or de-identified, it is useful to view 
de-identification as a continuum. Because data may be strongly or mildly de-identified, 
the Panel did not single out one specific process for dealing with de-identified data. 
Rather, the degree of de-identification should be used to determine the circumstances 
under which the data may be made accessible for research purposes.
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4.3.2 Duties and Roles of Provincial Custodians of Identifiable  
Health Information
While de-identified data are not subject to privacy laws, identifiable data must 
be used for many health research objectives (see Chapter 2). For such identifiable 
health information, provincial laws impose extensive duties on data 
custodians — to safeguard data in their possession, and, in some provinces, to 
create information protection practices and data transfer protocols 
(see Table 4.1, row 3). Consent of research subjects is typically required to 
collect, use, or disclose personal health information. However, some legislation 
allows health data collection, use, or disclosure without consent in certain 
cases, and approved research is one of these cases. Under these laws, researchers 
must usually show that identifiable information is essential to the research, 
that the use of data without consent is unlikely to adversely affect the subject 
individuals, that it is impossible or impracticable to seek individual consent, 
and that the research is in the public interest. Box 4.2 shows the detailed 
requirements imposed on custodians in Alberta. Ontario has similar guidelines 
for information custodians.
Box 4.2 
Custodians in Alberta: A Comprehensive Range of Duties
Under the Alberta Health Information Act custodians have duties to:
• protect confidentiality of information in their control as well as information disclosed 
to persons outside Alberta; 
• protect against “any reasonably anticipated” threats or hazards to the security 
of the data or against loss of the information, and against unauthorized access, 
modification or disclosure of the information;
• implement measures to address “the risks associated with electronic health records” 
and for the proper disposal of health records;
• identify all of its “affiliates” — employees, people providing services to the 
custodian, and professionals providing health services — who are also responsible 
for compliance with the legislation;
• develop policies for facilitating the implementation of the legislation, and provide 
copies to the Minister; and
• develop privacy impact assessments and submit them to the Minister for approval before 
making any changes to their administrative practices for handling health information.
These duties applicable to custodians of health information in Alberta are among 
the strictest in any provincial legislation.
(GOA, 2014b)
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Good Practice: To ensure privacy is respected, and to clearly delineate the requirements 
for access to identifiable data without consent, good practice suggests showing that 
the research serves the public interest, that obtaining consent is impracticable, that 
identifiable data are necessary to the research project, and that physical, electronic, 
software, and all other security measures are appropriately calibrated to protect the 
data and to sanction any misuses. 
4.3.3 Liabilities of Custodians for Breach
To enforce these duties, many provincial laws provide for sanctions if custodians 
breach their duties under legislation, including those imposed by privacy 
commissioners and, in some instances, even some form of prosecution (see 
Table 4.1, row 4). As well, custodians who breach their duties may be subject 
to tort liability (Govt. of SK, 2005; CAO, 2012; OSCJ, 2014; GNL, 2014; Govt. 
of BC, 2014a; Govt. of MB, 2014a). However, if data custodians can show that 
they have made all reasonable efforts to secure the confidentiality of data, 
they may be protected from liability. No provincial/territorial legislation in 
Canada defines what “all reasonable efforts” are with any precision. Chapter 5 
articulates governance measures that could help define “reasonable efforts.” 
4.3.4 Provisions to Facilitate Research 
As long as custodians have fulfilled their legal duties, and researchers have 
met conditions for approval of research using identifiable data, all provincial/
territorial legislation allows collection, use, or disclosure of identifiable health 
information without consent for approved research studies (see Table 4.1, row 5). 
Federally, PIPEDA and Statistics Canada’s policies also have similar provisions.13 
However, there is considerable variation among provinces/territories in the 
specific requirements that researchers must meet to receive or access health 
information from custodians. 
To be eligible, researchers generally must obtain approval from an REB or 
another responsible entity. The entity responsible for approving proposed 
research may be the provincial privacy commissioner, a special body with the 
exclusive power to review research proposals, an REB approved by a provincial 
oversight body or by the minister of health, or an REB constituted according 
to specific standards (such as those set out in the TCPS or in privacy statutes 
themselves), depending on the province (see Table 4.1, row 6). At Statistics 
Canada, the de facto REB is Statistics Canada’s Executive Management Board 
(StatCan, 2014g). Box 4.3 shows the Newfoundland and Labrador approach 
to research ethics review, in which a single regulatory body has the power to 
either approve research itself or approve other REBs to carry out this function.
13 CIHI, while a national organization, is governed by Ontario legislation.
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Furthermore, in most provinces and at Statistics Canada, researchers must 
also satisfy a series of criteria to be granted access to data other than strongly 
de-identified data without consent from participants. In some provinces, the 
law is silent on the criteria to be applied for approval, or requires REBs to apply 
the TCPS criteria. In those provinces that enumerate criteria, these include 
showing why the researchers need to use identifiable health information, 
why it is impracticable to obtain individual consent for the information 
(factors for determining this are found in CIHR’s Best Practices for Protecting 
Privacy in Health Research (CIHR, 2005)), and how the benefits of the proposed 
research outweigh the risks to the confidentiality of the data on the subjects 
of the study. 
In addition, in some provinces, researchers must prepare and submit plans 
for data security for approval (see Table 4.1, row 7). Researchers must usually 
sign agreements with custodians requiring them to take steps, extensive in 
some provinces, to secure the confidentiality of the information they receive 
(data- or material-transfer agreements) (see Table 4.1, row 8). Box 4.4 shows 
an example of such researcher-custodian agreements. 
Box 4.3 
Newfoundland and Labrador Health Research Ethics Authority
In 2011, a Health Research Ethics Authority (HREA) was formed to provide central 
oversight of research ethics review in Newfoundland and Labrador. Legislation in 
the province provides the same level of protection for health information as that in 
other provinces, but also has provisions for promoting public trust in health research 
through the HREA. Researchers may seek approval either from a standing provincial 
Health Research Ethics Board or from another REB, even out of province, that obtains 
approval from the HREA. After initial approval of the research proposal, researchers 
must be overseen by the approving REB and must report back to it when the project 
is complete (Kosseim et al., 2012; HREA, n.d.).
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Good Practice: To ensure that researchers are accountable for protecting data 
confidentiality, good practice suggests that full and explicit data transfer agreements 
between researchers and custodians are needed for each research project. 
In addition to requirements for transferring data directly to research groups, 
under some provincial legislation, certain organizations may receive identifiable 
health information for research purposes (see Table 4.1, row 10). Such 
“prescribed” or “designated” entities include Cancer Care Ontario, CIHI, 
ICES, and MCHP. Box 4.5 describes how this arrangement works for one such 
research centre.
Box 4.4 
Researcher-Custodian Agreements in Nova Scotia
Nova Scotia’s Personal Health Information Act (GNS, 2010a) has extensive requirements 
for the agreements that researchers must sign with data custodians, which 
are modelled after the requirements in Ontario’s Personal Health Information 
Protection Act (PHIPA). The Nova Scotia legislation requires that the researcher:
• comply with any terms and conditions imposed by an REB as well as those imposed 
by the custodian;
• use the information only for the purposes outlined in the research plan as approved 
by an REB;
• not publish the information in a form that could be used, either alone or with other 
information, to identify an individual;
• allow the custodian to access or inspect the researcher’s premises to confirm that 
the researcher is complying with the terms and conditions of the Act and of the 
agreement between the custodian and the researcher;
• notify the custodian immediately and in writing if the personal health 
information is stolen, lost, or subject to unauthorized access, use, disclosure, copying, 
or modification;
• notify the custodian immediately and in writing of any known or suspected breach 
of the agreement between the custodian and the researcher; and
• not attempt to identify or contact the individuals unless the custodian or researcher 
has obtained their prior consent.
These requirements are comprehensive and create a wide range of duties for researchers 
under the resulting agreements.
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It should be noted that there is a legal grey area concerning whether information 
is collected or used for research or some other purpose. In most cases, it is clear 
that information is being collected or disclosed for approved health research. 
However, much health information is also shared between health facilities, 
providers, and government agencies to assess or improve quality of care. Whether 
such disclosure or use constitutes research or should be governed by internal 
quality assurance mechanisms could become unclear in some instances. 
4.4 REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
INTERPROVINCIAL DATA SHARING
Sharing health information across borders is subject to legislation and regulation, 
which vary among countries and provinces. There is some international 
guidance, such as guidelines issued by the OECD (OECD, 2013c) and the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-border Privacy Enforcement Arrangement 
(APEC, 2014). However, each country has the primary responsibility for 
regulating international data flows. The legal barriers in many countries have 
been cited as the primary obstacle to transnational research studies (Kuipers 
& van der Hoeven, 2009; Zika et al., 2010; Colledge et al., 2013). 
Box 4.5 
Disclosure to a Designated Entity: Manitoba Centre for Health 
Policy at the University of Manitoba
Under the Manitoba legislation, trustees of health information may disclose the 
information to MCHP or CIHI, both designated as “prescribed health research 
organizations.” Such disclosures must be for the purposes of:
• “analyzing the health status of the population;
• identifying and describing patterns of illness;
• describing and analyzing how health services are used;
• analyzing the availability and adequacy of human resources required to provide 
health services;
• measuring health system performance; or
• health system planning”
With such broad information-gathering powers, MCHP has built large databases of 
research data, which researchers may apply to use and which continue to generate 
studies and analyses of population health and system performance.
(MCHP, 2014e)
85Chapter 4 Accessing Data for Research Purposes: Canada’s Current Legal and Ethical Framework
Data sharing involving the United States has raised concerns because of the 
wide powers of government surveillance under the USA PATRIOT Act (USA 
PATRIOT Act, 2001) and other laws authorizing surveillance. If health data 
are shared with U.S.-based recipients or using U.S.-based computer servers, 
the data could come under the purview of these laws and become subject to 
interception. This could limit the privacy protections for such data, both in 
the country where the data are originally entered into the database and in the 
United States creating a chilling effect on the sharing of health information 
for research purposes.
Sharing Canadian health information outside of Canada is governed in 
different ways depending on the jurisdiction (Weisbaum et al., 2005). At the 
federal level in Canada, Statistics Canada has its own federal legislation, the 
Statistics Act, and a detailed set of policies governing its data sharing agreements 
(GOC, 2014a). The federal privacy law, PIPEDA, applies primarily to the 
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information by a private-sector 
organization in the course of commercial activities. It requires that such data 
custodians ensure that information recipients in a foreign country provide 
a level of protection comparable to that found in Canada (GOC, 2014b). As 
well, the federal Treasury Board has prescribed guidelines for international 
data sharing (TBS, 2010). At the provincial level, laws in some provinces are 
silent on international data sharing (GO, 2012; Govt. of MB, 2012, 2014b), 
while others permit it for approved research purposes (GNS, 2010b; Govt. 
of BC, 2014c), and still others place additional restrictions on it (GDQ, 2014a, 
2014b; GOA, 2014b), including showing that the foreign research entity has 
legal protections comparable to those in Canada.
For data sharing between provinces within Canada, provincial laws also vary. 
In several provinces, the legislation is silent on out-of-province disclosures of 
health information. In others, out-of-province data sharing is permitted if (i) 
it meets the province’s provisions for research, such as approval by an REB or 
other entity, or (ii) the custodian ensures that the receiving province’s laws 
provide equivalent confidentiality protections for the health information 
or that the receiving researcher has adequate confidentiality safeguards 
(see Table 4.1, row 11).
Legal Challenges for Multi-Jurisdictional Data Sharing
The extensive variation in the regulation of cross-border data sharing 
among countries and among provinces within Canada impedes national or 
transnational research studies (Cate, 2008). Such studies have great potential 
for building evidence and knowledge to improve health outcomes, often 
through the creation of large databanks that pool data from many jurisdictions 
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(OECD, 2007; Kosseim et al., 2014). Furthermore, technological advances 
such as fast internet and “cloud-based” data storage, where data are stored 
on remote servers accessible from any country, have made such studies much 
more feasible (Seddon & Currie, 2013).
In addition to variation in legislation and regulation, another of the most 
immediate obstacles to this large-scale research is that research ethics approval 
in one province or country may not be recognized in another jurisdiction. This 
could arise from basic differences in legislation or from different interpretations 
of common terms such as “identifiable,” “impracticable,” or “all reasonable 
efforts” to protect data, as discussed earlier in the chapter. 
Within Canada specifically, while legislation in some provinces permits approval 
from REBs or other research ethics approval entities outside the province, 
in others it does not. Since custodians must comply with the laws of their 
home province, if that province refuses to acknowledge an approval from 
an out-of-province REB, the custodian cannot share the health information 
with out-of-province researchers without further approvals. This can pose a 
problem, especially when the province where the health data are sought has 
more extensive oversight of REBs and standards for research approval than 
the jurisdiction from which the original REB approval came. 
Even for studies in which researchers have obtained consent from participants, 
problems may arise with the use of that consent for interprovincial studies. 
For example, if researchers located in Alberta wished to use data obtained 
with consent during an earlier study in another province, the REB in Alberta 
may not agree to use of data covered by the out-of-province informed consent. 
Different national and provincial jurisdictions may have different interpretations 
of the adequacy of informed consent (e.g., in the case of whether a consent 
given for earlier research is valid for a later study on a related but different 
subject). The regulator may consider the informed consent inadequate, or 
the proposed research purpose as too different from the original purpose 
(Steinsbekk et al., 2013).
Another obstacle to cross-border data sharing is the multitude of agreements 
and policies with which researchers must comply. Among countries and among 
provinces within Canada, there can be wide variation in the administrative steps 
and undertakings that researchers must make with the custodian institutions. 
In some cases, these agreements or policies are drafted very broadly, to ensure 
compliance with domestic legal requirements, and can expose researchers 
to risk (Joly et al., 2011). If any data breaches or other adverse events related 
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to the shared data occur, researchers would be liable under the agreement 
for any resulting damage, in addition to being subject to other remedies and 
penalties under the applicable legislation.
As well, differences in enforcement mechanisms among countries can pose a 
challenge for the regulation of data access. When data are stored or accessible 
in multiple jurisdictions, as in cloud-based storage, it may be difficult to know 
which country’s laws apply (Seddon & Currie, 2013). Furthermore, enforcement 
mechanisms for monitoring the duties of custodians and researchers vary 
widely. Some countries have few mechanisms, while others have more robust 
mechanisms. As noted above, Canadian legislation is among the latter, as it 
commonly provides privacy commissioners with wide powers to investigate and 
make orders, and creates quasi-criminal offences for breach of the law. Finally, 
there are also non-legal barriers to cross-border data sharing, including conflicts 
between the participating institutions’ internal policies and procedures. 
These barriers to multi-jurisdictional research could be overcome through 
measures to make regulatory bodies in different countries and provinces more 
consistent. Common definitions for key terms and recognized templates for 
data transfer agreements would be useful (Knoppers et al., 2013). It would also 
be useful to clarify when obtaining consent from individuals is impracticable 
and when identifiable health information is reasonably needed. 
4.5 CANADA’S ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
As well as abiding by the law, researchers must also comply with established 
ethical standards, which have been articulated in international and national 
ethics guidelines.
There are two main overlapping sources of research ethics governance in 
Canada. First, the federal funding agencies impose research ethics review for 
all federally funded research, guided by their research ethics policy, the TCPS. 
Second, Health Canada imposes research ethics review through its Clinical 
Trials Regulations as a pre-condition for allowing clinical trials of drugs or 
medical devices. Health Canada refers to the International Conference on 
Harmonisation of Good Clinical Practice Guidelines (ICH-GCP), the World 
Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki, and the TCPS for research 
ethics and clinical trial standards that must be respected in pharmaceutical 
trials (Hadskis, 2002). In addition, Canadian privacy laws also impose research 
ethics review as a pre-condition for research involving health data. 
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However, some research involving human subjects in Canada does not appear 
to be covered by any of the research ethics requirements (for example, health 
research conducted in the private sector outside the context of drug or medical 
device approval). The enforceability of research ethics is also unclear. The 
federal funding agencies’ main mechanism to enforce the TCPS is withdrawal 
of funding. Health Canada’s power to enforce the TCPS, the ICH-GCP, and 
the Declaration of Helsinki, which are characterized as “guidance” documents, 
is also limited (Sprumont et al., 2007). 
The TCPS has emerged as the main ethical guideline in Canada. Its three core 
ethical principles — respect for persons, concern for welfare, and justice — govern 
the access, use, and sharing of research data. Under the first principle, misuse 
of stored health information may violate individuals’ autonomy, which is 
embedded in the concept of respect for persons. Under the second principle, 
research can also be seen as a key tool to promote the welfare of individuals 
and communities. The third principle, justice, requires that research should 
not unfairly burden some individuals, and that research is aimed at providing 
potential benefits that will be distributed fairly. The principle of justice also 
requires eliminating or minimizing any potential stigmatizing impact of health 
research on specific communities. For example, Aboriginal peoples may be 
concerned about the potential for such stigmatization from the use of their 
health data for purposes other than those for which their consent was given 
(CIHR et al., 2014).
The rest of this section examines four aspects of Canada’s ethical framework in 
light of these ethical principles: ensuring the benefits of research, protecting 
privacy, consenting to research, and managing risk using proportionality.
4.5.1 Ensuring the Benefits of Research
One of the arguments for enabling research access to data is that resulting 
research provides important benefits. There are well-established benefits to 
society from health research and health system innovation, which is one of the 
basic reasons why governments fund these activities. Supporting scientifically 
sound, ethical research that will translate into wider social and economic 
benefits is in the public interest. 
Much of the data to advance research and innovation already exist within 
publicly funded organizations. Taking advantage of these data thus increases 
activities in the public interest. The Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, for example, has made clear that public-sector information is 
a national resource that should, wherever possible and appropriate, be made 
available for community access and use (Adams & Allen, 2014). Similarly, in 
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Canada, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario has promoted the 
use of health information for wider public interest purposes beyond immediate 
patient care and argued for enhanced data protection measures to facilitate 
and regulate such uses (Cavoukian & Alvarez, 2012).
In fact, it is increasingly argued that there is an ethical duty to contribute to 
research. Reducing the risk of harm for individual patients, for example, by 
providing evidence of the adverse impact of a medical treatment or practice, 
is an ethically defensible course of action.14 However, in addition to simply 
avoiding harm, some researchers are calling for proactive measures to maximize 
well-being, and suggest that it may be unethical not to make use of existing data 
sources to help individuals, communities, and future generations who could 
readily benefit (Stanley & Meslin, 2007). When information in existing data 
holdings could be used to reduce premature death, or to improve survival of a 
disease, failure to use those data would create, or at a minimum fail to address, 
specific harms (Allen et al., 2013). 
Some have argued that those who benefit from publicly funded health care 
should also contribute to it to protect others (Meslin & Cho, 2010; Forsberg 
et al., 2014). For example, when new therapies become available on the market, 
there is limited evidence from the regulatory approval process concerning 
their efficacy and safety; reports of adverse effects may accumulate as the 
therapy is used. Society at large would benefit from being able to intervene in 
the cases where accumulating post-marketing evidence suggests that there is 
a safety concern (Sethi, 2014). Hence, there is an ethical imperative in such 
circumstances to intervene, and to do so as soon as possible. Data reporting, 
sharing, and linkage allow this critical information to come to light. 
In such cases, failure to analyze data and prevent future harm could be unethical. 
Indeed, those who have suffered harm from a failed drug, for instance, may not 
want their suffering to be in vain, and therefore expect lessons to be learned. 
This is particularly true when patients have consented to the use of their data 
for research purposes. In the context of a rare disease, for example, it may be 
difficult for researchers to gather sufficient data to do meaningful studies that 
may assist in fighting the disease. In such circumstances, the ethical imperative 
is to make as much use as possible of information, including through data 
linkage, “to maximize the chance that patients’ contributions translate into 
therapeutic advances” (Kush & Goldman, 2014). This aligns with the ethical 
principle of respect for persons. 
14 Non-maleficence, or the duty to avoid, prevent or minimize harms to others, is captured in 
the concept of welfare in the TCPS, along with beneficence (doing good) and proportionality 
(CIHR et al., 2005).
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A hospital in England provides a real-world example of the ethical obligation to 
examine data. High mortality rates at the Stafford Hospital, eventually uncovered 
through data analysis, suggested that many hundreds more individuals had died 
than would have been expected between 2005 and 2008 as a result of poor 
medical and management practices (Holmes, 2013). Although significant and 
direct physical harm had been done by the management and practitioners in 
the hospital, failure to analyze the data promptly had also caused preventable 
harm. This is at odds with the ethical principle of concern for welfare. Among 
the conclusions of one of the ensuing public inquiries was the following:
All such organisations have the responsibility to detect and redress 
deficiencies in local management and performance where these occur. 
[…] not just the [hospital]’s Board but the system as a whole failed in 
its most essential duty – to protect patients from unacceptable risks of 
harm and from unacceptable, and in some cases inhumane, treatment 
that should never be tolerated in any hospital. 
(Francis, 2013b)
Furthermore, 
All professionals, individually and collectively, should be obliged to take 
part in the development, use and publication of more sophisticated 
measurements of the effectiveness of what they do, and of their 
compliance with fundamental standards. Patients, the public, employers, 
commissioners and regulators need access to accurate, comparable and 
timely information. 
(Francis, 2013a)
The impacts of new drugs and practices on all parts of society also need to be 
considered. Capturing all impacts may be feasible only through analysis across 
databases. An example mentioned above is ADRs, which can often be detected 
only from large amounts of data, through data pooling, conducted effectively 
and in a timely fashion.
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4.5.2 Protecting Privacy
As noted in Section 1.2, the Panel distinguishes between the concepts of privacy 
and confidentiality. Privacy broadly encompasses protection of one’s physical 
self, protection of one’s private physical space, and protection of information 
about oneself and one’s activities (SCC, 2004). Confidentiality refers to the duties 
and practices of people and organizations to ensure that individuals’ personal 
information only flows from one entity to another according to legislated or 
otherwise broadly accepted norms and policies. Respect for privacy has emerged 
as an ethical standard for research. The TCPS highlights harms to individuals 
that may result from inappropriate use and disclosure of personal information, 
such as discrimination in insurance and employment (CIHR et al., 2014). 
Protection of confidentiality is relevant to the public during interactions with 
health and other professionals. For example, when patients communicate with 
their doctor, order a drug prescription from their pharmacy, or enter a clinic 
that specializes in a specific disease, they are revealing personal information with 
an expectation that it will be used within that context and kept confidential. In 
these situations, professionals such as doctors and pharmacists have specific legal 
obligations to keep that information confidential and not to reveal it to others 
without consent of the individual or as specified in law. However, obligations 
of confidentiality are never absolute, and laws and ethical guidelines provide 
exceptions to this duty of confidentiality, allowing the sharing of information in 
a variety of specific non-research circumstances without informed consent such 
as public health emergencies or exceptional police powers. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the various relationships that can give rise to an expectation of confidentiality.
What constitutes a confidentiality violation in the context of accessing individual 
data for research purposes? Confidentiality is clearly breached when third parties 
surreptitiously hack into databases and use that information, for example, 
to blackmail or deceive individuals. But mere access to information without 
consent, many would argue, does not necessarily violate confidentiality. Health 
information stored in databases is accessed by many people without explicit 
consent for various legitimate purposes, and this is acknowledged in privacy 
laws. Moreover, privacy law also relies on a concept of “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.” A person’s privacy is therefore violated in law only if it was reasonable 
for the person to expect that information would not be shared or accessible.
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Figure 4.1 
Common Confidentiality Relationships in Health Care
In relationships in health care, an individual (patient) has interactions with a health professional, who 
takes notes and enters data on the encounter. The primary contact with a health professional may 
lead to additional encounters with other health professionals (pharmacist, specialist) with whom 
confidential information may be shared. In exceptional circumstances, usually mandated by law, the 
health professional may share information with others outside these confidential relationships. For 
example, most jurisdictions have laws that include duties to warn a potential victim, to inform police 
of criminal acts, to inform family when the patient is not competent or a proxy decision-maker is 
needed, and to provide data for research.
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4.5.3 Consenting to Research
The early history of research involved various episodes with catastrophic 
consequences to patients resulting from a lack of respect for consent to medical 
research. These episodes included the syphilis experiments in the United States 
from 1932 to 1972 (Rusert, 2009), and atrocities of World War II, including 
forced human experimentation (Grodin & Annas, 1996). Public attitude surveys 
consistently find that the public wants to be asked and to have a right to make choices 
on the use of their bodies (Dixon-Woods & Tarrant, 2009; Murphy et al., 2009; 
Lewis et al., 2013). Consent regarding use of personal information has evolved 
more recently, and carries no intrinsic risk of physical harm.
In the context of consent regarding the use of a person’s data, there are 
different kinds of consent, ranging from specific to broad. When individuals 
give a specific consent for research using their data, only the data described in 
the consent can be shared and only under the conditions accepted, such as, for 
example, research on a particular disease or the use of data in a certain structure 
or certain circumstances. By contrast, under a broad consent, individuals may 
agree to research on a wide range of health conditions or even unspecified 
future biomedical research (subject to ethics or other kinds of approval) 
(Kosseim & Jospe, 2011). Again, the conditions of data sharing and the data 
confidentiality and security methods may be described in the consent and thus 
apply to the future use of the data. 
Some suggest that the right to control future use of health information is part 
of privacy protection, while others believe it is part of personal autonomy 
(Pritts, 2008). Regardless of the nature of the interest, approaches to this right 
to control vary from more restrictive to more flexible. A very restrictive view 
is that people should provide consent for every specific future use of data for 
which they did not originally give their explicit informed consent. A more 
flexible view is that autonomy is respected when data are used for research-
related purposes in line with the type of research for which people originally 
provided consent. 
The restrictive view is increasingly questioned, particularly in the context of 
biobanks, where participants have specifically consented to provide samples 
and related health information for ethics-approved research purposes that 
are not yet known at the time of storage (Knoppers et al., 2007). Moreover, 
there is strong evidence that requiring consent before making data available 
for research is likely to cause serious bias in the data, for example if those who 
withhold consent are systematically different in a health or biologically relevant 
respect from those who do provide consent. As a result, in an important range 
of circumstances, essentially where a government agency with appropriate 
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legislative safeguards is the data custodian, “consent” is deemed to have been 
given. For example, in the health surveys conducted by Statistics Canada since 
1994, respondents (close to one million) are asked to consent to linking their 
survey responses to provincial health-care records, and to share their data 
with provincial health ministries; well over 90% do provide their consent 
(StatCan, 2004). However, they are not asked for their consent to share their 
data with researchers. Rather, researchers’ access to the data is governed by the 
Statistics Act and the policies of Statistics Canada, as described in Section 2.5.3.
Informed consent also seems an inadequate mechanism to deal with various 
other components of research involving health information. The concerns 
raised by commercialization of research findings and access to the benefits 
of research to research subjects, patients, families, and communities are 
hard to deal with through individual consent. The familial and communal 
components of much information, particularly genetic information, make it 
clear that research has implications for others who are not directly involved 
in individual informed consent procedures. Concerns about stigmatization or 
discrimination of communities (e.g., Aboriginal groups) cannot adequately be 
dealt with through individual consent.
For specific diseases, new initiatives are being developed to more actively involve 
patients and research subjects in the use of their health data or related biological 
samples for such research. These initiatives aim at furthering autonomy. For 
example, “dynamic consent” refers to an ongoing consent process in which 
individuals remain involved in the decision-making process for future use of 
samples (e.g., Kaye et al. (2014)). Similarly, data sharing itself contributes to 
autonomy in the ways patients can make decisions about their information. 
Particularly in the context of ADRs to pharmaceuticals, adequate data sharing is 
essential for reliable drug safety and effectiveness research. Patients’ informed 
decision-making (and thus their autonomy) is enhanced when they have 
access to reliable information, for example, on when a given drug is likely to 
be helpful or not. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has stated 
in several instances that access to relevant health information can be seen as 
a component of the fundamental right to the protection of private and family 
life (Lemmens, 2013). 
There may be no confidentiality risk associated with the sharing of data (for 
example, in the case of properly and adequately de-identified data), making 
it unnecessary — from a privacy perspective — to limit data access. It may be 
very difficult to recontact individuals to obtain consent for their data to be 
used for research if that consent was not obtained when the data were initially 
gathered. And yet, these individuals may be willing to have their data used 
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for research. Furthermore, if a sizeable proportion of the individuals do not 
give consent, the quality of the data for analysis will be reduced, possibly to 
the point of uselessness (Tu et al., 2004). The results may even be misleading, 
and thus may lead to harms for others (Tu et al., 2004; El Emam et al., 2007; 
Kho et al., 2009; El Emam, 2013a).
Some commentators further argue that consent cannot fulfil its purpose of 
ensuring that research participants are fully informed and agree to use of 
their data. Studies have shown that people sign consent forms without really 
knowing what they are signing, and so consent forms may not offer an ethical 
defence for data custodians. McDonald and Cranor (2008) estimated that the 
time spent reading privacy notices each time an average person visited a new 
website would amount to 244 hours per year (at an average of 10 minutes per 
policy). Given this time burden, the expression of consent to such notices may 
not mean the user has read the notice and made an informed choice. The ethics 
of, and trust in, those holding confidential data may be called into question by 
the public, regardless of whether they have gained consent, they have released 
data, or they are allowed to hold data under legislation.15 
The process of obtaining consent by a clinician or researcher can be useful to 
raise awareness of the use of data and the benefits that research could entail, 
even if consent is not required. As well, if obtaining consent is not needed or 
practicable, alternatives to inform individuals, such as communication and 
notification strategies, should be considered when using health data. 
Given the challenges with regard to determining the appropriate role for consent, 
including the risks of bias and the extent to which in practice it can ever be 
fully informed, this is an area where, in a democracy, the balance is generally 
struck in legislation and regulation. The result almost universally is that while 
consent is often required, just as often there are situations enumerated where 
it is not required. From a broader perspective, therefore, the challenge is how 
best to enumerate and define those situations where consent to use individuals’ 
identifiable or potentially identifiable information is not required. 
15 Health research that improves public health generates a benefit for all (Anomaly, 2011). Public 
goods, such as the safety of medicines, cannot be tailored to individual demand. Consequently, 
it is difficult to justify a specific consent-based approach to their provision (O’Neill, 2003, 2004). 
As a result, there is no ethically defensible right to consent or to withhold consent in the same 
way that there are moral and legal rights to privacy and confidentiality (Clark & Weale, 2011). 
For many public goods, sufficient provision is enabled through notification with an opportunity 
to opt-out.
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To address the limitations of informed consent and additional issues at stake in 
sharing information, privacy governance is needed to determine what constitutes 
appropriate and ethical use of data (see examples in Chapter 5). All Canadian 
privacy laws require governance as an essential tool to promote and protect 
privacy and other social goals. Indeed, in the context of the development of 
databases and biobanks, participating individuals may “consent to a governance 
system” when their information is collected and stored, allowing future use of 
data determined through the governance system (Austin & Lemmens, 2009).
In regard to governance requirements, Canadian laws were modelled in part 
on Fair Information Practices (FIPs), a governance framework developed 
by the OECD beginning in 1980 to promote privacy protection. FIPs were a 
response to concern about the risk of privacy loss when digital data started to 
become available in all walks of life in the 1970s. Since that time, FIPs have 
been translated into the legal systems of many countries, including Canada 
(Cavoukian & Chanliau, 2013). In 2013, the OECD refined and expanded its 
guidelines on privacy protection, which include the FIPs, to take into account 
the proliferation of available data and the increased potential benefits to 
research (OECD, 2013b). 
A key element of the new guidelines is recognition that sole reliance on consent 
for data use may be impracticable and insufficient to protect individuals’ 
privacy. Furthermore, limiting data collection to the specific purpose in the 
notice used to solicit consent inhibits their future use for the benefit of society 
at large. The OECD notes: 
The notice and consent system, on which data collectors and data 
users have come to rely, was designed to empower individuals to make 
decisions about their personal data, but the evolution of data collection 
and data use has severely weakened that power while imposing increasing 
burdens on data subjects and on society. While notice and consent 
may provide meaningful privacy protection in appropriate contexts, 
this approach is increasingly ineffective as the primary mechanism for 
ensuring data privacy. 
(OECD, 2013a) 
As a result, the revised approach “shift[s] responsibility [for information privacy 
protection] away from individuals and toward data collectors and data users, 
who should be held accountable for how they manage data rather than whether 
they obtain individual consent” (OECD, 2013a).
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Key elements of the new guidelines include:
• focusing on practical assessment of the benefits and risks associated with 
data uses;
• restoring balance between privacy and the free flow of information, and 
avoiding suppression of innovation with overly restrictive or inflexible data 
privacy laws; and
• putting in place practical frameworks and processes for identifying, balancing, 
and mitigating harms from inappropriate uses of personal data.
(OECD, 2013a)
International evidence suggests that data useful to research should be accessible, 
but that there should be a greater onus on those who collect and use data 
to protect data confidentiality, which in turn calls for stronger governance 
practices, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Governance principles can also address some gaps in the legal and ethical 
frameworks. In some cases, long-standing principles of confidentiality in 
common law readily incorporate protecting data confidentiality. However, to 
allow for future technological or social change, the law is not always specific. 
In addition, principles of informed consent, which are focused on individual 
interests, may be limited in their ability to deal with collective social, political, 
and cultural interests of specific discrete communities such as Aboriginal groups. 
For these reasons, governance mechanisms that account for such realities in 
the context of privacy protection are vital. 
4.5.4 Managing Risk Through Proportionality
Proportionality — keeping measures to protect privacy proportional to the risks 
of harm from uses of individual information — is a central element in the TCPS. 
Furthermore, considerations of proportionality permeate legal rules about 
privacy protection: privacy is not an absolute right in the sense that it needs to 
be protected at all costs. Interference with privacy can be justifiable so long as 
the degree of interference is proportionate to the wider social benefit and is 
needed to achieve that social benefit. In practice, then, use of individual data 
for research, even without consent, can be justifiable. In some cases (e.g., for 
a university-based researcher), the onus is on those who seek to use the data to 
justify this use. This is particularly true if consent will not be sought. Moreover, 
a proportionate approach ensures that appropriate scrutiny is tailored to the 
level of risk presented by the research. Thus, the ethical acceptability of the 
research should involve consideration of the foreseeable risks, the potential 
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benefits, and the ethical implications of the research (CIHR et al., 2014). In 
other cases, (e.g., for data held by Statistics Canada), legislation is already in 
place to deem consent unnecessary.
Proportionality applies to the real risks inherent in data sharing, which can 
include risks to reputation of undertaking data linkage and sharing, risks to 
privacy (which cannot be completely eliminated),16  and other risks specific 
to particular types of data. El Emam and Arbuckle (2013) point out that de-
identification of genetic data would render the data useless for research purposes 
because the data would have to be severely distorted to become non-identifiable 
(see also Austin and Lemmens (2009)). Therefore, research using genetic 
data involves a particular risk of identification of people with genetic diseases.
As a result, appropriate practice suggests that in those situations where REB 
review, rather than legislation, is the primary method for judging these important 
trade-offs between individual privacy and the public good benefits of the 
research, ethics review must include this kind of risk assessment. Without such 
an assessment, any policies or practices required to address those risks may 
be too little or too great, and, hence, disproportionate. Analytical judgment 
should include appropriate consideration of risks against a background of core 
objectives so that an appropriate weight can be applied (Sethi & Laurie, 2013).
Good Practice: The TCPS recognizes that risk cannot be eliminated but should be 
considered proportionately. Good practice suggests incorporating risk management 
in all aspects of governance, including ethical governance. 
4.6 CONCLUSION
Protecting privacy and confidentiality is a legal and ethical duty. Yet, at the same 
time, there is an equally important ethical duty to conduct research through 
access to data to create public benefits and avoid future harm. With effective 
mechanisms to protect privacy and confidentiality — such as a carefully calibrated 
combination of a particular degree of de-identification and a corresponding 
level of access security — an ethical framework such as the TCPS clearly supports 
enabling access to data for research purposes.
16 The U.K. Academy of Medical Sciences has twice reported on the need to strike a better balance 
between privacy and proportionate governance (2006 and 2011) (AMS, 2011).
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The legal frameworks in Canada demonstrate a clear and consistent overall 
intent to balance the public interest in research with the protection of privacy 
and confidentiality. There are, for instance, no legal obstacles to releasing 
data that are considered de-identified under a given province’s legislation to 
researchers. There are many examples in Canadian legislation where research 
and analysis using identifiable individual data are specifically permitted, and 
there are agencies that publicly fund this research. 
However, parts of Canada’s ethical and legal framework lack clarity. There 
are variations in approach and in definitions of key terms in the laws across 
provinces and the federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the development of data 
sharing guidelines based on the terms defined in these laws can be confusing. 
Further, with the rapid technological changes in the capacity to move large 
volumes of data, as well as the explosion in the volume of available data, the 
various legislative and other approaches are often seriously lagging. The result 
is significant uncertainty as to what specific practices are allowed in various 
circumstances. To deal with this uncertainty, it is useful to view data on a spectrum, 
beginning with fully identifiable data and moving towards data that are more 
strongly de-identified and less likely to be re-identified. The key lies in finding 
an appropriate level of access control for the given level of de-identification.
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5 Effective Governance for Accessing Health  
and Health-Related Data
Timely access to data depends on the effectiveness of numerous organizations 
and other entities dealing with health and health-related data, and on the 
approach to governance implemented by them. Although often described as 
a “system,” these institutions, organizations, programs, and activities are only 
loosely coordinated, even within a given province. Yet, they share responsibility 
for the provision of timely access to health and health-related data. They are 
better described as constituting a “complex environment:” a collection of diverse, 
multiple, interacting entities and elements that have the capacity to adapt and 
learn from experience, but can equally become uncoordinated and inefficient.
Key Findings
• Many institutions, organizations, programs, and activities across Canada are 
collectively responsible for the provision of timely access to health and health-
related data. However, they are only loosely coordinated, even within a single 
province, let alone across provinces or legal jurisdictions. They are best thought of 
as a “complex environment of heterogeneous entities” — a collection of diverse, 
multiple, interconnected entities and elements. 
• Not all entities within this complex environment in Canada are formally constituted 
as discrete organizations with publically accountable boards of directors or 
their equivalent. Nonetheless, each program, department, project, individual, 
or organization has a responsibility to follow principles of good governance. 
• The Panel selected six entities that succeed in enabling timely access to data for 
researchers. The governance approaches of these six “best practice entities” share 
four common principles: enabling appropriate use of data, managing risk, respecting 
privacy, and maintaining public trust by providing evidence of trustworthiness. 
• These best practice entities, within complex environments in Canada or in other 
countries with similar social and legal systems, collectively address four cross-cutting 
aspects of governance: privacy, research, information, and network governance. 
• A final overarching consideration in delivering good governance is the need to 
consider the proportionality of governance mechanisms working together, that is, 
that the level of scrutiny and control over access must be commensurate with the 
level of risks at stake. Lower risks justify lighter touch governance.
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In the context of timely access to health and health-related data, the role of 
governance is crucial in bringing some order to the underlying complexity. 
For the purposes of this assessment, governance can be thought of as the 
role of an organization’s board of directors (or equivalent) that defines that 
organization’s purpose and develops the strategies, objectives, values, and 
policies to pursue that purpose. It includes such management tools as mission 
statements, statements of organizational objectives and values, logic models, 
organizational performance metrics, risk management frameworks, policies and 
guidelines for financial and operational matters, stakeholder relations, and the 
like. As will be discussed later, lying on top of such organizational governance 
matters are the higher-level, cross-cutting governance issues relating to how the 
environment as a whole addresses important issues, such as privacy, through 
the activities of the separate organizations.
The Panel’s analysis suggests that those responsible for governance of the 
organizations dealing with health and health-related data can learn from other 
organizations within Canada and around the world that have implemented 
effective governance within their own contexts. This learning would help each 
component of the complex environment to improve its governance, and thus 
improve the provision of timely access to health and health-related data. 
5.1 PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND BEST 
PRACTICE ENTITIES 
The legal and ethical framework defined in Chapter 4 provides general rules 
that constrain those making decisions on accessing and providing access to 
health and health-related data. Transforming those rules into concrete and 
effective guidance requires modes of governance that address the various layers 
of complexity within the system. The best such systems are built upon principles.
Principles of good governance in areas of public service have received increasing 
attention in recent years, both in Canada and elsewhere.17 One of the most 
compelling statements of such principles was developed by the Langlands 
Commission in the United Kingdom (Box 5.1). 
17 For example, the Government of Canada’s Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
was established to contribute to public confidence in the Canadian financial system. It is guided 
by seven key principles and a supervisory framework (OSFI, 2010).
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Part of the value of this statement is that it can be applied across the entire 
public sector. Applying these principles to the Canadian context, for example, 
would suggest that REBs that review data-intensive projects without members 
who have expertise in the potential impact on privacy would be counter to 
principles 4 and 5. Overlapping or multiple reviews would be inconsistent with 
principle 2. Lack of transparency in explaining decisions on preventing access 
to data would fail to meet principle 6. In the Panel’s experience, many of these 
principles, and especially principle 6, remain goals to aspire to in Canada in 
the context of timely access to health-related data for research. 
The Panel looked for evidence from Canada and internationally of organizations 
that support timely access to data, and follow good governance practices 
according to the Langlands criteria. Six institutions and programs (entities) 
were selected (three from Canada and three from other countries). All have 
successfully enabled timely access to health and health-related data as well 
as data linkage. The Panel regards these as “best practice entities” (Box 5.2). 
Box 5.1 
Principles of Good Governance 
According to the Langlands Commission, several principles are needed for good 
governance in public service:
1. Focusing on the organization’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens and 
service users;
2. Performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles;
3. Promoting values for the whole organization and demonstrating the values of 
good governance through behaviour;
4. Taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risk;
5. Developing the capacity and capability of the governing body to be effective; and
6. Engaging stakeholders and making accountability real.
(OPM & CIPFA, 2004)
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Box 5.2 
Best Practice Entities 
Farr Institute @ Scotland: The Farr Institute @ Scotland builds on the expertise, 
infrastructure and established cross-sectoral collaboration developed by the Scottish 
Informatics Programme (SHIP). SHIP was a research platform for the collation, 
management, dissemination, and analysis of electronic patient records from across 
Scotland. It was operated by a network of universities in collaboration with the 
National Health Service (NHS) Scotland, and funded by the main U.K. granting agencies. 
It included a new research institute specifically for research based on EHRs and an 
online research portal providing rapid, secure access to health data. It also found 
mechanisms to link these data to large third-party data sets. The programme has 
ended, and its platform has moved to the Farr Institute @ Scotland (SHIP, n.d.-a, n.d.-b).
Wales Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank (SAIL): SAIL is a 
database of anonymized health and social data about the population across Wales, 
funded by the Welsh Government’s National Institute of Social Care and Health 
Research. The individual-level data sets are held at Swansea University and can be 
linked together for research purposes, subject to privacy legislation and research 
approvals (SAIL, 2014).
Data Linkage Western Australia (Data Linkage WA): This data linkage system 
was established in 1995 to connect all health and related information for the Western 
Australian population. The system is a coordinated and collaborative effort between 
the Department of Health Western Australia, two universities, and an institute for 
child health research. The information is used for research, subject to ethical approval, 
and for planning to improve the health and well-being of citizens in the region (Data 
Linkage WA, 2014b).
Ontario – Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES): ICES is a research 
institute housing a secure yet accessible array of health information on Ontarians. 
It also involves a community of researchers conducting health services research by 
linking data from many sources to obtain a comprehensive view of health care and 
health-care delivery. The majority of data come from the publicly funded health-care 
system and include medical records, laboratory results, and medical imaging. A 
“prescribed entity” that may receive individual-level identifiable information under 
Ontario legislation, ICES de-identifies and anonymizes data collected, restricts access 
to data to relevant projects, and trains all of its scientists in privacy policy and practice 
(ICES, 2014a, 2014e).
continued on next page
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The Panel identified four principles common to all of the entities identified 
in Box 5.2: 
i.  Enabling appropriate use of data to enhance public well-being, which is one 
of the key elements of good data stewardship;
ii.  Managing risk by identifying the range of risks involved in providing data 
access and minimizing those risks where possible, while acknowledging that 
risks cannot be entirely eliminated;
iii.  Respecting privacy to reassure citizens that risks to their core personal 
interests are kept to an absolute minimum, which is another key element 
of good data stewardship; and
iv.  Maintaining public trust by providing evidence of trustworthiness, recognizing 
that the public has an interest in seeing the confidentiality of their personal 
data being maintained, but also in seeing that appropriate use is made of 
health and health-related data for research with demonstrable social value. 
(This applies to both the data custodians and the researchers involved.)
Ontario – Better Outcomes Registry and Network (BORN): The registry was 
started in 2009 to collect, interpret, share, and protect data about pregnancy, birth, 
and childhood in the province of Ontario. Its information system collects data on 
every birth and young child in the province from hospitals, laboratories, midwifery 
practice groups, and clinical programs. Its objectives include linking information and 
providers to address gaps in care, and to support research and innovation to improve 
maternal and child health. The organization is funded by the Ontario Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care and administered by the Children’s Hospital of Eastern 
Ontario (BORN, 2014).
Manitoba Centre for Health Policy (MCHP): Located in the Faculty of Medicine 
at the University of Manitoba, the centre is essentially a research unit focusing 
on population health. Most of its research is from its data repository, containing 
anonymized individual-level data on Manitobans’ use of hospital care, physician 
services, home care, nursing homes, prescriptions, education, and family services. It 
also links these data to non-personal (aggregated) socio-economic data from Statistics 
Canada. The provincial Ministry of Health has funded several large research projects 
at the centre, accounting for approximately half of its total funding. The rest comes 
from projects approved by other funding bodies and granting agencies (MCHP, 2014b).
109Chapter 5 Effective Governance for Accessing Health and Health-Related Data
These principles guide all aspects of governance that these entities have 
implemented, although specific policies and practices may differ from one 
institution or context to another. The value of a principle-based approach is 
that principles are starting points for deliberation and action; they provide a 
common framework to achieve certain goals while allowing flexibility in the 
specific means to achieve those goals. Each entity must choose its own approach; 
however, explicit commitment to these principles helps to ensure that each 
approach is the best one for each entity in the pursuit of providing timely and 
effective access to data. 
It is notable that all of these six best practice entities are at Level 1; they all 
operate within a single jurisdiction. At Level 2, best practices are most clearly 
evident at Statistics Canada and CIHI. At Level 3, the Panel was challenged to 
find best practice entities. This is a context where practices are evolving — most 
rapidly in genetic research.
5.1.1 Enabling Appropriate Use of Data 
When an entity enables appropriate use of data, it ensures that “all relevant 
[g]overnance requirements are met, but that [g]overnance is not unduly 
burdensome to research” (Farr Institute, 2015). As discussed earlier, the 
appropriate use of health and health-related data enhances social well-being. 
As a result, in many cases there is an ethical imperative to promote the use 
of such data. The Panel found that data custodians that had accorded a high 
priority to the use of data were organized and funded to facilitate access and 
had developed processes to foster such access.
Clarifying the role of data custodians in promoting the use of data enables 
appropriate decisions to be made. In some cases, data custodians originally 
established as secure repositories of data may not perceive supporting access 
to data for research as part of their core mandate. In most cases, provincial law 
designates who is a data custodian and prescribes rules for research sharing. 
However, some data custodians do state clearly in their mission statements that 
enabling appropriate use of data is a core purpose of the organization. This is 
also in keeping with the “setting the context” principle for risk management 
(Box 5.3), and the conclusions of the Second Caldicott Report in England and Wales 
(Box 5.4). The mission statement of ICES, for example, states that extensive 
use of data is intended: its mission is “research excellence resulting in trusted 
evidence that makes policy better, health-care stronger and people healthier,” 
and its vision is to be “a world-leading institute where data and discovery 
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improve health and health care” (ICES, 2014a). To complement statements 
such as these, data custodians could publish regularly how much access they 
have provided to researchers along with a list of subsequent publications 
(MCHP, 2010). As well, they could publish details of the researchers who have 
sought access, a summary of the proposed research, and an account of the 
intended public interest that the research is designed to address. Statistics 
Canada, for example, provides information on all approved record linkages on 
its website routinely (StatCan, 2014a). Population Data BC maintains a publicly 
available database, which lists all research projects and includes the data sets 
that were requested for each one (PopData BC, 2015a). Such transparency 
about data use also fulfils the principle of maintaining public trust.
Best Practice: The appropriate provision of data to researchers is central to those 
entities highlighted by the Panel. For example, entities such as the Farr Institute @ 
Scotland, SAIL, Data Linkage WA, ICES, and MCHP clearly state in their mission 
statements that enabling appropriate use of data for research is a core purpose of 
their organization. 
For some of these best practice entities, strong leadership has enabled them 
to move from a “data custodianship model,” in which holding and securing 
data are emphasized to the exclusion of other considerations, to a “data 
stewardship” model, in which enabling access is a core institutional objective. 
The advisory board for MCHP, for example, includes seven deputy ministers 
from the Government of Manitoba (MCHP, 2014a). In Western Australia, the 
Director General (equivalent to deputy minister in Canada) of the Western 
Australia Health Department (WA Health) is the delegated owner of all data 
stored, used, and disclosed. As the Director General sets the overall strategic 
direction of the WA Health, the data custodians “have delegated responsibility 
for setting the overall strategic direction of the specific data collection to ensure 
the collection is developed, maintained and utilized in accordance with the 
strategic goals of WA Health” (WA Health, 2014).
Other organizations focus on data access by including researchers in their 
governance decisions. Statistics Canada has a long-standing network of subject 
matter advisory committees, most of whose members are academic researchers, 
and the ministerial-appointed National Statistics Council has substantial 
researcher membership (StatCan, 2014i). The CIHI Board of Directors also 
has traditionally included at least one prominent researcher. The leading 
international genetic research consortia, such as the International Cancer 
Genome Consortium (see Box 5.6 and 5.11), exist primarily for research 
purposes, and are led and run by leading researchers.
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5.1.2 Managing Risk 
As discussed in Section 3.4, the possession and use of health and health-related 
data involve a number of risks, first and foremost the risk that individuals’ 
identities and sensitive information could be revealed. No data custodian 
or data steward can promise to eliminate all risks, as privacy risk cannot be 
completely eliminated. However, it can be significantly mitigated through 
effective risk management incorporating systematic processes for assessing 
and dealing with threats. The same is true for other risks involved, including 
risks of discrimination against or stigmatization of citizens, as well as risk to 
professional standing and reputation for those holding data if they grant access 
in a situation that could bring their organization into disrepute.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) lays out guidelines 
for risk management (ISO, n.d.), which can be adapted to the circumstances of 
any type of business or government agency. Box 5.3 describes how, for example, 
this standard has been adapted by Public Safety Canada for the Government 
of Canada, and augmented by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario to cover privacy issues. Based on these standards, risk management 
in providing access to detailed individual-level data, including linked data, is 
aimed at enabling access to data while recognizing the risk of privacy loss. The 
process of analyzing risks depends on the type of data released to researchers, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. 
5.1.3 Respecting Privacy 
Preventing inappropriate use of personal data is a key concern for the public. 
Some data custodians may choose to protect privacy by not allowing access to 
data at all, but thereby fail to act in the public interest by enabling appropriate 
access to the data. If data are to be shared, the core challenge is to enable access 
to data while maintaining appropriate protection of confidentiality. 
Concern over data custodians’ use of data in the NHS in England and Wales led 
to the release, in 1997, of the Caldicott Report on how patient information was 
controlled (DH, 1997). The objective was to ensure that confidentiality was not 
undermined by those handling data in the NHS. These concerns were recently 
re-examined and a subsequent report released in 2013 with the objective to 
ensure “an approximate balance between the protection of patient information 
and the use and sharing of information to improve patient care” (DH, 2013).
The key principles of the Second Caldicott Report (DH, 2013) are outlined in 
Box 5.4. The Panel believes these principles show how respect for privacy can 
be implemented in practice for data custodians, while also meeting other 
objectives. The addition of the seventh Caldicott principle in the second report 
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highlights the importance of enabling appropriate data sharing as a key objective 
of data custodians. The Panel recognizes that translating these principles into 
practice can be challenging given the overwhelming volume of data. In some 
cases, for example, exploratory data analysis may be a more optimal approach 
than conventional hypothesis testing, with its typically stringent requirement 
that reasons for performing research be strongly justified. 
Box 5.3 
Risk Management Steps: Canadian Examples
Public Safety Canada has articulated the following steps for managing risk in the 
public sector:
Step 1: Setting the Context: articulating an institution’s objectives and defining its 
external and internal parameters to be taken into consideration when managing risk.
Step 2: Risk Identification: defining, recognizing, and recording risks.
Step 3: Risk Analysis: understanding the nature and level of risk, in terms of its 
impacts and likelihood.
Step 4: Risk Evaluation: comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria to 
determine whether a risk and/or its magnitude are acceptable or tolerable.
Step 5: Risk Treatment: identifying and recommending risk control or risk 
treatment options.
(PSC, 2012)
Further elements of risk management in the context of privacy have been added by 
the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario:
Reporting: laying out policies on access, and establishing proactive notification of 
breaches, what data are accessed, how often, and by whom.
Monitoring for Compliance: external audit of risk control; periodic review of risk 
management policies, procedures, and operations by internal staff; and reviews by 
external and independent experts.
(IPCO, 2010)
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Box 5.4 
Caldicott Principles for the Protection of Personal  
Confidential Data
1. “Justify the purpose(s): Every proposed use or transfer of personal confidential 
data within or from an organization should be clearly defined, scrutinized and 
documented, with continuing uses regularly reviewed by an appropriate guardian. 
2. Don’t use personal confidential data unless it is absolutely necessary: 
Personal confidential data items should not be included unless it is essential for 
the specified purpose(s) of that flow. The need for patients to be identified should 
be considered at each stage of satisfying the purpose(s). 
3. Use the minimum necessary personal confidential data: Where use of 
personal confidential data is considered to be essential, the inclusion of each 
individual item of data should be considered and justified so that the minimum 
amount of personal confidential data is transferred or accessible as is necessary 
for a given function to be carried out.
4. Access to personal confidential data should be on a strict need-to-know 
basis: Only those individuals who need access to personal confidential data 
should have access to it, and they should only have access to the data items that 
they need to see. This may mean introducing access controls or splitting data 
flows where one data flow is used for several purposes. 
5. Everyone with access to personal confidential data should be aware of 
their responsibilities: Action should be taken to ensure that those handling 
personal confidential data — both clinical and non-clinical staff — are made fully 
aware of their responsibilities and obligations to respect patient confidentiality. 
6. Comply with the law: Every use of personal confidential data must be lawful. 
Someone in each organization handling personal confidential data should be 
responsible for ensuring that the organization complies with legal requirements. 
7. The duty to share information can be as important as the duty to protect 
patient confidentiality. Health and social care professionals should have the 
confidence to share information in the best interests of their patients within the 
framework set out by these principles. They should be supported by the policies 
of their employers, regulators and professional bodies.” 
(DH, 2013)
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5.1.4 Maintaining Public Trust by Providing Evidence  
of Trustworthiness
A strong and growing body of evidence suggests that many members of the public 
are willing to bear some level of risk of a loss of privacy in order to contribute 
to research that has a reasonable prospect of delivering public benefit or wider 
social value (Haddow et al., 2007; O’Doherty & Burgess, 2008; Dixon-Woods & 
Tarrant, 2009; Ipsos MORI, 2014). However, the evidence also indicates that 
tolerance of such risks is by no means unconditional; for example, common 
public concerns that must be addressed involve access by commercial entities to 
citizens’ data and ensuring that there is tangible social value from access. This 
suggests that who has access to the data and how the resulting research findings 
are used remain important considerations for many members of the public. 
This trust in public research needs to be fostered and maintained if research 
is to continue. Moreover, this trust has to be respected, as individuals have a 
continuing interest in their data. Trust can be maintained and strengthened 
through transparency of governance, including providing evidence of the 
steps taken to protect privacy and of the benefits to the public from research. 
Furthermore, the principle of maintaining trust has implications for some of 
the other principles outlined above. It suggests, for example, that the nature 
and degree of risks to privacy must be weighed against the nature and likelihood 
of public benefit. These considerations directly affect risk management. In 
finding the appropriate balance of considerations across all four principles in 
any given context, trust will be maximized. 
In most (if not all) cases, data have been collected by trusted professionals, 
whether by individual doctors and hospitals, academic researchers, or Statistics 
Canada. These data custodians preserve trust with the public by establishing and 
imposing rigorous policies aimed at preventing inappropriate access to data. 
This relationship cannot be compromised, and indeed must be safeguarded 
through ensuring that access to data is appropriate, and seen to be so. Continuing 
involvement of data custodians to ensure that decisions on accessing data are 
appropriate is warranted, as discussed later in this chapter.
The consequences of failing to secure and maintain the trust of citizens are 
profound. Loss of trust could have a direct and negative impact on citizens’ 
care. It is well recognized in law and by professional bodies, for example, 
that there is a public interest in maintaining trust, because its loss could lead 
citizens to stop providing vital information about themselves that can be used 
in their own care and protection. This has clear implications for public health. 
From a research perspective, availability of data could be imperilled if public 
trust were to decline. As a result, maintenance of public trust is at the heart 
of effective governance.
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While there are no specific established grounds for trust, Baroness Onora 
O’Neill, a philosopher and former chair of the Nuffield (U.K.) Council on 
Bioethics, argues that trust can be built in two steps: 
If we want others to trust us, the first step is to be trustworthy […] 
The second step is to show that we are trustworthy: we have to provide 
enough intelligible evidence of competence, honesty and reliability in 
the relevant matter for others to reach an intelligent judgment. This is 
not best done by showing that we have ticked all the prescribed boxes, 
kept perfect records or excelled in some league table. Complex forms 
of accountability may be useful for third parties, but what matters for 
most people in judging where to place their trust is generally simpler. 
Most of us look for evidence of trustworthiness — of competence, 
honesty and reliability — in relevant matters. 
(O’Neill, 2013)
Evidence of trustworthiness can be built up over time through such measures as: 
• demonstrating practically that the four guiding principles common to the 
best practice entities are being respected;
• engaging proactively with the public; 
• introducing and demonstrating best practices in governance; 
• communicating the value of research output; and 
 • describing to the public the effort undertaken to protect individual information. 
For example, MCHP has an award-winning (from CIHR) public communication 
program of short (four page) briefs on their research, which are readily accessible 
and often the subject of media stories. Statistics Canada and CIHI are in the 
news regularly with valuable new information. These are the results of explicit 
policies to develop a public profile and engender trust.
5.2 CROSS-CUTTING ASPECTS OF GOVERNANCE
As described earlier, the six best practice entities share with the other 
organizations within their respective jurisdiction’s complex environment a 
collective responsibility for addressing four cross-cutting aspects of governance: 
privacy, research, information, and network governance. The separate treatment 
of the four overarching aspects of governance provided in this chapter addresses 
comprehensive governance; depending on the entity and circumstances, certain 
aspects will be more prominent. For example, REBs may be more concerned 
with research governance, while data custodians may be more concerned with 
information governance. The four cross-cutting aspects are outlined in Box 5.5.
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While the four aspects of governance apply at all three levels of access 
(i.e., within a single jurisdiction, across Canada, and internationally), the 
application of each type of governance will differ at each level. In this chapter, 
much of the discussion of privacy, research, and information governance 
addresses best governance practices in single jurisdictions identified in the 
literature. The Panel did, however, also explore the types of governance 
mechanisms that have been put in place by organizations that are accessing 
and sharing data — across Canada and internationally — by forming networks. 
The discussion of such organizations will constitute part of the treatment of 
network governance below.
Box 5.5  
Four Cross-Cutting Aspects of Governance 
Privacy Governance: is concerned with how the “entities” (i.e., formal and informal 
organizations as well as individuals) in the complex environment of health and 
health-related data collectively address risks to privacy posed by the movement of 
data. Governance in this area requires specialized knowledge of technology, law, 
and statistical methods.
Research Governance: is concerned with how the entities collectively ensure that 
(i) the research that is undertaken is of high quality; (ii) there are significant benefits 
of research to society; and (iii) these benefits outweigh any risks, from practical, 
ethical, and legal perspectives. 
Information Governance: is concerned with how the entities collectively manage 
information in a way that maintains confidentiality of the data while also providing 
appropriate access. 
Network Governance: is concerned with how the entities collectively manage the 
research enterprise and share research results through the formation of networks. 
It involves creating common standards for data collection and developing policies 
for international data sharing. This is the broadest of the four overarching aspects of 
governance, since it can extend across multiple jurisdictions and complex environments, 
as well as involve entities from both the health and non-health sectors. Furthermore, 
it can involve consideration of how the other three overarching aspects of governance 
interact to create an effective platform for the undertaking of research. 
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Each of the four cross-cutting aspects of governance will now be explored. A 
comprehensive analysis would require addressing how each aspect pertains to 
each entity within the health and health-related data complex environment in 
Canada. For the sake of brevity, this chapter focuses on the entities within which 
each cross-cutting aspect of governance is especially relevant. To emphasize 
relationships between aspects of governance or different entities, sections of 
this chapter will be cross-referenced.
5.2.1 Privacy Governance 
Respect for privacy is a requirement for each organization as well as each 
individual involved in the complex health and health-related data environment. 
It is reflected in the methods used to frame, collect, store, and provide access 
to data. Establishing that such processes are defined and implemented is key 
to privacy governance and requires expertise in technology, statistical methods, 
ethics, and privacy law to determine whether privacy is respected. Academic 
literature suggests that some REBs can be inconsistent in interpreting ethical 
and legal guidelines on what is identifiable information (Gershon & Tu, 2008; 
Willison et al., 2008; Caulfield et al., 2011; Yiannakoulias, 2011). For example, 
not all REBs include members with knowledge of what constitutes “reasonable” 
de-identification measures. To address the concern that specialized knowledge 
is needed to protect privacy, some countries and Canadian provinces have 
either established an external entity to ensure that privacy and confidentiality 
are respected or developed an information governance review panel dedicated 
to privacy review. An example of the former is MCHP (Manitoba), where 
a separate approval process of the Health Information Privacy Committee 
(HIPC) works in parallel with the REB (MCHP, 2014d). An example of the 
latter is SAIL (Wales).   
Other examples of best practices in privacy governance are the following:
• BORN (Ontario): Data accessed from the BORN database in Ontario are 
certified to indicate that they have undergone de-identification and that 
the de-identification process has been approved by and reported to the 
REB (BORN, 2015). 
• ICES (Ontario): Internal procedures determine differential access by individuals 
to data sets that have different degrees of de-identification. These policies 
have been developed in consultation with the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario. REB notification is provided for health system 
evaluation projects conducted under Section 45 of PHIPA in Ontario. REB 
approval is sought for all research projects conducted under Section 44 of 
PHIPA (ICES, 2014b).
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 • Statistics Netherlands: Explicit criteria and processes (see Section 2.6) have 
been defined that flow from governing legislation for determining eligible 
institutions, eligible researchers within those institutions, and eligible research 
projects to be undertaken by the researchers (CBS, 2014a). 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these approaches, and 
introducing one approach may lead to changes to the governance in other 
parts of the complex environment. For example, when SAIL enabled online 
data linkage, it introduced the separation principle as an added safeguard 
(discussed in Section 5.2.3). By contrast, when ICES was formed in 1992, 
its data holdings were restricted to its own researchers; consequently, ICES 
did not have to consider the risks from releasing data to a wider audience. 
Certification that data are de-identified in the BORN database may be sufficient 
for a single database. 
Best Practice: The entities highlighted by the Panel have developed dedicated processes 
to evaluate privacy concerns when enabling data access.
5.2.2 Research Governance
While research governance entails many aspects, the panel chose to focus 
on the REB process. To comply with the ethics codes outlined in Chapter 4, 
university-affiliated researchers submit requests for approval to conduct data-
based research to REBs and also apply to data custodians for access to the 
data. Since research using health and health-related data may give rise to a wide 
range of ethical concerns beyond privacy protection, such as stigmatization of 
groups or potential future discrimination, ethical review of such research is 
an important element of the research governance framework. In its review of 
the evidence on the effect of research governance on timely and appropriate 
access to data, the Panel found that timeframes for these approvals vary widely 
among organizations and jurisdictions in Canada, ranging from months to 
years. Research involving data or researchers from multiple sites increase 
the number of REB reviews involved, and linkage or data transfer between 
Canadian provinces can lead to further confusion and proliferation of REB 
approvals required, sometimes stymieing the research plan. This concern has 
led to some action in Canada; for instance, Alberta has reduced the number 
of REBs in the province from six to three (AIHS, 2013). 
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One other model is provided by New Zealand, which reduced the number 
of REBs for the entire country to four after reforms in 2012.18 In keeping 
with good governance (Box 5.1), its new system is based on the principles 
of robustness, efficiency, transparency, and consistency. Standard operating 
procedures call for a single online application form that leads to a response 
within 35 calendar days, or 15 days for an expedited review (with a possibility 
of suspending the process once for up to 90 days). All four REBs can review 
multiregional projects, so that there is no duplication. Comprehensive minutes 
are published electronically to promote transparency and consistency. There 
is a process of appeal within a timeframe of 20 working days. Ethical review 
is kept separate from scientific review to prevent overlap with the peer review 
process (HDEC, 2012).
Vaughan et al. (2012) compared the New Zealand system with Australia’s (which 
is similar to Canada’s) in a case study of a research project on the epidemiology 
of serious conditions of pregnancy over the period 2009 to 2011. In New Zealand, 
researchers submitted a single application for an expedited review, and ethical 
approval across all 24 sites was granted. The entire ethics process required an 
estimated 10 hours of work by the researchers. In Australia, “as of September 
2011, 46 full/expedited ethics applications, 131 site governance applications 
and 136 letters of support requests were made over 33 months, involving an 
estimated 3,261 hours by [investigators], and an associated resource burden 
by participating sites, to obtain approval to receive non-identifiable data from 
291 hospitals” (Vaughan et al., 2012). Hard-copy applications were required by 
38 REBs. Of these, 26 REBs required multiple (range 2 to 27) hard copies of 
the application, resulting in over 17,000 printed pages (Vaughan et al., 2012).
Best Practice: To minimize the number of approvals when performing cross-subject 
or cross-jurisdictional research — and therefore to improve timeliness — certain 
jurisdictions, such as Alberta, New Zealand, and Wales, have harmonized the 
REB process. 
5.2.3 Information Governance
While privacy governance is concerned with the risks to privacy and research 
governance is concerned with the conduct of high-quality and ethical research, 
information governance is concerned with how the entities within the complex 
environment collectively handle information. This includes how they provide 
access, as well as under what circumstances and to whom they provide access, 
and how they address the legal, ethical, and quality standards relating to the 
18 New Zealand had begun to reform its system following a parliamentary report in 2004. The 
number of REBs was reduced from 15 to seven: six regional boards and one REB responsible 
for all projects that involved more than one region (Jenkin et al., 2006).
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handling of sensitive and personal information. Although the term “governance” 
suggests that one is dealing with higher-level principles of some sort, “information 
governance” tends to be more concerned with operational matters of roles and 
practices, including those of individuals as well as organizations. Accordingly, 
best practices in this context will tend to be concrete illustrations of how to 
address concerns relating to how information is managed. 
In part, information governance is concerned with how custodians strike an 
appropriate balance between ensuring confidentiality of data and enabling 
appropriate use of data. It does this by specifying requirements and standards 
to handle data “legally, securely, efficiently and effectively, and in a manner 
that maintains public trust” (DH, 2013). Requirements and standards may also 
apply to those who supply information (such as health-care professionals and 
institutions) to data custodians. Information governance defines who has the 
right to make decisions about information and who is accountable to ensure 
appropriate behaviour with respect to information. It also includes the processes, 
roles, policies, standards, and measures (such as quality assurance and audit) 
to ensure the effective and efficient use of information (Logan, 2010). 
Although the scope of information governance encompasses the entire life cycle 
of data, the Panel chose to pay particular attention to only a subset of concerns, 
specifically the matters of data access, privacy management, de-identification, 
data safeguards, and risk management. Each is discussed below, with a primary 
focus on best practices as illustrated by the Panel’s selected entities or by other 
organizations that enable access within a reasonable timeframe. 
Data Access
How data are accessed has an effect on the risk of information being revealed 
inappropriately. The range of data access regimes is covered in Section 2.5. 
These different data access arrangements involve different risks and necessitate 
different governance arrangements. 
In addition, there is public pressure to increase transparency of data, especially 
data held by public institutions (McNutt, 2015). This pressure is also fostered 
by the increasing tendency to make data available on the internet. As a result, 
there is a growing movement internationally towards “open data.” However, 
it is impossible to control how data are used when put entirely in the public 
domain, through the internet or other media. Moreover, public release of 
data is not appropriate when there are privacy implications. Accordingly, even 
institutions committed to an open data agenda must consider appropriate 
information governance arrangements, as discussed in Box 5.6. 
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Privacy Management as Part of Data Access 
Inevitably, some individuals working with data — whether as data custodians, 
stewards, or researchers — will come into contact with individual-level data 
that are sensitive or can be linked with data from other databases, placing the 
confidentiality of information at risk. To encourage respect for privacy and 
to build a culture of respect for privacy, several of Canada’s privacy officers 
have advanced privacy management programs (Table 5.1). Such a program 
assigns responsibility for privacy to certain positions in an organization and 
Box 5.6  
Data Access Governance in International Research
1 2
3
As an example of how information governance can be put into practice, the International 
Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC) established the International Data Access 
Committee (IDAC) to: 
• develop policies for investigators to obtain access to controlled data; 
• provide oversight to any ICGC member projects that are responsible for reviewing 
requests for such data; and, 
• monitor compliance by bodies authorized to distribute ICGC data, and users of 
the controlled data.
The IDAC has broad geographic representation and includes representatives of the 
ICGC executive; experts in ethics, databases, and international law; cancer survivors; 
potential users of the data; and other independent lay persons — ideally, fewer 
than 20 members.
“The IDAC also develop[s] guidelines for practical approaches to providing qualified 
investigators with access to controlled data. In doing so, it consider[s] mechanisms 
and tools […] already in use by other organizations that distribute controlled data 
sets to international scientists […]. Potential users and their institutions are required 
to submit Assurance Agreement forms that include:
• a written description of the purpose of the research;
• an agreement not to try to identify or contact the donor subjects;
• an agreement not to redistribute controlled access data; and,
• plans to destroy controlled access data sets once they are no longer being used.”
(ICGC, 2012)
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encourages training of staff. A Canadian example is the privacy management 
program implemented at Population Data BC (Hertzman et al., 2012); as well, 
privacy management is consistent with an approach called “privacy by design” 
advocated by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (PbD, n.d.). 
In other organizations, privacy management extends as well to researchers, via 
agreements between data custodians and those requesting data access.
Note that privacy management is concerned with processes within an organization 
dealing with ensuring confidentiality. It is therefore more operationally focused 
than privacy governance, which is mainly policy oriented. Nonetheless the two 
are closely related, and some overlap is to be expected. 
Best Practice: Certain entities have developed comprehensive and enforceable researcher-
custodian agreements, such as Nova Scotia’s Personal Health Information Act, to 
ensure that researchers maintain the confidentiality of the information that they receive.
Table 5.1 
Building Blocks of a Privacy Management Program
Organizational 
Commitment
a) Senior management support
b) Privacy Officer 
Responsible for the development and implementation of the program controls 
and their ongoing assessment and revision; role and responsibility for 
monitoring compliance are clearly identified and communicated throughout 
the organization. 
c) Privacy Office 
Supports the ability of staff to monitor compliance and fosters a culture  
of privacy within the organization.
d) Reporting
Program Controls a) Personal information inventory
Identifies the personal information in the entity’s custody or control; its 
authority for the collection, use and disclosure of the personal information; 
and the sensitivity of the personal information.
b) Policies 
On collection, use and disclosure of personal information, which include 
requirements for consent and notification; access to and correction of personal 
information; retention and disposal of personal information
c) Risk assessment tools
d) Training and education requirements
e) Breach and incident management response protocols
f) Service provider management 
g) External communication
Adapted with permission: OPCC et al. (2012) 
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Appropriate Institutional Structure and Separation Principle
Linking data sets across organizations might raise the possibility that a large 
number of individuals employed across several data custodians could access 
large amounts of identifiable data. However, institutional structures can be 
established to minimize the risk to confidentiality when linkage is performed. 
One approach for managing employee access is to separate identifying data 
and content data. Separation can be achieved in different ways, but the specific 
methods used by different organizations all follow the separation principle. In 
general terms, this principle means that any given individual cannot see both the 
identifiable data used to link data sets (e.g., name, address, date of birth) and 
the content data (e.g., clinical information, benefit information) (NSS, n.d.-a). 
The separation principle can be observed by using an external organization 
(typically called a trusted third party) to deal with identifying information or 
by managing all data internally but ensuring that identifying data and content 
data are administratively — and sometimes physically — separated. SAIL, Data 
Linkage WA, and Statistics Canada all use some form of the separation principle 
(Data Linkage WA, 2014a; SAIL, 2014; StatCan, 2014e).
SAIL is an example of an organization that uses an external trusted third party. 
Data custodians divide their data into a demographic component (containing 
name, address, gender, date of birth, etc.) and a content component. They assign 
a join key (also called a linkage key) to each part of the data. The demographic 
component is sent to the National Health Service Wales Informatics Service 
(NWIS) and the content component is sent directly to SAIL. NWIS replaces 
identifying data with a unique, encrypted code, and sends this code (along with 
minimal demographic information on area of residence, week of birth and 
gender) to SAIL. The two components of the data set are then re-combined at 
SAIL using the join key and made available for researchers to access, subject 
to approvals (SAIL, 2014).
In contrast, at Statistics Canada, both the data custodian and trusted third party 
roles are internal, but the processes involve essentially similar separation. For 
example, the details of the record linkages involved in creating and accessing 
the Social Domain Record Linkage Environment are spelled out in a lengthy 
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) signed by the Chief Statistician and submitted 
by Statistics Canada to the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner. This 
PIA includes detailed descriptions of the data sets involved, the flows of various 
kinds of data among different processing steps, a threat risk assessment, 
and enumeration of compliance with the ten prescribed privacy principles 
(StatCan, 2014e).
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Best Practice: Entities that use the separation principle for data linkage, such as SAIL, 
Statistics Canada, and Data Linkage WA, have minimized the risk of inadvertent 
access to data with nominal identifiers by staff. 
De-Identification of Data
Because a precise standard for de-identification of data is lacking, laws across 
Canada and in many countries have generally called for a “reasonable” method 
to be followed (see Section 4.3.3). The hallmark of such a process is a well-
documented risk-based approach with objective risk measures. It follows 
generally accepted statistical and scientific principles, and is documented and 
transparent (El Emam & Malin, 2014).
As part of information governance, an organization needs to follow and document 
a de-identification process meeting the requirements of a “reasonable” process 
of de-identification that would involve the following principles and process 
(Appendix B contains a high-level elaboration of how this is done in practice): 
1. Identify and classify variables in the data
2. Mask the direct identifiers
3. Determine the threshold for de-identification
4. De-identify data
5. Report on certification
A key part of a risk management strategy is to determine the objective risk 
thresholds. De-identification steps can be adjusted to meet a pre-set re-
identification risk; as discussed below, the risk of re-identification can be kept 
as low as warranted. 
However, de-identification can result in a loss of accuracy or usefulness of the 
data. There are well-developed methods for evaluating the impact on data 
quality from de-identification (for example, measures of information loss) (El 
Emam et al., 2009). There is also evidence that when sophisticated de-identification 
methods are used such information loss can be minimized, in some cases with 
negligible impact on the conclusions of the data analysis (CCO CPO & CIO, 2011). 
The degree of such loss can be adjusted depending on who uses the data and 
in what circumstances. The degree of de-identification can be lessened and 
the usefulness of the data improved if, for example, researchers receiving the 
data (i) have a track record of using data for research, (ii) sign confidentiality 
contracts, and (iii) hold data in secure locations (as discussed above). 
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Best Practice: Robust de-identification techniques that meet legal standards 
(i.e., de-identification is “reasonable”) make it possible to reduce the risk of 
re-identification to a level that is appropriate for a given access mode (and its 
accompanying security controls). Best practice includes ensuring that de-identification 
is documented, transparent, and meets statistical thresholds for re-identification risk 
while maintaining data utility. 
Technology’s Role in Enabling Access to and Safeguarding Data
As well as lowering the cost of generating and analyzing data, technology can 
also play a role in safeguarding data. A key concern, as outlined in Chapter 4, is that 
data on individuals can flow out of the jurisdiction in which the data custodians 
reside and in which contracts are signed, and data custodians may have no 
means of enforcing appropriate use in another jurisdiction. 
This traditional model of data physically flowing to the researchers who then 
undertake the analysis locally — wherever they are located — can be reversed, 
so that the data continue to reside with the data custodian, but the analysis 
moves physically to the data. The most obvious ways in which this happens are 
when researchers undertake their analysis in a secure safe haven under the 
control of the data custodian. Many Canadian organizations, including CIHI, 
MCHP, ICES, and Statistics Canada, have had such “safe havens” for many 
years. When safe havens are used, the data never leave their home jurisdiction 
and principal legal responsibility and accountability can continue to rest with 
the relevant agency.
Another approach where the analysis moves to the data involves providing a 
researcher with a secure connection to a remote computer that is under the 
control of the data custodian and on which both the sensitive data and the 
researcher’s analytical software reside. The researcher then runs the software 
remotely and only obtains the results for his/her later use, not the original data. 
For example, the Population Health Research Network (PHRN) in Australia 
has developed the Secure Unified Research Environment (SURE), a computing 
environment that allows researchers to access the approved data extracts for 
their research project and analyze them remotely. Researchers see a facsimile 
of the screen of the remote virtual computer on their local computer screen. 
“Within the SURE, each researcher is allocated a virtual computer that runs 
entirely on hardware physically located at and controlled by the SURE. The 
SURE also contains extensive data storage and back-up capabilities and a range 
of analysis software for researchers to use” (PHRN, 2014). 
This model cannot work, however, if data across multiple jurisdictions are 
required to be pooled. In this case, technology holds the prospect of helping 
as well. The traditional model of data flowing to researcher can also be broken 
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up into its component pieces. For example, Wolfson et al. (2010) propose 
an approach — called DataSHIELD — in which the core identifiable data 
remain at each data custodian, and summary statistics that enable statistical 
analysis flow freely via the internet. Critically, the summary statistics should not 
contain identifiable information, or information that could be used to generate 
identifiable information. Others suggest further ensuring confidentiality 
protection by encrypting the raw data (El Emam et al., 2012, 2013).
Such technologies allow data analysis to be conducted across borders while the 
original custodians in each jurisdiction retain principal responsibility for their 
portion of the data. These new methods offer a means to transcend current 
barriers to data flows between provinces. They also offer a means of developing 
national systems of linkable data while keeping the data with the data custodian. 
A different kind of example of the effective use of such a pan-jurisdictional 
approach is CNODES, described in Box 3.6. However, all such solutions involve 
a high level of knowledge and skills in software design and implementation. 
Consequently, for these solutions to be adopted, data custodians would need to 
learn about these new technologies, engage suitably skilled staff, and develop 
appropriate governance systems to ensure that the information flowing via the 
internet does not contain identifiable information, and that the code written 
to enable operation of such systems is rigorously checked.
While technological means to facilitate safe and secure data access and use are 
invaluable, they are not a complete solution to good governance challenges. 
All decisions about data access and the attendant arrangements also involve 
careful ethical judgments. In assessing acceptable levels of risk, decision-makers 
need to keep in mind that no technical measure is 100% risk-free.
Best Practice: Certain entities successfully maintain data confidentiality through safe 
havens or encrypted access or both. These entities include Statistics Canada and 
Statistics Netherlands. Key features of a well-functioning safe haven include mechanisms 
to approve researchers, robust internal and external monitoring and oversight, and 
continual review of governance arrangements. 
Best Practice: Technology is continuously changing. New technologies can be adopted and 
developed to improve the safeguards on confidentiality. Given the central importance 
of technology in this area, it is critical to have individuals with knowledge of its 
importance involved in governance. 
An additional factor to consider is the economics of the different options for 
data access such as de-identification, access at secure “safe haven” centres, and 
remote access. Some cost-benefit analyses have been done for certain approaches 
(i.e., de-identification) (El Emam, 2013c); however, without economic 
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comparisons of the different practices (or data to make these comparisons), 
an important yardstick for comparing the various alternatives was unavailable 
to the Panel. 
Establishing an Acceptable Level of Risk
A critical element of any information governance model is the determination 
of what level of risk is “acceptable.” The TCPS defines minimal risk research as 
“research in which the probability and magnitude of possible harms implied 
by participation in the research is no greater than those encountered by 
participants in the aspects of their everyday life that relate to the research” 
(CIHR et al., 2014). However, the “everyday life” standard, developed to deal 
with traditional types of research, may no longer be relevant, given that the 
risk of confidential data being revealed from online website visits and social 
media postings in everyday life is now quite high. 
By contrast, the American Society of Safety Engineers defines acceptable risk as 
“the probability of a hazard-related incident or exposure occurring and the 
severity of harm or damage that could result” are as low as reasonably practicable, 
and tolerable in the setting considered (ASSE, 2011). The as low as reasonably 
practicable standard is the “level of risk which can be further lowered only by 
an increment in resource expenditure that cannot be justified by the resulting 
decrement of risk” (ASSE, 2011). This definition reflects key concepts: (i) 
some level of risk has to be tolerated (risk cannot be completely eliminated), 
(ii) this level of risk is more than minimal, and (iii) ensuring a minimal level 
of risk could entail unreasonable expenditure.19 
Several benchmarks to conceptualize the level of risk have been developed 
around the world and across several industries, ranging from nuclear safety 
to pharmaceuticals. The European Commission has guidelines for product 
safety and has developed a risk assessment matrix (Figure 5.1). This matrix was 
designed to conceptualize a traditional type of risk (injury), and may not be 
directly relevant to modern, information technology risks such as data breaches, 
but is offered as an example of such an approach. In the matrix, the severity 
of injury is graded from level 1 (such as a mild allergic reaction or temporary 
pain in the eye that does not require treatment) to level 4 (such as fatality or 
permanent loss of sight). As the nature and severity of harm increase, the level 
of risk that is defined as low declines (European Commission, 2010). To give 
some indication of the probabilities in Figure 5.1, the draft guideline labelled 
19 A similar definition used at the European Environment Agency, for example, states that the 
acceptable risk level is the “level of risk judged to be outweighed by corresponding benefits or 
one that is of such a degree that it is considered to pose minimal potential for adverse effects” 
(EEA, n.d.).
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probability between 1 in 1,000 (0.1%) and 1 in 10,000 (0.01%) as conceivable, 
but highly unlikely, and between 1 in 10,000 (0.01%) and 1 in 100,000 (0.001%) 
as practically impossible (European Commission, 2010). A re-identification attack 
simulated to evaluate the vulnerability of data in the United States (reviewed 
in El Emam et al. (2011b)) found that an estimated 0.013% of records could 
be re-identified correctly, which would be considered conceivable, but highly 
unlikely, and on the borderline of practically impossible using the European 
Commission matrix. Furthermore, an “adversary” who is willing to spend the 
time and resources required for an attempted re-identification attack would 
presumably see some value in the data. However, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, 
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Reproduced with permission: European Commission (2010) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu, © European Union, 1998–2014. 
Figure 5.1 
European Commission Risk Assessment Matrix for Product Safety, Based on the 
Combination of Injury Severity and Probability
Under the European Commission risk assessment matrix for product safety, risk is “the combination of 
the severity of possible damage to the consumer and the probability that this damage should occur” 
(European Commission, 2010). An injury can vary in severity and each injury scenario happens with 
a certain probability. Thus, if minor injuries (e.g., level 1) caused by the use of a product are highly 
likely to occur (e.g., > 50%), then the product may still be labelled as high risk. In contrast, if the 
product has the potential to cause severe injuries but these injuries are extremely unlikely to occur, 
then it can still be considered a low risk product.
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the literature indicates that most “adversaries” are actually researchers 
who are attempting to evaluate whether a re-identification risk exists, 
rather than individuals who are hoping to use the re-identified information 
(El Emam et al., 2011b).
The system in Scotland adopted a different approach called “proportionate 
governance” in which the level of scrutiny given a proposal depends on the level of 
risk (see Box 5.7). This framework also embraced a proactive, iterative approach 
involving data custodians, research communities, and public engagement 
so that the core objectives of all stakeholders were respected. The resulting 
Good Governance Framework (GGF), initially developed by SHIP, consisted 
of four elements: 
1. An account of responsibilities of key actors and decision-makers (largely 
a matter of clarifying who is a “data controller” under European data 
protection law);20 
2. A training facility for researchers leading to SHIP accreditation (delivered 
through distance learning);
3. A statement of Principles and Best Practices to guide decision-making; and
4. A mechanism based on principled proportionate governance to assess 
data linkage requests (based on actual risks and calibrated accordingly).
(Laurie & Sethi, 2012)
20 Available at the Scottish Informatics Programme website (SHIP, n.d.-a). 
Box 5.7  
Proportionate Approach to Governance in Scotland 
The Scottish Informatics Programme (SHIP), funded by the Wellcome Trust from 2009 
to 2013, was a collaborative interdisciplinary initiative between Scottish universities 
and NHS Scotland, the principal data custodian of much of Scotland’s medical data, 
including hospital admissions and discharges as well as cancer registries. SHIP’s 
objective was to build on the long-established, high-quality data sets held within 
Scotland to maximize the value of research using these data sets, to reduce undue 
regulatory burden, and to maintain appropriate ethical scrutiny. Core features of the 
model were subsequently adopted by NHS Scotland and the Scottish government. The 
work now continues across sectors beyond health, and across the United Kingdom, 
as part of the Farr Institute (SHIP, n.d.-b). 
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The GGF, which is now being built upon by the Farr Institute @ Scotland, 
embodied a principles-based approach that recognized that sensitive decisions 
must be made with careful exercise of judgment. Accordingly, the governance 
framework was not overly prescriptive, setting hard-and-fast rules. Rather, it 
provided decision-makers with key principles to consider when scrutinizing 
data linkage requests. Key principles included demonstrating reasonable 
prospects of delivering benefits in the public interest through data linkage, and 
identifying and developing management strategies for privacy risks. If consent 
for linkage was not granted, the refusal needed to be fully justified. This last 
feature of the GGF was a direct result of findings from public engagement 
exercises (Laurie & Sethi, 2012). 
A crucial, additional pragmatic component of the GGF was its mechanism for 
delivering risk-based proportionate governance. It asked three fundamental 
questions about each linkage request: 
Safe people: Were researchers accredited by SHIP or an equivalent body? 
Safe data: Were data linked through SHIP and its indexing and 
linkage service? 
Safe environments: Were researchers using a SHIP safe haven 
or equivalent? 
(Laurie & Sethi, 2012)
If the answer to all of these questions was “yes,” a fast-track route was available 
for researchers, requiring no further scrutiny of the application. If the answer 
to any of these questions was “no,” further scrutiny was taken, including full 
review by an ethics body, such as the Privacy Advisory Committee in Scotland. 
Additionally, a privacy risk assessment ensured that the levels of governance and 
oversight addressed the relative risks of any proposal, including those meeting 
all three benchmarks (Laurie & Sethi, 2012). Figure 5.2 shows this approach.
The proportionate governance mechanism has been adopted within key 
bodies responsible for data linkages within NHS Scotland (NSS PAC, 2013). 
The Principles and Best Practices statement has also served as the basis of a 
public consultation on cross-sector data linkage undertaken by the Scottish 
government (The Scottish Government, 2012).
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Best Practices: The European Commission has developed a systematic method for 
characterizing risk. Scotland has integrated a proportionate approach to risk in its 
governance system. 
Practical Application of Information Governance
Box 5.8 summarizes professional standards established for accessing health-
related data in the United Kingdom. It provides an example of policies for 
implementation of information governance in practice, respecting the guiding 
principles highlighted by the Panel. 
CATEGORY 3: High Impact
Full review: possible further 
conditions
CATEGORY 2: Medium Impact
Fast track review: possible further 
conditions
CATEGORY 1: Low Impact
No further review: standard terms & conditions
CATEGORY 0: Public Domain
No further conditionsSTAGE 1
Benchmarks
STAGE 2
Privacy Risk
Assessment
Reproduced with permission: SHIP (2012). This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust through the Scottish Informatics 
Programme (SHIP) Grant (Ref WT086113). SHIP was a collaboration between the Universities of Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow and St Andrews and the Information Services Division of NHS Scotland. 
Figure 5.2 
Proportionate Governance at SHIP: Categorization of Data Access Applications 
According to Stratified Categories of Risk 
The categorization approach developed by SHIP was designed to make the process of application review 
faster and more efficient for researchers and data custodians. The risk categories “correspond directly 
to increasingly stringent terms and conditions that must be met in order to achieve authorization 
for a linkage to go ahead” (Sethi & Laurie, 2013). Category 0 relates to data already in the 
public domain. Category 1 involves applications where risks are thought to be minimal or negligible. 
Category 2 applications have issues that might be flagged for possible further consideration. 
Category 3 applications would be subjected to full Privacy Advisory Committee approval mechanisms.
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Box 5.8 
Professional Standards and Good Practice for Accredited Safe 
Havens in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom the following requirements for data stewardship must be 
met by accredited safe havens:
• attribution of explicit responsibility for authorizing and overseeing the anonymization 
process (e.g., through a Senior Information Risk Officer);
• appropriate techniques for de-identification of data, the use of “privacy enhancing 
technologies” and re-identification risk management;
• use of “fair processing notices.” These notices, a requirement of European data 
protection legislation, are sent to data subjects to inform them that personal data 
are being processed for stated purposes;
• a published register of data flowing into or out of the safe haven, including a 
register of all data sets held;
• robust governance arrangements including, at a minimum, policies on ethics, 
technical competence, publication, limited disclosure/access, regular review process, 
and a business continuity plan including disaster recovery;
• clear conditions for hosting researchers and other investigators who wish to use 
the safe haven;
• clear operations control, including human resources procedures for information 
governance, use of role-based access controls, confidentiality clauses in job 
descriptions, effective education and training, and contracts;
• a standard for information security commensurate with ISO 27001 (the ISO 
standard for Information Security Management Systems) and the NHS’s Information 
Governance Toolkit;
• clear policies for the proportionate use of data, including competency at undertaking 
privacy impact assessments and risk and benefit analysis;
• standards that are auditable;
• a standard template for data sharing agreements and other contracts that conforms 
to legal and statutory processes;
• appropriate knowledge management, including awareness of any changes in the 
law and a joint approach with others working in the same domain; and
• explicit standard timescales for keeping data sets, including those that have been 
linked, which should be able to support both cohort studies and simple “one-off” 
requests for linkage.
(DH, 2013)
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While access to linked administrative, registry, and vital statistics data is available 
in some Canadian provinces, these arrangements generally cover data for 
broad groups of people rather than specific subgroups. However, sometimes 
questions apply to more specific populations. For instance, is the prevalence 
of diabetes rising quickly among First Nations populations? What are special 
health needs of immigrant children? Are patients living with HIV developing 
other chronic diseases? Addressing these questions may require linkage of, 
for example, provincial data to special identifiers held by other authorities 
such as the federal government or public health departments. Linking these 
data requires specific data sharing agreements between organizations that 
can legally disclose and receive such data. The information created by these 
linkages is sensitive and warrants that representatives of the communities be 
closely involved in the governance of the data sets. This highlights an important 
point: information governance within an entity might not cover the range of 
considerations at stake when sharing data across organizations, provinces, 
or countries. For such reasons, it is important also to consider the wider 
notion of network governance that can, among other things, include a range 
of collaborations among stakeholders. 
5.2.4 Network Governance
The creation of collaborative research networks, perhaps involving not just a 
circle of researchers but also other stakeholders such as data custodians and 
funding agencies, has the potential to maximize social benefits flowing from 
data-oriented research. Indeed, networks focusing on particular areas of research 
have been formed both nationally (Level 2) and internationally (Level 3).
Among the benefits of building a research network is that it may be the only 
way to amass enough data to conduct a study. For example, international 
collaborations have made it possible to discover genetic variations that are 
associated with susceptibility to conditions such as cancer. A by-product of 
such international collaborations is that, since the data involved need to be 
comparable, definitions and standards must be defined in advance. Indeed, 
since a single network-based study may involve researchers from more than 
100 organizations (Milne et al., 2014), networks are a central contributor to 
standardization and harmonization (discussed in Chapter 2 and Box 5.9). 
Sharing of best practice at the network level can also improve governance 
(Di Iorio et al., 2013). 
While the advantages of networks are many, they also have some pitfalls. For 
example, unless care is taken in establishing a large network, it may be unclear 
who is responsible for coordinating the network to ensure that it provides the 
benefits envisaged. Without clear lines of responsibility, networks can fail to 
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reach their objectives. In addition, the creation and continued nurturing of 
networks is time-consuming and expensive, especially so for the researchers 
involved, some of whom are forced to spend an increasing fraction of their 
time on network management rather than research.
Box 5.9 
Coordinating Data Collection for Comparable Results
1 2
3
Data standards are a key element in facilitating data-based research, and numerous 
examples demonstrate how standards can be put in place by national or international 
networks. In addition to research networks, which are formed to address common 
research goals, another type of network involves the boards and committees of major 
organizations. These networks are composed of individuals who may have different 
research interests and diverse professional backgrounds, but who share the common 
goal of developing national or international standards.
Standardization has been a core function of the WHO and CIHI. The WHO has developed 
a family of international classifications (FIC) to provide a “consensual, meaningful 
and useful framework which governments, providers and consumers can use as a 
common language” (WHO, 2015a). The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 
is one of its three main classifications, which cover basic health parameters. Other 
more specific classifications, such as the ICD for Oncology, build on these main 
classifications (WHO, 2015a). The ICD-10 is used by all WHO Member States and has 
been translated into 43 languages. It is currently under revision, with an expected 
release date of 2017 for the ICD-11 (WHO, 2015c). The revision steering group consists 
of medical specialists; researchers; experts in terminology, classification, and public 
health; and WHO-FIC representatives. The group meets regularly to ensure that the 
combined expertise of its members is used to produce a consistent and coherent 
document that addresses user needs (WHO, 2015b).
In Canada, CIHI supports international standards for use by Canadian health-care 
professionals. For example, it tailored the ICD-10 to meet Canadian morbidity needs 
by producing the ICD-10-CA. CIHI has produced numerous standards to promote 
data quality and consistency in databases that keep track of information on hospital 
visits (CIHI, 2014g). Its Board of Directors links federal, provincial, and territorial 
governments with non-governmental health groups and is composed of Deputy 
Ministers of health, CEOs of hospitals and health networks, and other health-care 
leaders (CIHI, 2014f).
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Best Practice: Certain entities, such as the WHO and CIHI, have put standards in 
place before data collection to enable prospective data harmonization.
Another challenge confronted by multi-jurisdiction networks involves differing 
implementations and interpretations of privacy and other laws, which can hinder 
the pooling of data (this matter was also discussed in Chapter 2). Arising from 
this consideration, the Panel identified two types of multi-jurisdiction networks: 
those that share individual-level data, and those that share only aggregated 
data. Examples of the former include multiple genomics initiatives, such 
as the database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP) and the ICGC 
(see Boxes 5.6, 5.10, and 5.11). Examples of the latter include the FDA’s Sentinel 
System, CNODES, and EUBIROD (see Section 2.4.3). It is important to note 
that, whereas pooling of individual-level data may be ideal, valuable results can 
still be generated by networks that only share aggregated data. 
Best Practice: When it is not possible to pool individual-level data, other models, such 
as CNODES in Canada and DataShield in Europe, have been successful in enabling 
statistical analysis across jurisdictions.
It is also important that networks develop standardized data security protocols. 
This task is simplified, although still challenging, when all members of the 
network are governed by a central directive for protection of personal data. 
This is the case for networks that only involve participants from the European 
Union (e.g., EUBIROD), which has developed a single data protection directive 
for all member states (Di Iorio et al., 2009). Genetics initiatives such as the 
dbGaP (Box 5.10) are among the most advanced in their successful development 
of policies for international sharing of individual-level data. An additional 
example is the ICGC (Box 5.11), which includes members from Canada, the 
United States, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, Mexico, India, 
Australia, and more.
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Box 5.10 
The Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes
1 2
3
In the United States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) recognized the fundamental 
importance of making the rapidly growing volume of genetic and phenotypic research 
data more broadly available for secondary use. To this end, the NIH has established 
the database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP). This is a highly secure repository 
for individual-level data from a growing number of different studies. But at least as 
importantly, it is a set of security and policy protocols and metadata holdings for 
each of these many studies (NCBI, 2015).
Before researchers receive NIH funding for a large-scale study involving human 
genomic data, they must provide a detailed plan on how they will make their data 
available to dbGaP or another NIH-designated repository; thus, sharing data is a 
pre-condition for funding (NIH, 2014). These genomic data sharing plans must include 
information on planned data formatting, the specific respondent consents that will 
be asked in the study, the ethics approval process, and details on how data elements 
will be described (NIH, 2007). Once the study is complete and all the data have been 
collected and cleaned, they are deposited with dbGaP.
For secondary users, dbGaP provides two levels of access — open and controlled. 
Open access (publicly available) data are limited to non-confidential information. But 
for typical secondary analysis, researchers need “controlled access” to phenotype 
and genotype data for individual participants (NCBI, 2015). To gain such access, the 
researcher must submit an application that includes details of the planned data 
analysis, the names of collaborators, the physical and computer security setup, and 
whether the proposed research is consistent with the consents provided to the 
original study (NCBI, 2013). An important control mechanism is the organization of 
data by consent groups, which “consist of all of the data from study participants 
who have agreed to the same data use as specified in the informed consent for the 
study” (NCBI, 2012). Thus, to receive a complete data set containing all participants 
in a study, a researcher must apply for data from all consent groups and use them 
only as permitted.
In sum, the NIH dbGaP is an extensive, carefully developed set of protocols and data 
holdings that strikes the fundamental balance between protecting the confidentiality 
of study participants’ data and maximizing the public benefits from research using 
those data.
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Best Practice: When legal systems differ, methods have been developed to further 
research by multinational consortia such as dbGaP and ICGC. 
Scientific Integrity
In the context of data network governance, the Panel uses the term scientific 
integrity to refer to management of a range of practices that can affect the 
accuracy of research findings. These include the quality and the completeness 
of the data and the quality of the methods used to analyze the data. Very large 
data sets are particularly problematic, not only because they were not designed 
primarily for research, but also because it is possible to select multiple outcome 
variables and analytical approaches and selectively report only those that support 
a particular hypothesis. This is more likely in observational research, with an 
exploratory component than in randomized trials where most outcomes and 
analyses are pre-specified. Concerns have been expressed about the number of 
published research findings that prove to be inaccurate (Ioannidis, 2005). This 
potential for bias and error increases with the degree of statistical complexity 
and the number of variables and analyses. Inadequate statistical analysis of data 
Box 5.11 
The International Cancer Genome Consortium
The ICGC, a large-scale international initiative launched in 2008 to analyze 25,000 
cancer genomes, recognized at the beginning stage of its creation that a framework 
had to be developed to govern international sharing of the data its members would 
generate (ICGC, 2014). Its foundational policy, “Goals, Structures, Policies and 
Guidelines,” set forth a comprehensive list of data that would be deposited in 
either open or controlled access categories (ICGC, 2008). The list was understood 
to be dynamic, so that certain types of data could be transferred from the open to 
the controlled category and vice versa in response to changing scientific, technical, 
legal, and ethical issues. 
ICGC also created a controlled access mechanism that regulates access to certain 
sensitive data (e.g., detailed phenotype and outcome data, genome sequence files) by 
requiring third parties to apply to a data access committee (which itself is overseen 
by an international data access committee) and complete a simple but authoritative data 
access form that contains privacy safeguards. This controlled data access mechanism 
is seen as a best practice to both protect study participants from re-identification 
and data misuse by third parties and allow researchers streamlined and user-friendly 
access to useful but sensitive personal data that are crucial for biomedical research 
studies (Joly et al., 2012). 
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creates a significant risk of invalid results for a wide body of research across 
a broad swath of subjects. Developing best practices in data curation, pre-
specification of variables and statistical analyses, and registration of sufficiently 
detailed protocols are important roles for research networks. Furthermore, as 
one of the key tenets of science is replicability, making data readily available to 
facilitate replication will become increasingly necessary to scientific progress. 
In analysis of large data sets, risk of inaccuracy arises because of the increased 
complexity of the data, with anywhere from dozens to thousands of dimensions 
captured. Not only does effective analysis of such databases test computational 
power and storage capacity, but what is called “high-dimensional” modelling 
also challenges standard statistical methodologies because of statistical problems 
associated with the volume and complexity of the data (Fan et al., 2011; Einav & 
Levin, 2013; Fan et al., 2014). Failing to undertake adequate statistical controls 
may lead to results that are not meaningful, and, in the health context, that 
may create harm by leading to incorrect conclusions that are then applied to 
care (for example, if the estimated effects are inaccurate). 
A network of the research community can mitigate these potential problems 
with scientific integrity by putting in place standards for statistical analysis, 
sharing information on issues in high-dimensional modelling, and acting to 
address any incorrect conclusions — whether through research misconduct 
or faulty analysis — released publicly. These are fundamental issues that merit 
substantial further thought, but were considered to be beyond the mandate 
of the Panel.
5.2.5 Informing Governance through Public Engagement
Informed support from members of the public for research conducted with 
their data requires that they are aware of the research that is taking place, 
they approve of the policies and methods that are being used, they trust 
the researchers and data custodians who are handling their information, 
and they understand the benefits that may result from this research. These 
requirements can only be met if the public is engaged in the research process. 
The lessons learned from public engagement have the potential to inform all 
four aspects of governance. Although much of the work on public engagement 
has been in the experimental research or primary care setting, more recent 
work has explored public involvement in studies using existing health and social 
data (McKenzie & Hanley, 2007; Born & Laupacis, 2012; Ipsos MORI, 2014; 
Jones et al., 2014). 
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For example, CFHI (2014) highlights how Alberta Health Services introduced 
patient engagement research, which involves training citizens living with 
various health conditions to design and conduct qualitative health research. 
They then collaborate with health professionals and researchers and engage 
other patients in research.
Another form of patient engagement is patient-centred outcomes research, 
which focuses on outcomes of importance to patients, such as quality of life. 
This approach promises to enhance decision-makers’ ability to fully understand 
and weigh alternatives. In Canada, one objective of CIHR’s Strategy for Patient-
Oriented Research, for instance, is to ensure that the right patient receives 
the right intervention at the right time. This involves bringing innovative 
diagnostic and therapeutic approaches to the point of care, to ensure greater 
quality, accountability, and accessibility of care (CIHR, 2013a). Engaging with 
patients concerning their experiences of care and the likely benefits of research 
provides an opportunity for patients to understand how research benefits them 
directly as well as the population at large. 
Both types of public engagement discussed above — in which members of 
the public are involved in deciding whether or how to conduct research and 
in understanding how research benefits them — are at the level of individual 
projects. However, public engagement can be at the level of research in general. 
McKenzie and Hanley (2007) discuss how public engagement can play a role 
at many stages, to improve uptake of research benefits and strengthen support 
and understanding of research. In fact, many researchers in teaching hospitals 
also promote research as a positive benefit to the community.
To support a project-level or more general engagement framework, 
CIHR (2013c) has recently provided a set of principles. Working with citizens 
has the potential to add value to research programs or projects, while mutual 
learning and understanding build trust and credibility. Openness enhances 
transparency and accountability. Public engagement should be inclusive in its 
approach, supporting individuals to ensure their full participation. In addition, 
engagement should support communities. In Canada, there has been public 
engagement with specific cultural or socio-economic communities. For example, 
research is conducted in Aboriginal communities through the First Nations 
Framework, which involves those communities in research. Research networks 
working with Aboriginal data sets must make particular efforts to engage 
appropriately with the communities and their representative organizations. It 
is essential to build a relationship of trust in which the Aboriginal communities 
know that their interests are being protected. In Canada it is important that 
researchers comply with the Tri-Council policy on the Ethics of Health Research 
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Involving First Nations, Inuit and Métis People (CIHR, 2013b). As discussed in 
Section 3.4.3, ICES has established an arrangement with First Nations in Ontario 
by entering into a data governance agreement that incorporates, among other 
elements, the OCAP (Ownership, Control, Access and Possession) principles 
(First Nations Centre, 2007; Antone et al., 2014). 
Public engagement also has the potential to improve public understanding of 
privacy risks and protection in research involving linked data. A recent report 
on public attitudes towards research uses of administrative data in general 
carried out in the United Kingdom by Ipsos MORI found that those surveyed 
were broadly happy with data linking if (i) research has social value, (ii) data 
are de-identified, (iii) data are secure, and (iv) businesses cannot access the 
data for profit (Ipsos MORI, 2014). The report concluded that further work 
is needed to understand fully the public’s view on commercial involvement. 
These findings reflect similar results from public engagement within Canada’s 
health sector.
Examples of best practice consistently show that public engagement can be 
incorporated into the governance framework of data linkage initiatives for 
research. In the SAIL system in Wales, for example, there is a specialized 
consumer panel to provide a public perspective on research based on linked 
data. Its role is to act as advisers on research issues and on engaging with the 
public, guide recruitment of the public to steering groups for studies, provide 
views on data protection issues, discuss proposals for research, review information 
designed for a lay audience, and act as advocates for research based on linked 
data (SAIL, 2013; Jones et al., 2014). Representatives of the consumer panel 
also sit on the panel overseeing information governance at SAIL. 
The Farr Institute @ Scotland has been designed with an integral program 
of public engagement. The program has found high levels of trust in public 
institutions that use data for public benefit, but it has also revealed evidence 
that members of the public also want to be able to exercise some degree of 
continuing control over their data. This finding was reflected in SHIP’s GGF, 
which requires applicants for data linkage or use to address whether their 
research questions can be answered using data obtained with consent, and, if 
not, to justify use of data without consent in terms of a strong public interest 
(Sethi & Laurie, 2013).
In a guide written for health and medical research organizations, McKenzie 
and Hanley (2007) caution that researchers must work with community 
members to decide precisely how value can be added to research through 
community participation. Although public engagement has great potential, 
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measuring its impact is challenging. Much of the current evidence on 
impact centres on qualitative studies with relatively small focus groups, 
and more robust measurements of impact are needed (Barber et al., 2011a, 
2011b; Purtell & Wyatt, 2011).
5.3 ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ASPECTS  
OF GOVERNANCE
Without a clear allocation of roles and governance responsibilities among the 
entities within Canada’s complex environment dealing with the provision of 
timely access to data, there is risk of overlap, duplication, and confusion. In short, 
developing clear lines of responsibility in connection with the four overarching 
aspects of governance constitutes best practice. Without an integrated approach 
to determining roles and responsibilities in this sense, there is a clear risk of 
delay in accessing data, for example, since steps may be missed or inconsistent 
rulings may need to be sorted out. Clarifying the responsibilities of key entities 
in Canada’s complex environment could be a positive step in enabling timely 
access to health and health-related data for research. Table 5.2 summarizes the 
roles of different groups (e.g., researchers, data custodians, policy makers) and 
governing bodies (e.g., REBs, privacy monitoring boards) in overseeing various 
aspects of governance and provides examples of entities that are following best 
practice by successfully performing these roles.
Table 5.2 
Allocation of Governance Responsibilities
Stakeholder Group 
or Governing Body
Aspect of 
Governance
Role of Group or Governing Body and Examples 
of Entities Following Best Practice
Pr
iv
ac
y
Re
se
ar
ch
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
N
et
w
or
k
Privacy Monitoring 
Board ✓
Dedicated board to provide oversight of policies at data 
custodians, and to interact with researchers to evaluate 
data requests for privacy concerns
Examples: IGRP in Wales, HIPC in Manitoba
Research Ethics 
Board ✓
Dedicated board to provide review of ethical and legal 
implications of research while remaining aware and 
informed of risk to privacy
Examples: IGRP in Wales, REB system in New Zealand
Ensure that proposals to use data are appropriate and  
in the public interest
Example: IGRP in Wales
continued on next page
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Stakeholder Group 
or Governing Body
Aspect of 
Governance
Role of Group or Governing Body and Examples 
of Entities Following Best Practice
Pr
iv
ac
y
Re
se
ar
ch
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
N
et
w
or
k
Researchers
✓ Participate in networks to ensure that research  conducted is scientifically valid and ethical
✓ Follow protocols to hold data securely
✓
Be aware of the risks to confidentiality; follow  
data-confidentiality agreement
Example: researcher-custodian agreements in  
Nova Scotia, MCHP
✓
Participate in efforts to standardize and  
harmonize data
Examples: various genetics consortia
✓
Publish and archive all methodological details  
so their analysis can be replicated
Example: Statistics Canada
Data custodians
✓
Implement Caldicott Principles for the Protection of 
Personal Confidential Data, including clarity that use  
of data is necessary
✓
Develop clear mission statements, clarifying that the  
duty to share information can be as important as the 
duty to protect data confidentiality
Example: ICES
✓
Establish a privacy management program, such as 
training of staff on the importance of protecting privacy, 
establishing appropriate risk management policies,  
and establishing clear lines of responsibility
Example: Population Data BC
✓ Engage public on benefits of researchExamples: Farr Institute @ Scotland, SAIL
✓ ✓
Participate in efforts to standardize and  
harmonize data
Examples: CIHI, WHO, Statistics Canada
Publish descriptions of all record linkages
Example: Statistics Canada
For large data projects, perform privacy impact assessments
Examples: Statistics Canada, Canadian Health  
Measures Survey
continued on next page
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Stakeholder Group 
or Governing Body
Aspect of 
Governance
Role of Group or Governing Body and Examples 
of Entities Following Best Practice
Pr
iv
ac
y
Re
se
ar
ch
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
N
et
w
or
k
Data access office
✓
Authenticate the qualifications of researchers seeking 
access; verify security plan and institutional approval
Example: SHIP good governance framework
Individuals 
conducting data 
linkage
✓ Ensure that identifiable data are held securely
✓
Follow best-practice techniques for de-identification  
of data by establishing clear, transparent processes  
with objective measures of risk
Examples: ICES, Farr Institute @ Scotland
✓ Implement separation principleExamples: SAIL, Data Linkage WA,Statistics Canada
Health-care 
providers (such as 
doctors and nurses)
✓ Ensure accurate and complete data entry; obtain  consent; harmonize data
✓ Ensure accurate and complete data entry; obtain consent; harmonize data
✓
Engage public on benefits of research
Examples: Alberta Health Services, CIHR Strategy for 
Patient-Oriented Research
Senior policy 
makers
✓
Ensure that value of data holdings is maximized through 
enabling access for the public benefit; set framework  
for data access; communicate public benefit of research
Examples: Government of Manitoba, Western Australia 
Health Department
Among the international (but still Level 1) best practices chosen by the Panel, 
the case of Wales (Box 5.12) illustrates a governance innovation introduced 
to make the overall system for accessing data for research more efficient. The 
new system created a single agency, the Independent Governance Review Panel 
(IGRP), to oversee health data access for de-identified data. The main thrust of 
the innovation was to ensure that the risks of re-identification were minimized 
while access to data was made rapid and efficient. Note that, since data are 
de-identified, individual consent is not required, but ethical review is maintained 
to ensure that there are no ethical risks to segments of the population.
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5.4 CONCLUSION
The entities dealing with the provision of access to data for research purposes 
in Canada are best thought of as a “complex environment,” the parts of 
which were not designed explicitly to work in concert with one another as an 
integrated system with a common overall purpose and a coordinated set of roles 
and responsibilities. Compared with best practices from other jurisdictions 
where such an integrated approach has been taken (needless to say, with 
due regard to the overarching issues of privacy, information, research, and 
network governance), there is a risk of overlap, duplication, and confusion, 
and hence delays in accessing data. Nonetheless, over time, coordination, 
consistency, and overall effectiveness of Canada’s complex environment can 
be improved through the adaptation of the pre-existing entities with an eye 
to the Canadian as well as international best practices outlined in this chapter 
(that is, unless the responsible government(s) see(s) fit to undertake a broad 
review of organizational roles and alignment comparable to that undertaken 
in Wales or Scotland).
This chapter has provided examples of governance best practices, recognizing 
that the precise form of governance adopted by an organization or other 
entity depends on the individual organization, its mandate, the constraints 
within which it operates, the types of data involved, and other considerations. 
Governance of data is in a process of evolution, and the sharing of experiences 
and practices through networks will strengthen governance in future.
Box 5.12 
Governance Integration in Wales
In Wales, health data are held in linkable form at a university (SAIL at Swansea 
University), but the linkage is conducted by NHS Wales, as a trusted third party. As 
a government agency, NHS Wales is trusted to hold identifiable information such as 
names, addresses, postal codes, etc. Control over access rests with a single independent 
panel, the IGRP, in which NHS Wales participates. The IGRP ensures that the data go 
through appropriate de-identification, thus addressing the ethical concern over the 
risks to privacy. To ensure other ethical concerns are also respected, the IGRP includes 
representatives from ethics review as well. The IGRP comprises representatives from 
the British Medical Association, the National Research Ethics Service (ethics review), 
Public Health Wales (policy advice), NHS Wales Informatics Service (data custodian 
and trusted third party), and the SAIL Consumer Panel (SAIL, 2014). 
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6 Conclusion
Addressing the main charge and the five related sub-questions engaged the 
Panel in a study of considerable breadth as well as depth. Indeed, much of the 
content of this report is likely to be of greatest interest and value to experts in 
specific areas, such as statistics/analytics, law/ethics, and policy/governance.
6.1 MAIN CHARGE
The main charge to the Panel posed the following question: 
What is the current state of knowledge surrounding timely access 
to health and social data for health research and health system 
innovation in Canada? 
The Panel’s response can be briefly summarized as follows.
Providing health researchers and health system innovators with timely access 
to health and social data is important, and likely to grow more important in 
the future. The volume of data that could be used by these communities for 
the benefit of Canadians is expanding rapidly; taking advantage of these data 
represents a substantial opportunity. Indeed, it can be argued that there is an 
ethical imperative to use these data for the public good. Survey data suggest 
that Canadians generally support the use of their health-care encounter and 
related data, including evolving EHRs, for research.
Providing timely access to such data presents special challenges:
• One challenge is purely technical. The sheer range of different types of data 
involved, and the number of individuals and organizations collecting and 
holding the data, means that the development of common standards and 
formats is extremely complicated. 
• A second arises because the range of organizations, programs, and communities 
involved in the provision of timely access to data in Canada, as in other 
jurisdictions, is very broad, and constitutes what this report has called a 
“complex environment of heterogeneous entities.” In most places the 
environment is only loosely coordinated, with duplication of roles and in 
some instances outright conflicts between the goals of different entities. 
• A third involves striking a balance between providing timely access to data 
and respecting privacy. 
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All jurisdictions have to grapple with these challenges. While there is no 
single, ideal definition of roles for the entities in any jurisdiction’s “complex 
environment of heterogeneous entities,” some have been more successful than 
others in this effort. The Panel has highlighted six entities that constitute best 
practice, three from Canada and three from other countries. 
The Panel’s review of practices from these six entities, as well as others, shows 
that improvement in the current state of affairs in Canada is possible. Barring 
the redesign of provincial, territorial or, indeed, the pan-Canadian complex 
environment, these improvements could come from the adoption of some of 
the best practices articulated in this report, and the review by the appropriate 
governing bodies of the governance lessons learned from these best practices. 
The next four sections expand on this summary, and point to the Panel’s primary 
responses to the sub-questions raised in its charge. Although there is a rough 
parallel between the sub-questions and the chapters of this report, with the 
bulk of the Panel’s findings on a given question found in its corresponding 
chapter (with two addressed together in Chapter 5), there are also overlaps. 
6.2 OVERCOMING TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF  
INTEGRATING DATA
There are substantial benefits to be obtained from data linkage and pooling; 
in Chapters 2 and 3, several examples were given where research has been 
advanced in this way and public benefits have been delivered. There are also 
serious challenges involved in integrating data: some have to do with the data 
themselves (e.g., consistency of standards across studies); others have to do 
with legal/ethical constraints (e.g., prohibition against pooling data from 
different jurisdictions). 
The first sub-question raised directly the matter of how to deal with 
these challenges:
Sub-Question 1: What is known about how to address technological and methodological 
challenges associated with linkage of health and social data from various sources and 
across jurisdictions?
As noted above, Chapter 2 reviewed many of the challenges associated with data 
integration in detail. The Panel found it useful to adopt a tri-level distinction 
for clarifying the different concepts and challenges involved in timely access 
to data (recall Figure 1.1). Level 1 involves access to one or more data sets all 
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within one province or territory; Level 2 involves access to data sets spanning 
multiple provinces or territories; and Level 3 describes access to data sets 
collected or residing in multiple countries. Some issues apply primarily to one 
or two levels of access and others span all three. The Panel arrived at several 
findings that directly spoke to the challenges of data integration. Potential 
solutions are provided for the various challenges.
6.2.1 Harmonization
Challenges
Individual-level data held in different databases are more easily compared if they 
are collected using common standards and definitions; otherwise, retrospective 
harmonization is required to make them comparable. Harmonization is necessary 
for all forms of data integration at Levels 1, 2, and 3. Certain domains of 
information are more difficult to harmonize than others. Furthermore, it can be 
challenging to ensure that the precise meaning of any given data element is as 
close as possible across the different data sets being combined. Harmonization 
is particularly problematic for unstructured data such as free-form text.
Solutions
The most durable solution for harmonization is to develop standard terminologies, 
questionnaires, measurements, and operating procedures before data are 
gathered. Although such standardization is the ideal situation, other approaches 
can be considered if this approach is too challenging, time-consuming, labour-
intensive, or underlying consensus is absent.
If the data were collected without standards in place, retrospective harmonization 
could help make use of the existing information. For example, tools are available 
to map one set of clinical diagnostic codes to another, and techniques such 
as DataSHaPER can help determine whether similar inferences can be drawn 
from variables across different studies. However, the potential to harmonize 
existing information is necessarily always limited by the heterogeneity of the 
data collected and may not be possible for some types of information. 
For unstructured data, a more pre-emptive method is to collect the information 
in a structured format in the first place using a standard nomenclature such as 
ICD-10. A retrospective (but second best) solution is to use natural language 
processing to convert textual files into codified terms or tags drawn from 
controlled vocabularies. 
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6.2.2 Linkage
Challenges
Data linkage allows different types of information for one individual to be 
brought together. Because an individual, for the most part, receives health 
and health-related services in a single province or territory, linkage typically 
requires access to data from multiple organizations in one jurisdiction (Level 1 
access). It can be challenging if data have been strongly de-identified or if 
unique identifiers are available for some individuals in a data set but not others. 
Solutions
Even without unique identifiers for each individual, probabilistic methods can 
be used to link records. If data need to be linked, the simplest way, if possible, 
is to link prior to de-identification. Databases do not always need to be linked 
permanently to undertake most research. The link can be destroyed after the 
research is completed, and/or kept completely separate by a trusted third party.
6.2.3 Pooling
Challenges
Data pooling is often used to increase sample size by pooling similar data from 
several populations. It can occur within a province or territory, but is often most 
relevant to multi-jurisdictional access (Levels 2 and 3) because data from different 
jurisdictions will likely be stored in separate databases. In numerous important 
cases, restrictive interpretations of privacy and other laws within Canada are 
hindering interprovincial pooling of individual-level data. International data 
pooling is even more difficult, especially for health-care records.
Solutions
Various approaches have been developed to avoid the need to pool individual-
level data. For example, summary data meta-analysis, used by CNODES involves 
harmonization of individual-level data across different studies followed by 
statistical analyses at each study site, and, finally, pooling of the (non-confidential) 
summary statistics to obtain an overall result. Another solution, provided by 
DataSHIELD, uses sophisticated iterative techniques to mimic a pooled analysis 
of data from individual participants when, in reality, the data always remain 
with their original data custodian. A further extension of the DataSHIELD 
approach involves encryption of the individual-level data on each host computer.
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6.2.4 Access
Methods for providing researchers access to data vary from secure physical 
locations, to secure online links for approved researchers, to publicly available 
aggregated data. Along this spectrum, the degree of risk to privacy is lowered, 
as the information shifts from only mildly de-identified data made available to 
researchers under strict and secure conditions to more strongly de-identified 
individual-level data to aggregated data or data analysis results.
Current rules and procedures, to authorize research and to allow data access, 
overlap and are often time-consuming. Furthermore, processes and requirements 
for access are sometimes unclear. Depending on the jurisdiction, delays may be 
caused by slow approval from REBs, other governing bodies, or data custodians, 
or by incomplete applications from researchers. Decisions about access are 
not always consistent. As a result, the ability to access and link data for a given 
research project within reasonable timeframes is uncertain, uneven across 
Canada, or even lacking. Solutions to these access challenges are discussed 
in Section 6.5.
6.3 BENEFITS, RISKS, AND BARRIERS TO TIMELY ACCESS 
TO DATA
Sub-question 2: What is known about the benefits, risks and barriers to timely 
access to health and social data for health research and health system innovation 
in Canada?
The Panel responded to this sub-question in Chapter 3, the main findings from 
which are summarized below. The matter of better communication with the 
public on benefits and risks was addressed again in Chapter 5 in the context 
of the imperative of moving from a culture of caution to a culture of trust 
(see Section 6.4). 
Benefits
There are major benefits to increasing the appropriate use of individual-level 
health and health-related data to improve patient care, facilitate innovation, 
and generally improve the health of Canadians. Most obvious is more timely 
identification of adverse drug reactions.
Risks
Based on evidence from business and government, the main privacy risks 
of working with identifiable data are deliberate (e.g., malicious attack) or 
inadvertent (e.g., human error) data release. Although health data breaches 
can cause serious harm, the risk of a breach actually occurring in the context 
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of research is low, particularly if effective governance mechanisms are in place 
and respected by care providers, researchers, and data custodians. Calibrating 
various degrees of de-identification of individual-level data with corresponding 
degrees of access security is another effective strategy for managing privacy risks. 
An additional risk arises from research on specific communities, which has 
the potential to make individuals within these communities feel stigmatized. 
This risk can be appropriately mitigated by involving communities in the 
research process.
Barriers
Numerous barriers can impede health data research, including logistical and 
ethical barriers to achieving access and issues with the data themselves, such 
as lack of comparability between data sets.
Organizations are also sometimes hesitant to share data, and there are numerous 
reasons for this reluctance. In the context of many competing priorities, data 
custodians may be reluctant to undertake the considerable effort required for 
data preparation, particularly if they do not have an adequate budget and/or 
a specific mandate to support research uses of their data. Anecdotal evidence 
from the Panel also revealed an understandable reticence of some organizations 
to enable research access to data that might reveal poor performance. Fear of 
lawsuits due to unclear privacy and ethics laws may result in incorrect or overly 
conservative interpretations of legislation, thereby impeding data sharing. 
An additional barrier involves the potential for research to be hindered by lack 
of public engagement. A lack of communication with the public about their 
opinions on the use of personal data for research can lead to overly restrictive 
interpretations of the law. Informing the public of the controls that have been 
implemented to safeguard their information, as well as the benefits that have 
resulted from research using health data, has the potential to increase public 
confidence in and enthusiasm for this type of research.
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6.4 LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Sub-question 3: What are the ethical, legal, and social implications of timely access to 
such data?
Chapter 4 addresses this question at length. Some of the findings of that 
exploration are presented here.
There are ethical imperatives to protect the confidentiality of individuals’ data, 
on the one hand, and to provide access to quality data that enable research 
in the public interest, on the other. These two imperatives need not conflict, 
particularly when data do not include identifiable information or when data 
contain identifiable information and appropriate safeguards are in place.
Data custodians have fundamental legal duties to protect confidentiality of 
personal data, and these duties underpin their conduct. These duties can 
lead to cautious and conservative interpretations of allowable access when a 
complementary mandate to enable access to data for research is not made explicit.
Canadian federal and provincial/territorial laws generally address identifiable 
information and do not constrain researchers’ access to de-identified or 
non-identifiable information. However, given the imprecise and inconsistent 
definitions of the term “identifiable information” in laws and ethical guidelines 
from different jurisdictions, it is difficult to be sure whether a data set qualifies 
as non-identifiable. Instead, it is useful to view de-identification as a continuum 
and to adjust access controls accordingly to mitigate re-identification risk.
Canada’s governance of research ethics is fragmented, with significant differences 
across the provinces/territories. As well, laws on sharing data across provinces/
territories and between countries differ or are lacking, sometimes leading to 
confusion for researchers and REBs about whether, or on what basis, data can 
be shared.
While participant consent is a cornerstone of experimental research involving 
humans, the ethical and legal considerations for accessing personal information 
are not the same as those for physical involvement in research. There may be 
sound ethical reasons to pursue research with health and health-related data 
without consent in some circumstances, notably when risk is managed and 
the research benefits the public good. Appropriate risk management involves 
keeping measures to protect privacy proportional to the potential harms of 
proposed research. 
153Chapter 6 Conclusion
Among these findings, one deserves special emphasis. The ethical and legal 
frameworks currently in place in Canada appear to strike a balance between 
enabling research and respecting privacy. In practice, however, lack of knowledge 
and trust has led to a conservative implementation of these frameworks. Indeed, 
evidence suggests that current data use is too often subject to undue restrictions 
that inhibit timely access and adversely affect health and social outcomes. As 
discussed above, striking the appropriate balance between the public benefits 
of research and the risk of a loss of confidentiality is an important challenge 
for all jurisdictions. If Canada is to move from a “culture of caution,” which 
arguably prevails in many organizations dealing with health data today, to a 
“culture of trust,” Canadians must be engaged in the dialogue. 
6.5 BEST PRACTICES FOR GOVERNANCE TO IMPROVE 
ACCESS WHILE MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY
Sub-question 4: What are best practices for improving access to such data for researchers 
while ensuring appropriate privacy safeguards and also taking full advantage of the 
digital data revolution?
Sub-question 5: What are best practices in Canada and internationally for governance 
frameworks that facilitate access to such data and maintain public trust in the 
research enterprise?
The Panel chose to answer the last two sub-questions together in Chapter 5 
because of their joint reliance on the identification of best practice organizations 
that provide timely access to health and social data. Six entities were highlighted. 
Although from different jurisdictions, their operations shared four underlying 
principles: (i) enable appropriate use of data, (ii) manage risk, (iii) respect 
privacy, and (iv) maintain public trust by providing evidence of trustworthiness. 
In themselves, adoption of these principles by entities involved in the provision 
of access to data can be regarded as an element of best practice.
In addition, the international “best practice entities” reviewed by the Panel 
operate within systems where a deliberate effort has been made to create a 
governance framework that addresses four cross-cutting aspects of governance: 
privacy, information, research, and network governance. Within their respective 
jurisdictions, this conscious effort to address overall governance in such a 
systematic way led to these entities sharing many of the following “earmarks” 
of best practice; not all earmarks will or need be found in every situation, but 
each is worthy of consideration in the Canadian context: 
• dedicated processes (parallel to REBs) that specifically evaluate privacy 
concerns when enabling data access;
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• maintenance of data confidentiality through safe havens and/or 
encrypted access;
• comprehensive and enforceable researcher-custodian agreements to ensure that 
researchers maintain the confidentiality of the information that they receive;
• use of the separation principle to minimize the risk of inadvertent access 
to data by staff;
• use of robust de-identification techniques to reduce the risk of re-identification 
to a level that is appropriate for a given access mode (and its accompanying 
security controls), with de-identification that is documented, transparent, 
and meets statistical thresholds;
• adoption of new technologies to improve the safeguards on confidentiality 
and lower the costs of conducting research; 
• development of systematic methods for characterizing risk, and adoption of 
a “proportionate approach”;
• minimization of the number of approvals needed when performing cross-
subject or cross-jurisdictional research;
• harmonization of the REB process; 
• adoption of standards prior to data collection to enable prospective 
data harmonization; 
• adoption of other models, such as sharing of summary statistics across 
jurisdictions (e.g., the CNODES approach), when it is not possible to pool 
individual-level data; 
• development of multinational consortia such as ICGC when legal systems 
differ; and
• engaging the public with evidence of the usefulness of the research and the 
steps being taken to protect privacy and confidentiality.
6.6 FINAL THOUGHTS
Effective use of health and health-related data — including social and 
administrative data — by the country’s health researchers and system innovators 
will contribute to the development of beneficial health policies that improve 
the quality of health care for Canadians. This need will increase in the future 
as technology continues to develop and digitized data become more abundant. 
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However, timely access to health and health-related data for research in Canada 
varies across the country. While some jurisdictions have developed processes 
that provide access to data within a period of four months, others can take a 
year or longer. The reasons for these delays are multifold, such as concerns over 
data quality, lack of a roadmap for how to access data, fear of potential legal 
liabilities or embarrassing results, or media attention in the case of data breaches. 
The Panel found that legal definitions and interpretations differ across provinces/
territories and countries, which can lead to confusion or overly cautious 
interpretations of whether data can be accessed or shared, and that careful 
ethical judgments must be taken (sometimes in the absence of specific laws). 
However, the Panel also found that good governance can ensure the co-existence 
of access to data and respect for ethical principles and the law. Indeed, the 
prevailing legal structure in Canada calls for a system of governance to guide 
data custodians in their decisions on whether and how to give access to data. 
The Panel has identified several best practices, with a strong emphasis on public 
engagement, that provide the necessary guidance to help transform what is 
known as a culture of caution to a culture of trust. 
The Panel concludes, therefore, that it is possible, in practice, to balance the 
competing responsibilities of protecting individuals’ privacy, while simultaneously 
enabling timely access to data for the purposes of health research and health 
system innovation.
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Glossary
Appropriate Use: Appropriate use of data is enabled by laying out requirements 
and standards to handle data “legally, securely, efficiently, and effectively, and 
in a manner that maintains public trust” (DH, 2013).
Best Practice: Policies and practices currently in use by entities that collect, 
analyze, provide access to, and regulate laws surrounding access to, data, 
that — according to evidence identified by the Panel — are already helping 
to improve timely access while still protecting privacy. See also Good Practice.
Bona Fide Researchers: Researchers who “generate new knowledge and 
understanding using rigorous scientific methods,” who intend to publish their 
research and share their data, and who conduct research in compliance with 
ethical and legal requirements as well as recognized good practice (MRC, n.d.).
Confidentiality: The duties and practices of people and organizations to ensure 
that individuals’ personal information only flows from one entity to another 
according to legislated or otherwise broadly accepted norms and policies. In the 
context of health data, restrictions on and authorities for communicating personal 
information arise primarily from legislation, duties relating to professional 
obligations, or contracts. In these cases, confidentiality is breached whenever 
personal information is communicated that is not authorized by legislation, 
professional obligations, or under contractual duties. 
Controlled Vocabulary: “A controlled vocabulary only includes terms that 
have been selected by the group that created the vocabulary. The goal of 
such a vocabulary is to standardize and simplify the organization of data and 
knowledge in a particular domain” (Kohane, 2011).
Data Custodians: Organizations that collect and/or hold data and make initial 
decisions on data use, disclosure, retention, and disposal. Data custodians play 
a central role in enabling or inhibiting access to health and health-related data 
by implementing policies on data collection, use, and disclosure. They also 
endeavour to ensure that their employees follow appropriate practices, such 
as keeping data secure. Data custodians include ministries of health, hospitals, 
primary care physicians, and regional health authorities.
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Data Element/Data Record: In a set of data, a data element or “data field” is 
one attribute pertaining to an individual data record. A data record is a number 
of data elements pertaining to an individual or to an event like a health-care 
encounter. For example, a data element could be a date or a location.
Data Harmonization: The processes involved in producing inferentially 
equivalent data, thus allowing data from different sources to be compared 
or combined and used meaningfully in statistical analysis (e.g., regression).
Data Linkage: The process of “bringing together from two or more different 
sources, data that relate to the same individual, family, place or event” 
(Holman et al., 2008). For example, linkage may be used to bring together 
information about an individual’s health status, prescription drug use, and 
social media habits.
Data Pooling: The process of bringing multiple data sets together for analysis. 
Often, the data are from individual participants, rather than summarized results. 
In contrast to data linkage, which brings together different data pertaining to 
the same individual, data pooling brings together sets of similar data (ideally 
harmonized) from different individuals, so that a relationship amongst variables 
can be examined with a larger sample.
Data Standardization: The process of developing and implementing identical 
methods and tools for data collection, which, when used at different sites, will 
produce data that are already harmonized and thus comparable.
De-identification: The act of minimally perturbing individual-level data to 
decrease the probability of discovering an individual’s identity (El Emam 
et al., 2011b). It involves masking direct identifiers (e.g., name, phone number, 
address) as well as transforming indirect identifiers that could be used alone 
or in combination to re-identify an individual (e.g., birth dates, geographic 
details, dates of key events). If done correctly, de-identification is a defensible, 
repeatable, and auditable process that consistently provides assurance, based 
on generally accepted and repeatable statistical methodologies, that there is 
a very small risk of re-identification of any data that are released (El Emam, 
2013b). The Panel chose to use the word de-identify rather than other similar 
terms in common usage that have various interpretations (such as obfuscate 
or anonymize).
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Electronic Medical Record: “An electronic version of the paper record that 
doctors have traditionally maintained for their patients and which is typically 
only accessible within the facility or office that controls it” (CMPA, 2014).
Electronic Health Record: “A compilation of core [electronic] health data 
submitted by various healthcare providers and organizations, accessible by 
numerous authorized parties from a number of points of care, possibly even 
from different jurisdictions” (CMPA, 2014).
Good Practice: Policies and practices that — based on a combination of 
anecdotal evidence, literature review, and Panel analysis — have the potential 
to improve timely access while still protecting privacy. See also Best Practice.
Governance: Governance can best be thought of as the role of an organization’s 
board of directors or its equivalent that is focused on defining that organization’s 
purpose and the development of the strategies, objectives, values, and policies 
that frame how that purpose will be pursued. It includes the development of 
such things as mission statements, statements of organizational objectives and 
values, logic models, organizational performance metrics, risk management 
frameworks, policies and guidelines for financial and operational matters, 
stakeholder relations, etc.
Harmonization: See Data Harmonization.
Health Data: Data on health status of individuals (e.g., well-being, health 
conditions), health system performance (e.g., accessibility, effectiveness), and 
community and health system characteristics (e.g., resources) (CIHI, 2014h).
Health-Related Data : Data on non-medical determinants of health such as 
health behaviours, living and working conditions, personal resources, and 
environmental factors (CIHI, 2014h).
Identifiable Data: “Data is identifiable if the information contains the name 
of an individual, or other identifying items such as birth date, address or 
geocoding. Data will be identifiable if the information contains a unique personal 
identifier and the holder of the information also has the master list linking the 
identifiers to individuals. Data may also be identifiable because of the number 
of different pieces of information known about a particular individual. It may 
also be possible to ascertain the identity of individuals from aggregated data 
where there are very few individuals in a particular category. Identifiability 
is dependent on the amount of information held and also on the skills and 
technology of the holder” (European Commission, 1999; OECD, 2013d).
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Information: The output of a process that analyzes, summarizes, interprets or 
otherwise represents data to convey meaning (Cabinet Office, 2012).
Information Governance: “How organizations manage the way information 
and data are handled within the health and social care system […]. It covers 
the collection, use, access and decommissioning as well as requirements and 
standards organizations and their suppliers need to achieve to fulfill the 
obligations that information is handled legally, securely, efficiently, effectively 
and in a manner which maintains public trust (UK Government, 2013).
Masking: Involves “the application of a set of data transformation techniques 
without any concern for the analytical utility of the data. This is a good approach 
for fields that are not required to be analyzed.” Masking is applied to direct 
identifiers such as name and phone number. Masking techniques include, among 
others, removal of direct identifiers or replacement of direct identifiers with 
pseudonyms. In contrast to masking, statistical de-identification is applied to 
indirect identifiers and involves “the application of a set of data transformation 
techniques such that the resulting data retains a very high analytic value” 
(El Emam, 2013b).
Minimal Risk Research: “Research in which the probability and magnitude of 
possible harms implied by participation in the research is no greater than those 
encountered by participants in the aspects of their everyday life that relate to 
the research” (CIHR et al., 2014).
Natural Language Processing (NLP): “A field of computer science and linguistics 
concerned with the interactions between computers and human (natural) 
languages. NLP techniques allow the text in electronic medical records to be 
transformed from a clinical narrative to a set of codified terms or tags that are 
more readily subject to computational and statistical analysis” (Kohane, 2011).
Network Governance: How entities interact to manage research, so that it 
becomes the responsibility of the research community collectively rather than of 
individual organizations. Such governance includes, for example, establishing 
and publicizing common standards and definitions and developing policies 
for international data sharing.
Personal Health Data: “Personal health data encompass a wide range of 
information about an individual, which all touch upon an individual’s private 
life. A health biography could include not only basic medical data: a history 
of all medical diagnoses, diseases and medical interventions, medications 
prescribed, test results, including imaging, etc. but could also include more 
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sensitive data: on mental health, relevant […] family history, behavioural patterns, 
sexual life, social and economic factors, etc. and health care administrative 
data: admissions and discharge data routine operational data, insurance and 
financial transactional data, etc.” (European Commission, 1999).
Personal Health Identifier: A number, code or other element used in a health 
system to uniquely identify an individual, such as a health insurance number.
Pooling: See Data Pooling.
Privacy: A broad concept that in Canadian law encompasses personal privacy 
(protection of one’s physical self), territorial privacy (protection of one’s private 
physical space), and informational privacy (protection of information about 
oneself and one’s activities) (SCC, 2004).
Privacy Governance: In the context of this report, privacy governance monitors 
the risk to privacy posed by data requests from researchers, and the practices 
of data custodians in providing data (information governance) to ensure that 
confidentiality is protected. Such governance requires specialized knowledge 
of technology, law, and statistical methods.
Proportionate Governance: In the context of this report, proportionate 
governance refers to keeping the procedural mechanisms that researchers 
and data custodians must follow when engaged in data sharing and linkage 
proportional to the degree of risks associated with such practices. Proportionate 
governance operates in situations that are too variable to be regulated by hard 
laws (e.g., custom data access requests). It requires that analytical judgments 
be performed to ensure that the governance mechanisms deployed for a given 
research proposal correspond to the level of risk it entails (Sethi & Laurie, 2013). 
Proportionality is an important cross-cutting consideration across all types of 
governance that are put in place.
Research Governance: Among many other things, research governance 
ensures that the benefits to society of research outweigh any risks, from both 
an ethical and legal perspective.
Safe Haven: A physically, electronically, procedurally, and otherwise secure 
computer data system that bona fide researchers can access physically through 
an on-site visit or remotely through secure Internet connections (ISD 
Scotland, 2010b).
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Social Data: See Health-Related Data.
Structured Data: “Structured data are those that can be easily organised, 
stored and transferred in a defined data model, such as numbers/text set out 
in a table or relational database that have a consistent format (e.g. name, date 
of birth, address, gender, etc.)” (Kitchin, 2014).
Timely Access: Access granted and provided within a reasonable timeframe; 
in this assessment, access granted within four months of submission of a data 
request is considered timely access.
Unstructured Data: Unstructured data (e.g., free-form text) do not have 
a common identifiable structure. These data can often be searched as long 
as they are digital, but they are more difficult to use for computer analyses 
(Kitchin, 2014).
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Appendix A  Detailed Overview of Canadian  
Legal Frameworks
CANADA’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Each province in Canada has evolved its own governance frameworks that 
facilitate access to health data and maintain public trust in and support 
for research. Health information legislation in all provinces embodies the 
twin goals of privacy and the promotion of health research. A single health 
information-specific statute governs all handling of health information in 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
and Newfoundland & Labrador. (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; 
GO, 2010; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of MB, 2014b). In British Columbia, 
Prince Edward Island, and Quebec, the regulation of health information 
is divided between separate “personal information” protection statutes for 
the public and private sectors (with health information subsumed within 
“personal” information) (GPEI, 2012; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; Govt. of BC, 2014c, 
2014b). At the federal level, privacy legislation is also relevant in some contexts 
(GOC, 2014b). However, despite differences in form, certain common elements 
exist among the provinces (GPEI, 2012; Govt. of BC, 2014b).
Application of Statutes to Custodians of Health Information
Provincial health information legislation typically applies to a wide range 
of public and private bodies, defined as “custodians,” “trustees,” or “public 
bodies” depending on the province. “Health information” is typically defined 
to encompass all records related to a person’s health status, diagnosis history, 
and treatment history. Of the seven provinces with health information-specific 
statutes, some use a brief but general definition (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; 
GNS, 2010a; GO, 2010; Govt. of MB, 2014b), while others have broader and 
lengthier definitions. Among the broadest definitions are found in Alberta and 
Newfoundland & Labrador. Alberta defines “health information” to include 
both “diagnostic, treatment and care information” as well as administrative 
(“registration”) information, and the Newfoundland & Labrador definition is 
nearly as broad in scope (GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b). In the provinces without 
health-specific information statutes (British Columbia, Quebec and Prince 
Edward Island), health information is not defined but considered to be subsumed 
within “personal information.”
Sharing of Health Data that have been De-identified 
It is crucial to note that only identifiable health information is regulated 
by provincial legislation. Custodians and researchers are free to use and 
share health information that have been de-identified without any legal 
195Appendix A Detailed Overview of Canadian Legal Frameworks
constraint. All provincial health information statutes apply only to identifiable 
health information, and some specifically exempt information that has been 
“de-identified” from the application of the statute (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; 
GNS, 2010a; Govt. of MB, 2014b) and permit sharing of it without restriction 
(GNB, 2009; GOA, 2014b).
How “identifiable” is defined slightly varies across the provinces (see Table 4.1). 
In some provinces, “identifiable” is used but not defined in the statute (GPEI, 
2012; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; Govt. of BC, 2014c, 2014b). Other provinces use 
a reasonable-foreseeability test, meaning that information is identifiable only 
if it is reasonably foreseeable that it could be used, on its own or with other 
information, to identify a person (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; 
GO, 2010; GNL, 2014). Other provinces’ definitions of “identifiable” have no 
reasonable foreseeability component; if the information “allow[s]” identification, 
it is identifiable (GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; Govt. of MB, 2014b). In Alberta, the test 
seems the most stringent: information is identifiable only when their identity 
is “readily ascertainable” from it (GOA, 2014b). Despite these differences, as 
discussed in Section 4.3, the TCPS specifies a national standard definition for 
“de-identified” data, which can lend greater consistency in interpretation between 
Canadian REBs (CIHR et al., 2014). Still, differing visions of “reasonableness” 
in determining identifiability may exist within even shared definitions.
Table A.1 
Provincial Definitions of “Identifiable”
Used but  
not defined
Reasonable 
foreseeability test
“Allows” 
identification
Is identity “readily 
ascertainable”
 • British Columbia
 • Prince Edward 
Island
 • Quebec 
 •  Saskatchewan
 • Ontario
 • New Brunswick
 • Nova Scotia
 • Newfoundland & 
Labrador 
 • Manitoba
 • Quebec
 • Alberta
Duties and Roles of Custodians of Health Information
For identifiable health information, however, custodians of health data are 
subject to a wide range of statutory duties that are complex and vary somewhat 
between provinces. Provincial legislation typically prohibits custodians from 
collecting health information except with the consent of the individual or 
without consent but authorized by the statute (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; 
GNS, 2010a; GO, 2010; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of 
BC, 2014c, 2014b; Govt. of MB, 2014b). Where consent is required for collection, 
use, or disclosure, legislation typically requires that the consent be informed 
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and voluntary (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; GDQ, 2014b; Govt. of 
MB, 2014b). In some provinces, a collector of health information must inform 
the subject individual of the purposes of the proposed collection and use. In 
most provinces, the legislation provides that consent can also be revoked (Govt. 
of SK, 1999; GNS, 2010a; GNL, 2014; Govt. of BC, 2014b). If consent is given, 
most provincial legislation has a general rule that health information must be 
collected directly from the individual except in prescribed circumstances. One 
common such exception is where health information is collected from a third 
party for research purposes (GNS, 2010a; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of 
BC, 2014b, 2014c; Govt. of MB, 2014b). Such provisions are tied to the broader 
research-facilitation provisions found in provincial legislation, discussed below.
There is also commonality among the provinces in regulating the use of health 
information collected. Typically, legislation requires the custodian of the 
health data to only use them for the original stated purposes for which they 
were collected, or for uses or purposes considered to be consistent with the 
original purpose (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; Govt. of BC, 2014b, 2014c). 
As noted in more depth below, uses for research purposes are permitted if the 
applicable conditions are met (GNS, 2010a; GNL, 2014).
All provincial legislation also imposes duties on custodians to guard health 
information. Every province imposes obligations on custodians of health 
information to take steps to ensure it remains confidential (Govt. of SK, 
1999; GNB, 2009; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of BC, 
2014b, 2014c). In some provinces, these duties are worded briefly and generally, 
typically requiring the taking of necessary measures to ensure security of the 
information (GPEI, 2012; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; Govt. of BC, 2014c, 2014b). 
Other provinces go further and require custodians to develop and comply 
with written policies, information practices, and safeguards on the holding, 
sharing, retention, and destruction of health information, as well as designation 
of a contact person for every custodian (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 
2010a; GO, 2010). Of all the provinces, though, Alberta’s legislation has the 
most detailed requirements for security controls (GOA, 2014b, 2014a).
In most provinces, custodians must obtain the informed consent of the individual 
to disclose their health information, but every province’s legislation has a wide 
range of exceptions to this rule, one of which is disclosure for research purposes 
in accordance with the statute’s research-facilitation provisions discussed 
in the next section (Govt. of SK, 1999; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; GOA, 2014b; 
Govt. of BC, 2014c, 2014b; Govt. of MB, 2014b). 
197Appendix A Detailed Overview of Canadian Legal Frameworks
In addition to the specific rules for collection, use, and disclosure of health 
information, most provinces also have overarching duties that require custodians 
to exercise restraint in collection, use, and disclosure. In most provinces, 
legislation limits collection, use, and disclosure of health information to 
what is reasonably necessary for a purpose (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; 
GO, 2010; Govt. of MB, 2014b). Nova Scotia’s legislation limits such collections, 
uses, or disclosures to the “minimum amount…necessary to achieve the 
purpose…” (GNS, 2010a), while Alberta’s statute refers to an amount of health 
information “essential” to the purpose (GOA, 2014b). Another common rule 
is that identifiable health information is only to be used where “other” or de-
identified health information will not serve the purpose (Govt. of SK, 1999; 
GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; GO, 2010; GDQ, 2014b; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b).
At the federal level, all of the foregoing elements are found in the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), which governs 
health information collected by federal works, undertakings, or businesses 
(GOC, 2014b). However, PIPEDA now only applies in four provinces, and likely 
will be inapplicable in three of those that have private-sector privacy legislation 
substantially similar to PIPEDA (GOC, 2014b). Until official Orders-in-Council 
are passed exempting these three provinces from PIPEDA, there could be a 
possible federal-provincial question about whether PIPEDA or the provincial 
enactment takes precedence. 
Liabilities of Custodians for Breach
In every province, custodians that breach one or more of their statutory duties 
can be subjected to investigation by the provincial privacy commissioner or other 
appointed body. In every province, the broad role of the privacy commission or 
commissioner is to supervise and enforce the privacy statute(s) in the province. 
Part of that role is to hear complaints against custodians for alleged breaches 
of privacy or unauthorized collection, use, or disclose. In some provinces, 
these inquiries can lead to binding orders against the custodian to cease 
collection, use, or disclosure of health information, or to comply with the statute 
more generally (GO, 2010; GDQ, 2014b; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of 
BC, 2014b). Other provinces use a lighter approach in which the commissioner 
makes “recommendations” to the custodian, which the custodian must decide 
to adopt or reject. In most such provinces, the complaining individual can 
appeal a custodian’s refusal to adopt a recommendation to the courts or another 
body, which have the power to issue binding orders against the custodian 
(Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; GNL, 2014; Govt. of MB, 2014b). 
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Where health information is wrongly disclosed, custodians can also be 
liable for damages to the individuals affected, from three basic sources of 
law. First, the common law: since a 2012 Ontario Court of Appeal decision, 
it is now widely accepted in Canada that a person can sue for the tort of 
“intrusion upon seclusion” (CAO, 2012). To succeed, the claimant must 
prove that the custodian acted intentionally, without lawful justification, 
and if a “reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive, 
causing distress, humiliation or anguish” (CAO, 2012). Second, five provinces 
(British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Newfoundland 
& Labrador) have statutory provisions creating a general “invasion of 
privacy” cause of action (Govt. of SK, 2005; GNL, 2006; GDQ, 2014c; Govt. 
of  BC, 2014a; Govt. of MB, 2014a). And third, health information legislation 
in two provinces (Ontario and British Columbia) provides statutory causes of 
action against custodians against whom an order has been made by the provincial 
privacy commissioner (GO, 2010). However, regardless of the legal grounds 
on which they may be sued, provisions in health information legislation also 
provide that custodians may avoid liability by showing that they acted in good 
faith or took all reasonable steps to prevent the breach (Govt. of SK, 1999; 
GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; GO, 2010; GPEI, 2012; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. 
of BC, 2014c; Govt. of MB, 2014b).
In addition to tort liability, custodians in breach of the legislation or an order 
of the provincial privacy commissioner may also be found to have committed 
an offence under the legislation (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; 
GO, 2010; GDQ, 2014a; GNL, 2014; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of BC, 2014c, 2014b; 
Govt. of MB, 2014b). In Alberta, researchers also commit an offence if they 
breach an agreement with a custodian (GOA, 2014b). However, under these 
provisions, to amount to an offence, a breach by a custodian must have been 
“wilful.” In addition, custodians in three provinces have a defence of “due 
diligence,” or showing that they took all reasonable steps in the circumstances 
to avoid the breach (GNB, 2009; GNL, 2014; Govt. of MB, 2014b). Thus, if 
custodians have complied with all of their statutory duties and taken all steps 
required to secure the agreement of researchers to safeguard the data and carry 
out the research ethically, they may be shielded from liability in the event of 
negligence on the part of the researchers. 
Research-Facilitating Provisions 
Despite all of the foregoing general duties, custodians in every province may 
disclose identifiable health data to researchers without the consent of the 
individual if certain requirements are met. Every provincial health information 
statute has provisions that promote research by permitting the sharing of 
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identifiable health information without consent when certain conditions are 
met. While the specific legislative models used vary somewhat from province 
to province, there are still common features that can be identified. 
In all provinces, researchers must obtain approval of their study from a research 
ethics body of some kind (GNS, 2010a; GO, 2010; GNL, 2013, 2014; GOA, 
2014b; Govt. of MB, 2014b). At one end of the spectrum, some provinces 
directly specify particular bodies to approve health research. In Quebec, for 
example, research must be approved by the provincial privacy commission 
(GDQ, 2014a). In Newfoundland & Labrador, it is the Health Research Ethics 
Board, in Manitoba it is the Health Information Privacy Committee (for 
government-held records), and in Alberta it is three specific REBs named by 
regulation (GNL, 2013; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; GOA, 2014a; Govt. of MB, 2014b). 
A more flexible approach is found in provinces where the statute allows any 
REB that has been approved by the minister of health or a government entity 
to grant research approvals (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNL, 2013, 2014). And in four 
provinces, the legislation sets standards that REBs must meet to act under the 
legislation but does not require them to obtain official approval (GNB, 2009, 
2010; GNS, 2010a; GO, 2013; Govt. of MB, 2014b).
Table A.2 
How Research Ethics Boards are Chosen
Statute 
designates 
Privacy 
Commission(er) 
as REB
Statute 
designates 
specific entities
REB obtains 
approval of 
minister or 
other entity
Standards but 
no approval 
requirement
Legislation 
silent on who 
may act as REB
 • Quebec  •  Newfoundland 
& Labrador 
 •  Manitoba 
 •  Alberta
 • Saskatchewan
 • Newfoundland 
& Labrador
 • Ontario
 • New Brunswick 
 • Nova Scotia
 •  Manitoba
 • British 
Columbia
A related point is the variation between provinces in how REBs are regulated and 
monitored. Again, there is a spectrum of regulation: some provinces designate 
specific REBs directly by statute (Quebec, British Columbia, Newfoundland & 
Labrador, Manitoba and Alberta), some provinces regulate REBs with Ministerial 
or administrative oversight (Saskatchewan, Newfoundland & Labrador), and in 
others the regulation is left to universities or provincial Colleges of Physicians 
(Austin & Lemmens, 2009; Lemmens & Austin, 2009). 
The administrative steps that researchers must take vary between provinces 
from simple to complex. In some provinces, the statute does not specify a 
particular procedure for obtaining research approval from the relevant body 
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(Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GPEI, 2012; GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; GNL, 2014; 
Govt. of BC, 2014c, 2014b; Govt. of MB, 2014b). Other provinces, however, 
have more detailed requirements such as a formal application to the REB, a 
research proposal, and a research plan including data security measures (GNS, 
2010a; GO, 2010, 2013; GOA, 2014b). In Newfoundland & Labrador, an entirely 
separate statute provides a very detailed and complex approval process: it 
specifies the steps researchers must take, requires monitoring of research and 
reporting back to the custodian after the research is complete (GNL, 2013).
On the legal tests and criteria for researchers against which research proposals 
are assessed, there is some commonality across provinces, although some 
provinces have more criteria than others (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; 
GO, 2010; GNL, 2013; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of MB, 2014b). In some provinces, 
the statute enumerates a lengthy list of legal tests and criteria that must be met, 
in the opinion of the research review body, before approval can be granted 
(Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; GNS, 2010a; GO, 2010; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of 
MB, 2014b). In four provinces, a brief provision sets out general criteria for 
researchers to meet (British Columbia, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and 
Newfoundland & Labrador). Taking all of the provinces’ legislation into account, 
researchers are typically required to demonstrate one or more of the following:
• that the benefits of the proposed research outweigh the potential risks to 
individuals from disclosure of private information (e.g. Govt. of MB (2014b) 
and Govt. of SK (1999));
• that the researcher is qualified to do the research (e.g. Govt. of BC (2014b) 
and Govt. of SK (1999));
• the necessity, to the research project, of collecting and using identifiable 
health information (e.g. GO (2010));
• that they should not be required to obtain consents from the subject individuals 
because it is “impractical” (e.g. (Govt. of BC, 2014b) and GNS (2010a)), 
“impracticable” (e.g. GOA (2014b)), “unreasonable, impractical or not feasible” 
(e.g. Govt. of SK (1999)), “not reasonably practicable” or “unreasonable 
or impractical”, depending on the province (e.g. GNB (2009) and Govt. of 
MB (2014b));
• that they have adequate measures in place to safeguard the confidentiality 
of the information collected and used so as to minimize the risks and harm 
of accidental disclosure (e.g. Govt. of MB (2014b) and GOA (2014b);
• if data matching or data linkage is to take place, that they have ensured 
that the linkage will not be harmful to the individuals identified and that 
the benefits from the linkage are in the public interest (e.g. GNB (2009), 
Govt. of BC (2014c), Govt. of BC (2014b) and GOA (2014b); and
 • that the researchers do not have a conflict of interest arising from their 
funding arrangements or other circumstances.
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In addition to meeting these criteria, researchers often must sign an agreement 
with the custodian before disclosure. There are differences between provinces 
in whether or not researchers must sign agreements to obtain health data, and 
in the terms of those agreements. In two provinces, no agreement is required 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec), and in others the agreements that 
researchers must sign range from simple to complex. In some provinces, the 
agreements are simply to comply with the conditions of disclosure (GO, 2010; 
GPEI, 2012; Govt. of BC, 2014c, 2014b). In three provinces, the agreements 
extend to non-publication, adherence to purpose, and measures to secure 
data (Govt. of SK, 1999; GNB, 2009; Govt. of MB, 2014b). The most complex 
agreements researchers must sign are in Nova Scotia and Alberta, where the 
legislation sets out an extensive list of duties as terms of the researcher agreement 
(GNS, 2010a; GOA, 2014b). In Alberta, the agreement is also enforceable by 
Court order. Once all of these steps have been completed, custodians are then 
authorized to disclose the health information sought by the researchers.
Table A.3 
Researcher-Custodian Agreement Requirements
No agreement 
required
Simple and general 
in terms
Statute requires 
detailed terms
Statute prescribes 
lengthy, detailed 
list of terms
 • Newfoundland & 
Labrador
 • Quebec
 • British Columbia 
 • Prince Edward 
Island
 • Ontario
 • Saskatchewan
 • Manitoba
 • New Brunswick
 • Alberta
 • Nova Scotia
Aside from the responsibilities that researchers take on under the agreements 
they sign with custodians, the statutory duties of researchers in receipt of 
health data range from few to many depending on the province. On one end 
of the spectrum, in most provinces, researchers are not bound by the same 
general statutory duties as other custodians or trustees, and in Newfoundland 
& Labrador, the legislation specifically states that disclosure to a researcher 
does not make the researcher a “custodian” under the statute (GNL, 2014). 
This frees researchers from compliance with the wide range of confidentiality 
and other duties applicable to custodians or trustees. At the other end of the 
spectrum, in New Brunswick and Saskatchewan, researchers in receipt of health 
information are subjected to the same duties as custodians (Govt. of SK, 1999; 
GNB, 2009; Govt. of MB, 2014b). In Ontario and Newfoundland & Labrador, 
legislation imposes specific duties on researchers in receipt of health data 
(GO, 2010; GNL, 2013).
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Role of Designated Research Entities
In some provinces, custodians may disclose to specially designated entities. In 
Ontario, the legislation permits disclosure of health information to a “prescribed 
entity” (GO, 2010, 2013), which may use and disclose health information 
for research purposes (GO, 2013). Currently, these entities are Cancer Care 
Ontario, the Canadian Institute for Health Information, the Institute for 
Clinical Evaluative Sciences, and the Pediatric Oncology Group of Ontario. 
In Manitoba, regulations designate the Manitoba Centre for Health Policy at 
the University of Manitoba and the Canadian Institute for Health Information 
as “prescribed health research organizations” that are able to collect health 
information for research related to a series of purposes (Govt. of MB, 2012, 
2014b). In Alberta, the legislation provides that health information may be 
disclosed without consent to a designated “health information repository” 
(GOA, 2014b) however, no such entity has yet been designated by regulation.
Data Linking Rules
Whether done by custodians or researchers, data linking can be an important 
research strategy but carries risks of identification of a person by combining 
information together. In four provinces, the legislation specifically regulates 
“data linking” or “data matching” with health information (GNB, 2009; GNS, 
2010a; GOA, 2014b; Govt. of BC, 2014c). In these provinces, it is usually defined 
as the creation of identifiable health information from the combination of two 
or more other pieces of information, whether de-identified or not. In Alberta 
and Nova Scotia, researchers must submit an explanation or assessment of 
the need for data matching (GNS, 2010a; GOA, 2014b). In Alberta and New 
Brunswick, custodians may only do data linking with information that arose 
from approved research (GNB, 2009; GOA, 2014b). In British Columbia, 
regulations governing data linking by public bodies have not been enacted 
yet (Govt. of BC, 2014c).
Prospects for Interprovincial Health Data Sharing
Can researchers collect and pool data from custodians in multiple provinces 
in pursuit of national-level studies? If the data are all de-identified, then yes. 
If not, then whether pooling can take place depends on the provisions of 
provincial legislation that apply to this issue. 
Again, there is a range of provincial regulation on out-of-province disclosures. 
At one end of the spectrum, some provinces’ legislation is silent on 
out-of-province disclosures of health information (Govt. of SK, 1999; GO, 2010; 
GPEI, 2012; Govt. of MB, 2014b). In four other provinces, out-of-province 
sharing is prima facie prohibited but permitted if authorized by the statute’s 
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research-facilitation provisions (GNB, 2009, 2010; GNS, 2010a; GNL, 2014; 
Govt. of BC, 2014c). And the most restrictive are in Quebec and Alberta, where 
the statutes prohibit out-of-province disclosures unless the custodian ensures 
that the receiving province’s laws provide equivalent privacy protections for 
the health information (Quebec) or “takes reasonable steps to protect” the 
information to be shared (GDQ, 2014a, 2014b; GOA, 2014b). 
Table A.4 
Provincial Regulation of Interprovincial Data Sharing
No restrictions Permitted for  
research purposes
Requirement to ensure 
protection of data
 • Ontario
 • Saskatchewan
 • Manitoba
 • Prince Edward Island
 • British Columbia
 • Nova Scotia
 • Newfoundland & Labrador
 • New Brunswick
 • Quebec
 • Alberta
However, for such sharing to occur, the researchers must meet the requirements 
of their home province, and the donors must be authorized in their province to 
disclose for research purposes. This necessitates seeking approvals in multiple 
jurisdictions for the same research study. As noted above, there are interprovincial 
variations in the criteria that researchers must meet for approval. While some 
standards are common between all provinces, some provinces do not have the 
same range of requirements as others. In addition, even when two provinces 
apply identical criteria for research approval, there is still a risk of inconsistent 
interpretations between those provinces on key criteria such as “reasonable 
necessity” for identifiable data. Thus, research approved in a destination 
province may not meet the legislative standards in the province from which 
disclosure is sought. 
However, this problem could be overcome if researchers have the approval 
from the REB In their home province recognized as a valid approval in other 
provinces. In some provinces, this appears possible. In Ontario, approval from 
an out-of-province REB is recognized and qualifies to permit disclosure in the 
same way as an Ontario REB (GO, 2010). In other provinces, the definition 
and requirements of REBs are worded broadly enough to encompass out-of-
province entities (GNB, 2009, 2010; GNS, 2010a). And in those provinces where 
REBs must be approved by government or a government agency, it remains 
theoretically possible on the language of the statute to qualify an out-of-province 
REB for such approval. Therefore, in most provinces it is possible to collect 
health information under the authority of an REB approval granted in another 
province. By contrast, in Alberta, Quebec, and Manitoba’s public sector, REBs 
or other research approval entities are prescribed by statute, so out-of-province 
researchers will require their approval. A related problem, noted above, is 
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that REBs in some provinces are more tightly regulated than in others, which 
could lead REBs to be skeptical of the approval of out-of-province REBs that 
they consider to be less well regulated.
Prospects and Challenges for International Data Sharing
Similarly, there are potential legal obstacles to the increasing occurrence of data 
sharing between countries and across international borders. Technological advances 
and investments in infrastructure and international consortia are fostering the 
creation of global research networks such as disease cohort studies, population 
health data repositories, and biobanks, all of which engage in data sharing. 
In particular, the rapid growth of cloud-based computing in health research 
has, in a sense, globalized the sharing of data. Cloud-based computing has come 
to mean storage of data on remote servers potentially accessible worldwide by 
authorized users. Though cloud-based data sharing has obvious advantages for 
researchers, concerns have arisen about unauthorized users having access to 
data and unauthorized reuses for which consent has not been obtained from 
patients or research participants. A related concern is how data stewardship 
responsibilities will be carried out in a cloud environment that may implicate 
a number of people and entities (e.g., what happens in the event of a data 
breach or what happens to data at end-of-life of a project). The global nature 
of the cloud also means that it is difficult to know which laws apply, let alone 
how to ensure compliance with the applicable laws.
In addition to challenges posed by new technologies, more funding agencies (in 
addition to other entities such as journals) are imposing data sharing requirements 
on researchers, including the deposit of data in repositories that are either entirely 
open to the public or are available to a limited number of qualified researchers 
(Ohno-Machado, 2012). Together, the effect of this changing landscape is that 
data are swiftly moving away from the laboratory or office in which they were 
generated and into devices and databases around the world.
International and domestic privacy laws are therefore playing a bigger role in 
international data sharing. At the international level, guidance includes the 
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(OECD, 2013c), and at the national level are laws such as Canada’s federal and 
provincial privacy legislation. The potential issues arising from sharing data 
internationally, especially personal health information, include:
• non-compliance with national/provincial laws, particularly privacy laws; 
• unauthorized release of personal information; 
• inability to provide individuals with access to their personal information; 
• inability to cooperate with national/provincial regulators regarding complaints; 
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• inability of the national/provincial regulators to investigate or enforce laws; 
• inability to guarantee the protection of personal information in countries 
without privacy or data protection laws; 
• conflicts between foreign laws and national/provincial laws; 
• possible access to sensitive data by foreign governments; 
• overseas judicial decisions that might require the disclosure of sensitive data; 
• problems with recovery or secure disposal of data; and
 • loss of trust if data are transferred and misused. 
(SSC, 2009) 
Each of these issues can unduly impede the flow of health and social data and 
harm valuable health research and health system innovation. A recent global 
review of the literature on biobanks found that legal issues were the most 
frequently cited barriers to data sharing (Colledge et al., 2013). Other studies 
on perceived barriers to data sharing routinely find legal issues rank as the top 
problem (Kuipers & van der Hoeven, 2009; Zika et al., 2010). 
An international comparison of privacy legislation showed that different 
countries or regions follow different approaches to privacy and data protection. 
In Europe, for example, data protection is treated as a “fundamental right” 
whereas in other jurisdictions, such as the United States, data protection is 
not considered a fundamental human right. Additionally, depending on the 
jurisdiction, international data sharing regulation can be based on the level of 
data protection in the country to which the data are imported (e.g., European 
countries), the measures taken by the person or organization that receives the 
data (e.g., Canada), or the ability to realize the benefits of electronic commerce 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation region) (Kuner, 2013). 
This disharmony in legislation between countries carries repercussions for 
researchers. Researchers within and outside Canada may have to navigate 
multiple laws and regulations with different standards for access to and use of 
data. One research study found, for instance, that current provincial legislative 
restrictions on international data sharing causes “fewer services available to 
Canadian public bodies […], increased bureaucracy and significantly reduced 
efficiency, higher financial costs, the threat of tangible harms to health and 
safety, and the undermining of competition for public bodies’ business and of 
Canada’s burgeoning services industry” (Cate, 2008).
 When data are shared internationally via an agreement with a non-Canadian 
entity, a recurring issue is determining the scope of jurisdiction over data breaches 
outside Canada. Once personal information is in the custody and control of an 
entity in a foreign jurisdiction, the laws of Canada are unlikely to apply, though 
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it is possible that data custodians may have a continuing legal responsibility for 
the confidentiality of health information disclosed to, or stored, or used by, 
a person in a foreign jurisdiction. However, there has been improvement in 
cooperation between regulators outside of traditional legal assistance channels, 
such as through APEC’s Cross-border Privacy Arrangement (APEC, 2014), 
which creates a framework for regional cooperation in the enforcement of 
privacy laws (and of which the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
is a participant), and through international dispute resolution mechanisms 
that allow individuals and organizations to assert their privacy rights overseas.
Another issue arising from international data sharing is the adequacy of 
consents given by research subjects. All privacy laws in Canada permit the 
international sharing of data if the research subject provides consent. Yet 
obtaining express consent in writing for international data sharing for health 
research purposes can be a challenging endeavour. Consent forms provided to 
research participants (to say nothing of patients in a clinical care context) may 
not be “future proofed” for all possibilities, including sharing of their (personal) 
information for other research projects, perhaps with a purpose distinct from 
the original collection. Part of this is attributable to research projects carried 
out at a time before wide-scale data sharing was envisaged. This leaves the 
legality of internationally sharing data from these research projects in doubt.
Besides consent issues, international data sharing also encounters the problem 
of a multiplicity of institutional data sharing/access policies, Researchers often 
encounter different access procedures each time they apply for access to data 
from different institutions, and access agreements often are drafted in highly 
legalistic terms that fail to communicate expected commitments clearly and 
understandably to researchers. Some international research consortia are 
seeking to overcome such problems by harmonizing data sharing agreements. 
For example, the Public Population Project in Genomics and Society (P3G)
(P3G, 2014) has developed a Generic Access Agreement to improve transparency 
and interoperability in the international sharing of data for use by population 
genomic studies (Knoppers et al., 2013).
Roles of Governance Frameworks
The provincial legislative frameworks discussed above are sometimes very 
specific and in other instances leave open key concepts and terms for definition 
by decision-makers. In the latter instances, governance frameworks can play a 
useful role in developing harmonized national standards and definitions so as 
to facilitate interprovincial cooperation among researchers. One key concept 
is that of “de-identified” data. As noted, such data may legally be shared and 
used by researchers without restriction, but the legislative definition for 
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de-identified data varies between provinces: some have no definition, others use a 
reasonable-foreseeability test, and in Alberta a “readily ascertainable” test is used. 
Researchers and custodians will benefit from a consistent national approach to 
what kinds of information should be removed from health data to make them 
de-identifiable under the law. As noted above, the TCPS has stipulated a national 
shared definition of “identifiable” data for use by REBs, so this may increase 
consistency in research review between provinces (CIHR et al., 2014).
Another concept requiring a shared meaning is the necessity for using 
identifiable health information in research. REBs in different provinces may 
come to different conclusions on this issue for the same research, with one 
REB finding that de-identified data will suffice and another REB that it will 
not. A related term common to the use of health information in research is 
whether it is “impracticable” to obtain consents from the subjects. Only Nova 
Scotia specifically defines this term (to mean “a degree of difficulty higher than 
inconvenience or impracticality but lower than impossibility” (GNS, 2010a). If 
REBs in different provinces adopt different views of this term, this may create 
a barrier to interprovincial data sharing. 
Assessment of Canadian Provincial Legislative Models
Each province’s legislation strives in different ways to protect health information 
and promote health research. In some provinces, there are more privacy 
protections than research-facilitation provisions, tipping the balance in favour 
of privacy and a possibly more restrictive view of the kinds of research that are 
appropriate. In others, the research-facilitation provisions are extensive but lack 
enough checks and balances to ensure that privacy values are fully respected. 
In the Panel’s view, the best practices involve the maintenance of strong privacy 
rules in tandem with rules giving an incentive to health researchers without 
unduly interfering with privacy values. 
Another key best practice involves the facilitation of interprovincial data sharing 
with the Newfoundland & Labrador framework the best example. There, the 
legislation provides the same level of protection for health information as 
other provinces, but has superior provisions for promoting public trust in 
health research. It has clear mechanisms and procedures researchers must 
use to seek approval, as well as flexibility in the manner in which research is 
approved. Researchers may seek approval either from the standing provincial 
Health Research Ethics Board or a different REB, possibly one out of province 
that obtains approval from the provincial Health Research Ethics Authority. 
At the same time, researchers must be overseen by the approving REB and must 
report back to it when the project is complete. If other provinces followed this 
model, the prospects for nationally based studies would improve.
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Appendix B  High-Level Description of an Effective  
De-Identification Process
De-identification will result in some loss of accuracy or usefulness of the data, 
but the degree of such loss can be adjusted depending on who uses data in what 
circumstances. If, for example, those receiving the data have a track record of 
using data for research, sign confidentiality contracts, and hold data in secure 
locations, then the degree of de-identification can be less. A well-documented 
risk-based approach to de-identification is the cornerstone of enabling access 
to individual-level data with minimal risk of re-identification while maintaining 
data utility.
A key test for determining whether de-identification has been sufficient is what 
information a “motivated intruder” could garner from the data set that can 
be accessed. The threshold for what this information might be is set at a high 
level. Many attacks that have been made on a database have raised attention 
because a single record has been identified correctly (Barth-Jones, 2012). In 
such instances, there is no monetary reward for a successful attack, but such 
successes undermine public trust that confidentiality is being respected. A key 
metric, consequently, is to lower the probability that the data to which access 
is granted would allow a single record to be associated with an individual.21 
To heighten this threshold, the attacker is assumed to know that a person is 
in the database, which may be obvious in a province-wide database but not for 
more localized databases. Another strategy to control against is that the attacker 
has the data and wishes to identify a person from the data in the real world. 
These risks may pertain to an employee of the data custodian who recognizes 
a neighbour, which is why the number of individuals who come into contact 
with individual data needs to be limited.
Once the content of each record is scrutinized for data fields that could include 
identifiable information, the process of de-identification removes or disguises 
these fields. Those fields that are thus adjusted mean that there is a reduced 
chance of associating the released record with other information that is in the 
public domain or otherwise known by an adversary. Hence, for example, if the 
accessible health records included an address of Sussex Drive, Ottawa and the 
person was born in April 1959, then such information could be associated with 
21 Looking at the risk of re-identifying a single record is a high threshold since those with criminal 
intent would need to obtain many records in order to even hope of garnering a financial return 
for the cost of attempting to undertake a re-identification attack.
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other information in the public domain to find out who the person was and 
then their health data would be identifiable. The de-identification process 
removes or perturbs such identifiers. 
After data custodians de-identify databases appropriately, the released data 
record contains less detailed information so, for example, a record to be released 
may show the patient only as a female born in Ottawa in 1941. Critically, there 
are many other people in the database who also have those characteristics, so 
identifying the record with a particular person is difficult. Hence, the number 
of individuals in the released database with similar characteristics is a central 
concept in determining how much de-identification can be done. If the attacker 
knew that Anne Dupont was born in Ottawa in 1941 and knew that she was 
in the database released, but there are four other people in the released data 
that are also female and born in Ottawa in 1941, then the probability that a 
single file is that of Anne Dupont is one in five, which is likely of limited use 
to the attacker. 
This probability is known as the re-identification risk, and is a key measure that 
can be set based on the risk involved in releasing the data. In the example 
above, releasing data to a researcher with birth years adjusted to indicate the 
person was born between 1940 and 1950 and was a resident of Ontario would 
dramatically increase the number of people with the same characteristics in 
the data, and hence reduce the re-identification risk. 
Sweeney (2000) showed from an analysis of census data that 87% of the U.S. 
population is unique — which makes re-identification easier — through the 
combination of gender, date of birth, and zip code. However, even limited 
de-identification could significantly reduce the possibility of identifying 
individuals. If census data contained only the month and year of birth, the 
percentage of those uniquely identifiable drops to 4.2%. Further replacement 
of the zip code with the county of residence reduces the population that is 
uniquely identifiable to 0.2% (Golle, 2006). 
For Canada, El Emam et al. (2011a) estimated that 98% of the population of 
Montréal is unique based on full postal code, date of birth, and gender. If the 
postal code is limited to three characters and combined with the full date of 
birth, 80% of the population is unique. These results indicate that care needs 
to be exercised when enabling access to data. Given these known risks, if a 
database that included information on full postal code, gender, and birth 
date were shared, a successful re-identification attack would not be surprising. 
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To estimate the probability of a successful re-identification attack, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services conducted a study of data that 
has undergone de-identification following U.S. standards. Using a data set that 
included about 15,000 records, an attack was simulated by manually searching 
through external data to see if any of the records aligned to identify a unique 
person. Two individuals were identified successfully, for a success rate of less than 
0.013%. In weighing the cost of such an effort against the value of success based 
on this probability, there is little incentive to attempt to re-identify individuals 
in data sets that have undergone rigorous de-identification (Lafky, 2009). 
In practice, databases include many fields that could be used to associate files 
with other information that is in the public domain or otherwise known to 
an adversary. Scrutinizing the data for such identifiers involves specialized 
knowledge of whether these fields are replicable, distinguishable, and knowable, 
e.g., whether the information is known to an acquaintance or available in a 
public database such as a voter registry. In turn, the data from these fields can 
be aggregated, masked, or coded, or have some of their values suppressed to 
lessen re-identification risk.
Re-identification risk can also be adjusted based on a wide range of factors such 
as who is to receive the data, how they will handle the data, what incentives they 
have to re-identify someone from the data, and whether there are contracts in 
place to ensure the data recipient is liable for poor data handling. If sensitive 
data (such as the records of individuals with HIV/AIDS infection) are to be 
released as a public database for online access, the data could be de-identified 
such that re-identification risk was extremely low. For less sensitive data to be 
held in a secure facility, the re-identification risk could be set at a higher level 
(El Emam, 2013b).
Many well-publicized successful re-identification “attacks” involved data sets that 
do not meet the latest standards for de-identification; the data sets released 
contained fairly precise identifying characteristics than could be matched 
with other publicly available data, for instance El Emam et al. (2011b) and 
Barth-Jones (2012).
Cavoukian and Castro (2014) conclude that “the risk of re-identification of 
individuals from properly de-identified data is significantly lower than indicated 
by commentators on the primary literature.” As noted for the United Kingdom, 
“[t]here is a perception that too much information is being disclosed inadvertently 
as well as too little being shared deliberately” (DH, 2013).
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Given that there is a risk — albeit low — to privacy from release of data that 
have undergone de-identification, what would be the attendant harm if that 
risk materialized? Placing value on the harm of breaching privacy in general 
is difficult. Although polling and the media have highlighted public concerns 
over a loss of privacy (e.g., Harris/Decima (2011)), researchers monitoring 
the actual behaviour of individuals have found little evidence that the public 
believes there are large costs of lost privacy (Hui & Png, 2006; Tsai et al., 2011). 
The researchers would have expected greater behaviour change if the costs 
of lost privacy were perceived as large. Behavioral changes to protect privacy, 
have, however, been documented (see Section 3.4.2).
Exploring this dichotomy has led researchers to uncover complex ways in 
which people value privacy and in which people differ in their valuation of 
privacy. Valuations differ according to precise situations and the use to which 
information is to be put. For example, individuals are more ready to agree to 
divulge personal information if accessing a website is important to them. In an 
experiment in Singapore, Hui et al. (2007) found that people were willing to 
disclose more personal information in exchange for small monetary incentives.22 
The type of information that is revealed can affect the valuation, as can the 
circumstances in which it is revealed. Research based on experiments reported 
in Wathieu and Friedman (2007) suggested that “consumers are sensitive to 
context and indirect effects, rather than data collection itself.” The authors 
suggest that consumers’ concerns do not centre on pieces of information 
but focus instead on the use to which the data are put. Acquisti et al. (2013) 
concluded that “what people decide their data is worth depends critically on 
the context in which they are asked, and specifically on how the problem is 
framed.” For an example of tangible behavioural changes caused by privacy 
concerns about health information use, see Section 3.4.2.
A recent report examining evidence of harms arising from data linkage and 
prepared for the Nuffield (UK) Council on Bioethics notes a distinction between 
legally recognized harms for which remedies might be available, on the one 
hand, and softer psychological impacts of inappropriate uses of personal data, 
for which no legal recourse is available, and yet which might have considerable 
psychological consequences, on the other. The report concludes:
Given that the abuse of data can result in multiple types of harm 
(financial, legal, physical, social, and psychological), the prevention of 
harmful processing and/or award of damages can only address a small 
aspect of harm caused to individuals. Furthermore, these remedies cannot 
22 Similar findings are reviewed in Acquisti (2010) and Acquisti et al. (2013).
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rectify harm caused to broader public interests such as diminishment of 
public trust in the health services they receive or in the confidentiality 
of relationships e.g. between doctors and patients.
(Laurie et al., 2014)
The implications of this are that “[m]ere compliance to legal rules or official 
guidance might not be enough to secure the social license required for trusted 
and effective data use, linkage, sharing and transfer. A governance system that 
shows awareness of, and responsiveness to, likely impacts of data management 
is more likely to meet this objective” (Laurie et al., 2014).
A further harm from data being used inappropriately is to the data custodians 
themselves, which may face legal liability and damage to their reputation. The 
Ponemon Institute estimated the cost of a data breach to a private company 
by surveying firms on their resulting legal costs, costs to business processes, 
etc. Across nine countries, the average cost was USD$136 per record, reaching 
USD$199 per record in Germany (Ponemon Institute, 2013). Strategies to 
reduce these risks are identified and covered in Chapter 5.
The picture that emerges from analysis of actual individual behaviour is highly 
nuanced and stands in contrast to positions that privacy is to be protected 
at all costs. Although most of the analysis has tried to evaluate the value of 
privacy in general rather than privacy specifically of health and health-related 
data, the same principles would apply. In particular, individuals appear to be 
open to data being used if they believe the use is appropriate and justified. 
For example, well over 90% of respondents to Statistics Canada’s Canadian 
Community Health Survey agree to allow Statistics Canada to link and share 
their personal, individual-level survey data (StatCan, 2004).
The process model in Figure B.1 illustrates the complete steps for de-identifying 
a data set in practice. The assumption of that process is that a data set will be 
shared with a Qualified Investigator, who in this case would be a health researcher.
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Figure B.1 
The Overall De-Identification Process for Re-Identification Risk Assessment  
and De-Identification 
This figure shows the steps involved in de-identifying a data set. It illustrates a general process that 
is intended to be suitable under different use cases. The process would be followed each time a data 
set needs to be de-identified. Each step is described in detail below.
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“Step 1: Classify variables
Determine which fields in the data set are direct identifiers, quasi-identifiers, 
and not of interest from a de-identification perspective. 
Direct identifiers refer to attributes which can uniquely identify an individual, 
either by themselves or in combination with other readily available information. 
For example, there are more than 200 people named “John Smith” in Ontario 
(based on a search in the public telephone directory), therefore the name by 
itself would not be directly identifying, but in combination with the address it 
would be directly identifying information. A telephone number is not directly 
identifying by itself, but in combination with the readily available public 
telephone directory it becomes so. These numbers are identifying because 
there exist public and/or private databases that an adversary can plausibly get 
access to where these numbers can lead directly, and uniquely, to an identity. 
The quasi-identifiers are the background knowledge variables about individuals 
in the disclosed data set that an adversary can use, individually or in combination, 
to probabilistically re-identify a record. If an adversary does not have background 
knowledge of a variable then it cannot be a quasi-identifier. The manner in 
which an adversary can obtain such background knowledge will determine which 
attacks on a data set are plausible. For example, the background knowledge 
may be available because the adversary knows a particular target individual in 
the disclosed data set, an individual in the data set has a visible characteristic 
that is also described in the data set, or the background knowledge exists in a 
public or semi-public registry.
Examples of quasi-identifiers include sex, date of birth or age, language spoken 
at home, ethnic origin, marital status, criminal history, total income, visible 
minority status, profession, event dates (such as admission, discharge, procedure, 
death, specimen collection, visit/encounter), codes (such as diagnosis codes, 
procedure codes, and adverse event codes), country of birth, birth weight, 
and birth plurality.
Step 2: Mask (transform) direct identifiers
Once the direct identifiers have been determined, masking techniques must 
be applied to those direct identifiers. Relevant masking techniques include the 
following: (a) removal of the direct identifiers, and (b) replacement of the 
unique direct identifiers with pseudonyms. Once masking is completed there 
is virtually no risk of re-identification from direct identifiers.
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Step 3: Perform threat modelling
Threat modelling consists of the identification of the plausible adversaries and 
what information they may be able to access.
Step 4: Determine minimal acceptable data utility
It is important to determine in advance the minimal relevant data based on the 
quasi-identifiers. This is essentially an examination of what fields are considered 
to be the most appropriate given the purpose of the use or provision of access to 
the researcher in this case. This step concludes with the imposition of practical 
limits on how some data may be de-identified and the analyses that may need 
to be performed later on. For a non-public data set a minimal requirement 
may be to allow the replication of another published study.
Step 5: Determine re-identification risk threshold
What constitutes acceptable risk? As an outcome of the process used to define 
the threshold, the security and privacy controls that need to be imposed on 
the Qualified Investigator, if any, are defined. 
Step 6: Import (sample) data from the source database 
Importing the data from the source database may be a simple or complex 
exercise, depending on the data model of the source data set. This step is 
included explicitly in the process because it can consume significant resources 
and must be accounted for in any planning of de-identification.
Step 7: Evaluate actual re-identification risk
The actual risk is computed from the data set using the appropriate measure 
of re-identification probability (e.g., maximum and average risk). A number 
of parameters need to be set to compute risk, such as the sampling fraction.
Step 8: Compare the actual risk with the threshold
Compare the actual risk with the threshold determined in Step 5.
Step 9: Set parameters and apply data transformations
If the measured risk is higher than the threshold then further de-identification 
and masking methods are applied to the data such as generalization, suppression, 
randomization, and sub-sampling.
Sometimes a solution cannot be found within the specified parameters, and 
it is necessary to go back and reset the parameters. It may also be necessary to 
modify the threshold and adjust some of the assumptions behind the original 
risk assessment. Alternatively, some of the assumptions about acceptable data 
utility may need to be renegotiated with the Qualified Investigator.
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Step 10: Perform diagnostics on the solution
If the measured risk is lower than the threshold then diagnostics should be 
performed on the solution. Diagnostics may be objective or subjective. 
An objective diagnostic would evaluate the sensitivity of the de-identification 
solution to violations of assumptions that were made. For example, an assumption 
may be that an adversary might know a secondary diagnosis of a participant, 
or if there is uncertainty about the sampling fraction of the data set then 
a sensitivity to that value can be performed. A subjective diagnostic would 
determine whether the utility of the data is sufficiently high for the intended 
purposes of the use or disclosure.
If the diagnostics are satisfactory, then the de-identified data are exported 
and a report documenting the de-identification, as well as the conditions 
accompanying the de-identification, is produced. On the other hand, if the 
diagnostics are not satisfactory, the re-identification parameters may need 
to be modified, the risk threshold may have to be adjusted, and the original 
assumptions about minimal, acceptable utility renegotiated with the data user.
If the data custodian is providing access to multiple de-identifications of the 
same data set to different Qualified Investigators, then there is a risk of an 
adversary trying to link these different data sets to get a more detailed data set. 
There are two ways for the data custodian to manage this risk. First, the data 
sharing agreement should prohibit linking data sets without permission. Second, 
the data custodian can pre-emptively compute the risk of re-identification if 
different versions of the data set are linked and apply further perturbations 
to the data accordingly.
Step 11: Export transformed data to external data set
Exporting the de-identified data to the destination database may be a simple or 
complex exercise, depending on the data model of the destination database. 
This step is included explicitly in the process because it can consume significant 
resources and must be accounted for in any planning of de-identification.
Step 12: Produce report documenting process and results
At the end of the de-identification process, a report documenting the process 
and results is produced and provided to the data custodian.” 
(El Emam, 2013b)
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Assessment of the Evidence (2007)
 • The State of Science and Technology in Canada (2006)
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• Energy Use and Climate Change: A Synthesis of the Latest Evidence
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